Why Has China's Military Been Challenging One-Man Rule for Nearly Two Years?

In the past two programs, I examined the Fifth Plenum's communique and full resolution in detail. Both of those two documents placed great emphasis on democratic centralism and collective decision-making. And in Tuesday's program, I even explained how these principles were closely associated with the political legacy of Hu Jintao. You can check out that program. Thank But here's something I didn't fully explore, and I didn't tell you, and I think it's very, very interesting. The revival of these Hu Jintao era governing principles didn't begin at the fifth plenum. Similar ideas, I should say the same ideas, you. had already been appearing in the PLA's own newspaper. And not just once or twice, the message appeared repeatedly over nearly two years. So, yes, it was the PLA that revived the Hu Jintao era governing principles. And this has been going on for two years. It began attracting attention in December 2024, when Zhang Youxia was still a powerful figure in the Central Military Commission. And what happened next makes the story even more interesting. So let's go back to December 2024. Something unusual was happening inside the PLA. On November 28th, if you still remember, Admiral Miao Hua, a powerful member handling personnel and political work for Xi Jinping in the military, was officially suspended. Then 11 days later, on December the 9th, the PLA Daily published an article titled, Take the Lead in Upholding Collective Leadership. Now remember, the PLA Daily isn't an independent newspaper. It's the official newspaper of the Central Military Commission. So when it discusses how the military should be governed, its wording deserves particular attention. And this article contains some remarkable language. It declared that collective leadership was one of the party's highest principles. It criticized military leaders who made major decisions on their own, effectively turning party committees into rubber stamps. And then just two days later, on December the 11th, the newspaper published another article It's called Take the Lead in Promoting Intra-Party Democracy. Listen to the word, democracy. This one went even further. It declared that a party secretary may be the leader of a committee, but must never become its sole master. But here's what's particularly interesting. These weren't isolated articles. The message continued. In November 30th, 2025, the PLA Daily published an article titled, An Area of Responsibility is Not a Personal Fiefdom. It warned against officials who monopolized authority and treated their areas of responsibility like private kingdoms. In December, the newspaper continued emphasizing democratic centralism and collective leadership, and the message didn't stop there. In January this year, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhengli were taken down, and they were two of China's most senior military commanders. If the PLA Daily's earlier emphasis on collective leadership had been approved by Zhang Youxia or authorized by Zhang Youxia or connected to Zhang Youxia, you might have expected the message to disappear after his downfall. But that's not what happened. On August the 16th, the newspaper published another fascinating article, and the article essentially presented the dangers of unchecked personal authority as a lesson from the communist military history. Then, just one week before the 5th plenum, on October the 19th, the PLA Daily published another one, and this one is even more clear. The message is clearer. The article condemned officials who were arrogant, self-important, arbitrary in their decisions, and unwilling to tolerate criticism. It also called for protecting people who dare to express different opinions. In other words, the PLA Daily was emphasizing something absolutely essential to effective military leadership, that is, the ability to challenge a bad decision before it becomes a military disaster. None of the articles named Xi Jinping, and they drew on established Communist Party principles, but consider the messages conveyed right before the plenum. And both articles, I'm talking about the August one and then the October one, both appeared after Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhengli had been placed under investigation or taken down. Of course, I don't have direct evidence that Zhang Youxia was actually behind those articles, but people generally attributed his leadership in the military at the time who encouraged the publishing of those articles. OK, so regardless which faction pushed those, which faction in the military pushed those articles forward, here's what we know. Zhang Youxia was removed, yet the message about collective decision-making did not disappear. In fact, it continued even after his formal expulsion from the party. So was this really Zhang Youxia's personal political position? Or had these ideas, meaning collective decision and democratic centralism, Ha, ha. had these ideas taken root more broadly within the military establishment? That's an important question. But either way, it doesn't help Xi Jinping's political standing. And what happened at the Fifth Plenum makes it even more interesting. So let me show you how the Fifth Plenum remarkably echoed the PLA's articles. So on October the 29th, the Fifth Plenum adopted a major resolution on comprehensive party governance and discipline. When the full text was released on November 1st, it contained language remarkably similar to what the PLA Daily had been emphasizing for nearly two years. Now, let's be clear. The Fifth Plenum resolution wasn't a military document. It applied to the Communist Party as a whole. But these similarities do make people pay attention because the PLA, we can't say that the PLA dictated the contents of the resolution, but the fact that the PLA publication or the PLA Daily was the first state media that used these languages, that called for these political frameworks to be put in place. So if you look at the sequence, in December 2024, the PLA Daily emphasized collective leadership. Throughout 2025 and 2026, that message continued. In August 2026, after Zhang Yuxia was taken down, the PLA Daily warned about a disastrous... ...or disastrous consequences of arbitrary individual decision-making. And then in October, it condemned the suppression of dissent and encouraged officials to challenge mistakes. Then at the Fifth Plenum, similar principles appeared prominently in the party's most important documents. So is that a coincidence? All right, well, that will bring us to the central mystery of today's program. Xi Jinping still holds China's highest military position, but does he still exercise effective control over the PLA? That's the million-dollar question. And I think we need to examine three things to answer that question. First, personnel. Who controls the people who command the military? Remember, Xi Jinping spent 14 years restructuring the PLA and promoting generals he believed would be loyal to him. But look at the results. He Weidong, Miao Hua, Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhengli, and numerous other senior commanders have been removed. And the Central Military Commission... Originally, composed of seven members, has been reduced to just two, including Xi Jinping himself. If Xi Jinping is still firmly in control, why has he allowed the military's highest leadership body to become so depleted without rebuilding it? If he personally orchestrated all the purges, like many top experts believe, why hasn't he appointed a new generation of trusted commanders? So the prolonged vacancies on such a large scale raise serious questions about what's really happening inside the military leadership. So that's our criteria number one, personnel. Number two, command. Can Xi Jinping still issue orders and expect them to be carried out? This is even more important than personnel appointments. Now, the removal of his three successive military gatekeepers has seriously challenged his real command. Who coordinates major decisions? Who controls the flow of information? Who resolves disagreements among senior commanders? And who ensures that orders from the CMC are carried out? Remember, holding the title of military chairman and exercising effective military command are not necessarily the same thing. Which brings us to the third test. That's official party documents and the political language they use. This may be the most revealing of all. I don't think any major Western analysts have paid attention to this, but this is a major revelation. Okay, so remember that in 2017, at the 19th Party Congress, two very important military formulations were incorporated into the Communist Party constitution. One was Xi Jinping's thought on strengthening the military, In Chinese, it's called Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Army. The other was Central Military Commission Chairman Responsibility System, the Chairman Responsibility System of the Central Military Commission. These weren't ordinary political slogans. They became part of the party's formal constitutional framework. I mean, basically, one is Xi Jinping's military thought. And the other is saying Xi Jinping, the chairman, is in charge of the CMC. That's what the two things, the two formulations essentially say. And they became part of the party's formal constitutional framework. And for years, they were repeatedly invoked in official documents or state media to reinforce Xi Jinping's leadership over the armed forces. But something unusual happened at the Fifth Plenum. Neither formulation appeared in the official communique, and neither appeared in the full resolution released three days later, not once. The communique is shorter, but the full resolution was long, it was 17,000 words. And instead, the resolution devoted... considerable attention to democratic centralism, collective leadership, all these jargons associated with Hu Jintao. I want to make it clear, neither military doctrine has been removed from the party constitution. Both remain formally enforced, but their omission from these two important documents issued from the Fifth Plenum is worth examining. After all, these formulations are closely associated with Xi Jinping's military authority. And now, at a time when the military leadership is undergoing extraordinary upheaval, both formulations are absent from the party's two most important and authoritative documents. What does that tell us? If Xi Jinping is still firmly in command, why are these formulations missing from both documents? And why does this coincide with the renewed emphasis on Hu Jintao's legacy? So I find it increasingly difficult to assume that Xi Jinping's actual military power is as secure as his official titles suggest. Thank you so much for watching. If you're new here, please hit subscribe. Don't forget to give my video a like. If you want me to answer your questions directly, please join my live every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday at 9 p.m. Eastern Time. I'd love to chat with you there.