Beijing in Crisis | Is Xi’s Secret Order Triggering a Power Showdown?

The final war is closer than ever. Rumors are exploding. Was she arrested? One man's fate may decide everything. Is Zhang Yuxia still alive? China just endured its most uneasy new year in decades. Disasters everywhere. Power fractures widening. Is there still a narrow path forward for China? Or are we standing at the edge of total darkness? Welcome back to Final War with Catherine Hu. The Lunar New Year has just passed, but the tension inside Beijing's highest political circles is already impossible to conceal. In just one week, early March 2026, the two sessions will convene, and those meetings may determine Xi's political fate. This is no longer routine internal maneuvering. It is shaping up to be a decisive confrontation between Xi's faction and the Party elders, as well as the reform-oriented camp that once defined China's political trajectory. And the outcome of that confrontation may ultimately hinge on one critical variable. The fate of General Zhang Yuxia. As February draws to a close, Beijing feels unusually tense. Beneath the outward calm, the balance within this political deadlock appears to be shifting. This is the eve of the final war. And the pressure is almost suffocating. Over the past few days, an explosive rumor began circulating across overseas Chinese language media. It claims that General Li Xiaoming, commander of the PLA ground force, mobilized troops to arrest Xi, along with his wife and daughter. The claim spread rapidly. But is there any realistic basis for it? Who exactly is General Li Xiaoming? He is a career ground force officer and has long been regarded as part of Zhang Yuxia's camp. He previously served as commander of the Northern Theater Command, one of the PLA's most strategically important regions. Under the current circumstances, does he truly have the capacity to move into Beijing and carry out an arrest? Since the January 20 Zhang Yuxia incident, Xi has remained in Beijing under the tight protection of the Central Guard Bureau. The Bureau alone commands more than 10,000 personnel. On top of that, Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong controls tens of thousands of police forces, along with armed units operating quietly in the shadows. These are not forces that can be easily confronted. In principle, any arrest would require General Li to move PLA troops into Beijing. But to deploy troops into the capital, he would need authorization. With Zhang Yuxia and General Liu Zhenli no longer in place, that authorization would have to come from those now seen as holding real control over the military, Elder Hu Jintao and General Liu Yuan. Without their approval, General Li, as commander of the ground force, cannot independently order troops into Beijing. Complicating matters further, the capital's garrison forces are, at least on the surface, under partial control of Chen Yuan, a sheer-lined figure from the People's Armed Police System. Any unilateral military move could face severe resistance and risk becoming the spark for internal war. In fact, if the military were to make a move, it would not require a nationwide mobilization. Deploying the 82nd Group Army, the former 38th Army, would be enough. The 38th Army is stationed in Baoding City. Military vehicles could reach Beijing in under three hours. Tanks and armored units would take slightly longer, but five hours would still be sufficient. It is the PLA's strongest formation, equipped with the most advanced weapons. By contrast, the Central Guard Bureau and the Ministry of Public Security are limited to light weaponry. If the 38th Army enters Beijing, it would hold an overwhelming advantage. But whether to take that step remains in Hu Jintao's hands. And judging from Beijing's outward calm, no decisive military action has been initiated. So does that mean that as long as Hu Jintao and General Liu Yuan still control the military, Xi has no path to reverse the situation? It would be unwise to be that optimistic. As the saying goes, the longer the night, the more can happen. The widely suspected assassination of Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli has already sounded an alarm for the military, the elders, and the reform camp alike. And a recent internal commendation event held by Xi makes the situation even more unsettling. On February 23rd, Du Wen, a former Inner Mongolian official now living in Europe, revealed new information on his self-media program. According to him, the Central Military Commission recently issued a formal commendation order praising several units of the PLA's cyber force, including a certain brigade and regiment, for what it called major successes in handling the Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli case through external online operations. It is said that the commendation was personally signed by Xi, and that multiple units and individuals were awarded first-class and second-class merits, both collective and individual. Du Wen further stated that, regarding what he described as the battle over narrative control in the Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli case, the situation runs far deeper than it appears. According to his account, the operation was personally planned by Xi, with orders issued directly from him. At this point, we cannot independently verify the authenticity of these claims. However, rumours surrounding whether Zhang Yuxia is still alive and the circumstances of his detention have continued to circulate widely online. Different versions describe where he was taken, where he is being held, and even details about his physical condition. So the question becomes, why did Xi personally commend the cyber force, rather than those who allegedly carried out the actual detention? First, this case itself is highly unusual. If you've been following the Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli case closely, you've probably noticed one unusual detail. This case is highly irregular, almost completely out of pattern. The investigation and the release of information have been driven entirely by the military, while party and government organs at every level have remained silent. Next, let's walk through the timeline. Around January 20th, mysterious overseas self-media accounts began releasing information. On January 24th, the Ministry of National Defence held a high-profile press conference announcing an investigation. Then the PLA Daily ran repeated commentaries criticising the two men. Soon after, major international outlets, such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, began publishing exclusive reports. Throughout this entire sequence, Xi's faction projected strong confidence, maintaining control over the narrative at every step. Isn't this exactly what Xi's camp has been doing? Using information asymmetry, feeding the story on their own terms, controlling the media tempo and gradually steering a public storm toward a managed calmer landing, and in the process, successfully framing Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli as failed figures, defectors, traitors, losers, while portraying Xi as the cold strategist, the hardline strongman still in command? And if you look at the overall effect, domestically and internationally, the public focus on Xi having lost power inside the party and the military was largely neutralised at the narrative level, allowing Xi to temporarily steady the international audience. This new playbook, this entire sequence of moves, points straight to a new PLA branch, the PLA Cyber Force. In fact, the CCP's top build priority today isn't the rocket force, and it isn't the army, navy or air force, it's the cyber force. In recent years, its manpower and equipment have been expanding at geometric speed with no clear ceiling. According to internal party language, the cyber force coordinated efforts at home and abroad, planned in advance, took proactive action, and combined forward operations with rear coordination to seize the initiative in this critical battle, effectively striking its opponents while safeguarding Chairman Xi's authority. That reportedly is why Xi personally oversaw this round of commendations. If that is the case, then what lies behind the Zhang Yuxia episode is not simply an investigation, it is a media war, an information war, even a cognitive war. And that raises a deeper question. If so many online narratives insist that Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli are still alive, should we perhaps read those claims in reverse to get closer to the truth? What are the latest developments in the mystery surrounding Zhang Yuxia's fate? In recent days, rumours surrounding Zhang Yuxia have once again intensified overseas, spreading through multiple channels with clear signs of coordinated narrative shaping. The central focus remains the same, is Zhang Yuxia alive or dead? On February 19th, the Wall Street Journal citing individuals described as close to the Chinese government's decision-making circle reported, It was a bitterly cold, overcast winter day when China's senior-most general left for a meeting with hundreds of high-ranking Communist Party officials, including their leader, Xi Jinping. General Zhang Yuxia never made it. Security personnel sent by Xi intercepted Zhang en route to the gathering at the Central Party School in Beijing, said people close to Chinese government decision-making. Securing the general in an undisclosed location, officers also raided Zhang's home and detained his son, a military researcher, the people said. On February 22nd, political commentator Lao Deng claimed on his self-media program that, according to what he described as an urgent disclosure from a core military insider, Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli attended the opening session of a Central Party School seminar on January 20th, 2026. As soon as they entered the venue, they were taken away by personnel from the Ministry of Public Security's Special Operations Unit and transported directly to an interrogation facility under the ministry. According to that account, they were reportedly put to death late that same night, with the entire process conducted in complete secrecy. The source further alleged that there were no formal judgment documents and no record of the transfer of remains. Lao Deng went on to say that, based on information he had received, Zhang Yuxia's son, Zhang Xin, recently sent a letter to the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission. In the letter, he expressed deep grief and said he suspected that his father had died while being held at a Ministry of Public Security interrogation facility. On February 23rd, Canada-based activist Xiang Xue posted that she had received an urgent phone call from an source who told her that no one would be able to see Zhang Yuxia again because he was no longer alive. Xiang Xue pressed for details. Was it abuse, suicide, or something else? The caller replied that the exact circumstances were still unclear. So far, he said, they had received only a brief notice and would need to wait a couple more days to see whether further information emerged. We can see that although these disclosures differ in detail, they share one common conclusion. Most of them point to the belief that Zhang Yuxia is no longer alive. After the Zhang Yuxia incident first broke, I released two videos analyzing the possibility that he had already died and that both Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli were targeted in a coordinated operation allegedly arranged through channels linked to Wang Xiaohong. At this point, more and more accounts appear to be reinforcing that assessment. Zhang Yuxia's life or death directly shapes Xi's next move. If Zhang is still alive, it works in Xi's favor. He could proceed with formally convicting him first and completing the required procedures afterward. But if Zhang was reportedly assassinated, Xi would face serious trouble. In that case, the decisive battle over his political future would be right in front of him. General Zhang Yuxia is a second-generation communist elite, a princeling, and a leading figure among the military's red aristocracy, widely seen as a representative of the party's conservative bloc. Removing Zhang would amount to tearing up the implicit understanding between Xi and the broader princeling network and breaking a long-standing internal norm dating back to the Deng Xiaoping era that factional struggles within the party would not cross into lethal territory. If Xi did in fact eliminate Zhang, it would signal an open rupture with the entire red aristocracy. He would find himself standing alone against dozens of powerful political families, families whose wealth rivals that of nations. That may well have been a consequence he did not fully anticipate. Zhang Yuxia was not only a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission but also a member of the Politburo, effectively treated as a national-level leader. To subject someone of that rank to capital punishment, allegedly without formal charges or due process, would inevitably send shockwaves through the entire senior party elite. If someone of Zhang's stature can be removed without clarity, then any official could face the same fate. Who could claim to be safe? No one. In such a climate, every level of the state apparatus would feel the loss of security. From this perspective, targeting Zhang could prove to be the gravest miscalculation imaginable. At this point, the divided leadership in Beijing may no longer have a third path available. This moment marks the first major turning point since the Zhang Yuxia incident. The final confrontation is drawing near. And what about the other side of this struggle? The decision-making coordination body represented by Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Liu Yuan, how are they positioning themselves? Do they believe they hold the advantage? At this stage, a single order from Hu Jintao would allow General Li Xiaoming to move ground force units into Beijing. What has held that back is Hu's hesitation to make a final decision. The key difference between Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, compared with figures like Mao, Deng, or Xi, is this. Hu and Wen have never been willing to resort casually to lethal measures. They have long been reluctant to deploy PLA forces into the capital, fearing that it could trigger large-scale internal conflict and heavy casualties. Their preliminary assessments suggest that if troops were to enter Beijing, the number of deaths and injuries could reach at least into the thousands. For that reason, they have been weighing the situation carefully, hoping to resolve the standoff peacefully, using pressure to push Xi's camp toward a voluntary retreat. Their caution in using force and their concern for human life can be seen as strengths, but that restraint is also a double-edged sword. In fact, many voices overseas believe it is no longer possible to rely on Xi's assurances, and that further delay carries its own risks. In their view, a clear decision must be made soon. The window for hesitation is closing. At this point, it may not be clear until the two sessions in March whether Xi's camp prevails, or whether the Central Party decision-making and coordination body emerges on top. If Xi's faction ultimately consolidates control, he would likely continue in office, and China could move further toward a far more closed and centralized system. For many ordinary citizens, the space for choice could narrow dramatically. And if Xi were to regain full control of the military, he would purge the entire group of recently elevated by Zhang Yuxia and Hu Jintao. In such a turbulent and uncertain climate, could people in China truly have celebrated the New Year in peace? This may well have been the least festive Lunar New Year in a century. Just as the Lunar New Year began, a massive sandstorm swept across the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. Yellow dust filled the sky, blotting out the sun. In Beijing, wind speeds reached force 14 at their peak. It was the largest and most intense sandstorm of 2026 so far, leaving more than 130 cities under severe pollution alerts. Videos circulating online show scenes from across the country. Howling winds, walls of yellow dust, skies turned dark. Visibility dropped to nearly zero. People struggled to stay on their feet. Drivers reported being unable to see anything ahead. Tourist sites were reduced to scenes of chaos. Fires moved in step with the sandstorms. During the New Year period, blazes erupted across the country. Beijing as well as the provinces of Hebei, Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, and Yunnan, nearly at the same time. Wildfires flared in multiple regions, spreading rapidly. In some places, entire villages and even whole mountains were reduced to ash. Highways were closed as thick smoke from the fires engulfed the roads. At 11am on February 23rd, a truck caught fire inside a tunnel along the G5 Beijing to Kunming Expressway. Witnesses said they heard three loud blasts and felt the tunnel shake noticeably. The incident forced more than a thousand people to abandon their vehicles and evacuate. In Chinese tradition, natural disasters have long been seen as warnings from heaven. Yet, during what should have been the most joyful holiday of the year, the entire country was battered by fire and sandstorms. Dust filled the cities. Thick haze covered the sky. The atmosphere felt almost apocalyptic, a stark and tragic reflection of the country's current state. To many, these scenes carry a deeper symbolism, a sense that the existing political order has entered its twilight. Here is Xinzhou City, in Shanxi province. In strong winds, a flagpole flying the five-star red flag was blown to the ground, snapping in the process. The scene was uploaded to Douyin, Chinese TikTok, where online comments quickly followed. Some wrote, heaven's will cannot be defied. Others said, just like that red flag, the regime will fall. Still others commented, at the end of a dynasty, strange signs appear in the sky. And there were voices declaring, a free and democratic China is coming, and this shows their time is running out. The red flag, long seen as a symbol of force, was falling. And the firewall, often viewed as a symbol of censorship, may soon face its own breach. This is a project that goes far beyond what many expected. The U.S. State Department has launched a direct VPN initiative, Freedom.gov, to help people in countries such as China and Iran bypass online restrictions and access the open internet. The program is being led by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and is expected to go live in the coming weeks. Once the news broke, many Chinese communities, both inside and outside the country, reacted with strong interest. Freedom.gov is widely seen as a powerful tool for breaking through China's internet firewall. If fully operational, the platform could provide hundreds of millions of Chinese internet users with stable and secure access to the global web. On the Freedom.gov homepage, a white horse gallops across the globe beneath a stark message. Information is power. Reclaim your human right to free expression. Get ready. Unlike previous efforts that funded non-governmental groups to develop circumvention tools, this time the U.S. government is directly involved. For advocates of internet freedom, it marks a historic shift. What was once described as a kind of grassroots digital guerrilla effort is now being framed as a state-led initiative. Many see it as the most direct and forceful challenge yet to what Beijing has built as a digital iron curtain. Imagine what it would mean if, almost overnight, a flood of previously restricted information poured into mainland China. If Freedom.gov were widely adopted, hundreds of millions of Chinese internet users could gain direct access to censored historical accounts, reports about officials' overseas assets, documented human rights cases, and uncensored voices from the international community. Such an information shock could have a profound psychological impact on a society long accustomed to tightly filtered narratives. If the earlier trade war and chip restrictions were aimed at weakening the CCP's limbs, then Freedom.gov is aimed at its brain. Of course, the fall of any political system involves many factors. Economic strain, military dynamics, internal power shifts. It would not collapse overnight because of a single platform. But the firewall remains one of its most vulnerable pressure points. When a ladder is placed against a wall that has confined more than a billion people for two decades, the question is no longer whether information will flow but whether the wall itself can withstand it. If it cannot, the consequences will go far beyond cyberspace. It will mark the eve of a decisive confrontation. March 2026 is approaching. Beijing will answer. Get the real story behind the CCP's shifting power games and see where US-China relations are headed next. 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