Cuba’s Economy Dependant on Political Change: Professor

Cuba is opening its doors to exiles and nationals living abroad, including Cuban Americans, to invest in the country. This, as Havana is negotiating with the Trump administration. Joining me now to discuss is Evan Ellis. He's a research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Professor, thank you so much for joining us here today. I want to get right into it. Cuba has recently announced that Cuban exiles can invest in the country. Here's Secretary of State Marco Rubio commenting on that recent development. Professor, what changes would Cuba need to make to improve relations with the U.S. and conditions for its people? Well, I think certainly President Trump and Secretary Rubio will decide what's appropriate in the negotiations. But in general, Secretary Rubio has a good point. Of course, Cuba wants to attract more investment, especially from the diaspora abroad. But until you change the structure in which the government controls, confiscates most of the income, doesn't allow substantial private property, doesn't allow your legal juridical security, and doesn't change the repressive political system that it has, it's going to be very difficult to get a functioning economy or to be able to turn the economy around, let alone attract people back who are not fearing for their freedom and feel safe expressing themselves and participating politically in the future of the island. All right, I want to dive into that a bit more. Let's go back to that recent announcement regarding investment from Cuban exiles. Cuba's basically allowing people who have fled the country to invest and conduct business in the country. As a professor in the humanities, do you feel like this could be similar to the perestroika, where the Soviet Union implemented market reforms before their collapse, and then it's a sign of this communist regime's impending collapse? Well, it's a matter of intention. Certainly, Cuba, as Secretary Rubio has indicated, is on its last legs. It's not just because of U.S. sanctions. It's also because of the structure of their industry and government control and the corruption and inefficiency their infrastructure is collapsing. And so, like the Soviet Union during the days of Mikhail Gorbachev, I think there's a need to do things dramatically different. Whereas in the Soviet Union, however, the system themselves, the political leaders, recognize that they are at the end. It's not yet clear whether Miguel Diaz-Canel and the Cuban leadership currently recognizes that. So, of course, as Secretary Rubio and the Trump administration are in talks with the grandson of Raul Castro, Raulcito, and it remains to be seen whether that could lead to some type of change. But at the end of the day, the parallel that you alluded to is correct, that economically and politically, I think that the regime can't sustain the path that it's on. But the question is, is the regime itself ready to do the type of transition that you saw allowed the Soviet Union to effectively collapse from within once that began to happen? Now, President Trump was quick to highlight the improvement in relations with Venezuela as Marco Rubio was discussing Cuba. Here's a clip. The relationship we have with Venezuela has been, I think you could almost say, incredible. It's been really good. It's been good for Venezuela and it's been good for us. Professor, what do you make of the parallel, if there is any, between Venezuela and Cuba? Could they follow a similar path? There's a loose parallel in two ways. Number one, obviously, when the U.S. was able to capture Nicolas Maduro, an illegitimate leader, and bring him to justice, that left essentially his number two in the criminal hierarchy, Dulce Rodriguez, willing to essentially cut a deal to save herself and her brother Jorge and the Chavistas in power. And that allowed the U.S. to do certain things that it wanted, but we're still in a delicate dance there. So in the same way, it's possible that Raul Sito, in talking with the United States, could put forth a deal in which perhaps Miguel Diaz-Canal, as President Trump has indicated, could be cast aside for some type of superficial going on to economic policies that allow U.S. investment in without actually giving up complete control of the Communist Party. Having said that, however, the big difference is that whereas broadly the regime in Venezuela was seen as illegitimate and Nicolas Maduro was seen as not the legitimate president, in Cuba there has been decades and decades of indoctrination of the Communist Party. And so it's not clear that until the party itself relinquishes hold that the U.S. is going to have an easy go in kind of directing how things occur and how things play out in Havana. Now, on China's efforts to influence Latin America, how much of a strategic loss would Cuba's realignment be for China? In certain ways, it would be a symbolic loss, but also an important strategic loss in military terms. Specifically, you have at least four, if not more, electronic intelligence listening posts that have been acknowledged operated by China, on top of the ones that were previously operated during the Cold War in places like Bejucal by the Soviet Union. That and also what China's ability to have military access and even train troops and be able to do operations from Cuba that could put at risk U.S. deployment flows through the Caribbean, perhaps in times of war at the Indo-Pacific. And so taking that away from China would be potentially significant. Also, Cuba's influence in essentially undercutting the U.S. agenda elsewhere in the region, especially the Caribbean, but elsewhere in the Americas would be significant for China. Although in economic terms, China wouldn't be losing a whole lot with Cuba in trading terms, certainly not in resource terms. Cuba has a little bit of a sugar, a little bit of nickel, but it would really be about China's loss of strategic access in time of war in the Indo-Pacific for the PRC. And they've been investing heavily. We had Secretary Rubio making an interesting point in describing the Cuban economy as one that survived thanks to the Soviet and Venezuelan subsidies. How has China helped prop up the Cuban regime? Interestingly, China has been very reluctant to do much in Cuba, largely because China couldn't make money in Cuba. And so it's companies stayed away. They have done some loan-based programs. They have, probably mostly in the electricity sector, helped make things a little bit better. They've deployed a number of different solar facilities. But again, that only accounts now for maybe 4 or 5 percent of Cuban electricity generation. They've provided some cars. They've provided a very small amount of aid. But in comparison to what China's done in terms of the information infrastructure and buying massive amounts of, for example, Venezuelan oil and mining goods, what China has done to help Cuba is relatively minuscule by comparison to, for example, how Cuba has been able to survive taking advantage of Venezuelan oil, Russian oil, and to a certain degree, Mexican oil, especially under the Morena government that plowed the Ushain bomb previously. Well, Professor Ellis, thank you very much for sharing your time and insights with us today. Really appreciate it.