Who Took Down Ma Xingrui and Why?

Ma Xingrui. He is now, like I said, the fourth Politburo member to fall under Xi Jinping, and the third in just the last 12 months. Actually, I would say in the last six months, because He Weidong was the first that fell, and his announcement came in October, followed by Zhang Youxia in January, and now Ma Xingrui. So in the past six months, three had fallen. So the Politburo itself now has only 21 members left. And some people are already calling this Xi Jinping's Waterloo moment. To understand why this matters, or why it's called his Waterloo moment, you have to understand who this guy is, who Ma Xingrui is. This is someone deeply embedded in Xi's inner circle, and even his family. Now, he is closely tied to Xi Jinping's wife, Peng Liyuan, not just personally, but politically. And reportedly, they're connected through shared networks of financial interests. And they're from the same city in Shandong, Shandong Yuncheng. And there are even rumours or claims saying that, although unconfirmed, that they may be distant relatives or distant cousins. Now, in 2013, Peng Liyuan became China's first lady. And that same year, Ma Xingrui's political rise began. As soon as Xi Jinping took power, Ma transitioned from General Manager of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation to Vice Minister of Industry and Information Technology. And from there, his career entered what can be called a turbo mode. In the same year, just after six months, after a quick six-month stint in the ministry, he was sent to Guangdong as Deputy Party Secretary of the province. Less than two years later, he became Party Secretary of Shenzhen, one of the most affluent cities of China. And then in 2016, he was promoted to Governor of Guangdong. After one full term, he was elevated again, becoming Party Secretary of Xinjiang in December 2021. And in 2022, he entered the Politburo, from a technical post to the very top tier of political power in under 10 years, in just nine years. That's not just rare, it's exceptional. For most officials, reaching the Politburo takes 15 to 20 years of accumulation. He did it in less than half that time. All of that points to one conclusion. Ma Xingrui wasn't just promoted, he was selected from the very beginning. He was a seed candidate, chosen early, backed from the top, and placed on a fast track beginning in 2013. And then there's one more layer that makes him more important. Now, after that brief stint in Beijing in the Ministry of Information, whatever, Industry and Information Technology, he was sent to Guangdong and then Shenzhen. That matters because Guangdong, especially Shenzhen, is deeply tied to the Xi family. After Cultural Revolution, Xi Jinping's father, Xi Zhongxin, rebuilt his political career there. And then even after retirement or political exile, he stayed in Shenzhen for many years. After he died, Xi Jinping's mother, Qi Xin, continued to live in there. And members of the Xi family, his sister, Qi Qiaoqiao, maintained significant ties and assets in Shenzhen and Guangdong, which means after Xi Jinping came to power, whoever controlled Guangdong and Shenzhen was not just governing a province or a city. They were in effect looking after the family. That role had to go to someone trusted completely. And in that context, Ma Xingrui's position becomes even more revealing. If nothing had gone wrong, many believe that he was on track to enter the Politburo Standing Committee at the next party Congress in 2027. So now the question is, why would Xi Jinping take down someone like him? The answer may lie not in what was said, but in what wasn't. Let's talk about the official announcement of Ma Xingrui. The announcement is very short. There's a saying about CCP's official statements. The shorter it is, the more serious. The longer it is, the less serious. Ma's announcement contains, not only is short, but also contains two unusual omissions. First, he was not referred to as a comrade. Second, the statement did not specify who made the decision. The standard phrase, approved by the CCP Central Committee or approved by the top leadership, was missing. By comparison, when former Politburo members like Bo Xilai and Sun Zhengcai were removed, this was the first Politburo member that Xi Jinping took down during his term. That was in 2017. So when Sun Zhengcai was removed, and when Hu Jintao took down Bo Xilai, they were still called comrade. And the statement clearly said the decision came from the central leadership. And think about that. Bo Xilai was accused of plotting at the highest level against Xi Jinping. Because Xi Jinping was the crown prince, and Bo Xilai was plotting with Jiang Zemin's faction and trying to overthrow Xi Jinping a year into his leadership. And Sun Zhengcai was taken down by Xi Jinping because he was widely seen as a potential successor. So both of these two men were Xi Jinping's political rivals. And yet, even in those cases, the procedure was clearly stated. So here's the question. If Ma Xinrui's case is even more serious, why is the procedure less clear? And according to CCP's own rules, removing a Politburo member must be approved by the Politburo. So why didn't the announcement say so? Because that raises a much bigger possibility. Well, what if the decision didn't come from Xi Jinping or the Politburo at all? And there's another detail, one that makes this case even more unusual. In previous cases, officials like Bo Xilai and Sun Zhengcai, the announcement said that they were investigated for disciplinary violations. But in Ma Xinrui's case, the wording is different. This time, it's disciplinary and legal violations. That's a higher level of severity. It means Ma's conduct doesn't just violate disciplinary rules, but was illegal. So now you have a contradiction. If the case is more serious, why is the procedure less clear? That leads to a possibility we cannot ignore. What if the decision didn't come from Xi's central leadership at all? What if it came from somewhere else? Earlier, I mentioned that the CCP leadership is not as unified as it appears. And this is where it matters. Because what we may be looking at is not one center of power, but two. One is Xi Jinping's leadership. The other is an alternative center tied to party elders and associated with the internal coordination and decision-making body established last June that's linked to party elders like former Premier Wen Jiabao. So if that's the case, then Ma Xinrui wasn't removed by Xi Jinping. He was removed despite Xi Jinping. If you go back to the timeline, you can actually see this struggle playing out. Ma first lost his position as Xinjiang Party secretary last July. That's one month after the decision-making and coordination body was announced. At the time, it already hinted at internal friction. But then something changed. After the arrest of Zhang Youxia this January, Xi Jinping appeared to launch a counter-offensive. And for a moment, it looked like he might regain control. At that time, many people were watching one key indicator, or they were asking themselves one key question, which is, could Xi Jinping protect Ma Xinrui? Because if he could, it would mean Xi Jinping still had real power. And for a while, it seemed possible. Take a case of Ma's close aide, Guo Yonghang. Rumors were already circulating that Guo would be investigated. But instead, rumors were spreading before Zhang Youxia was taken down that Ma Xinrui's aide, Guo Yonghang, would be investigated. But four days after Zhang Youxia's downfall was announced, on January 28th of this year, Guo Yonghang was promoted to vice chairman of the Guangdong Provincial CPPCC. For many people, that was a clear signal. A signal that Xi Jinping might still be able to shield his people. Some even speculated that Ma Xinrui could make a comeback. But then, everything flipped. On March 27th, Guo Yonghang was suddenly placed under investigation. That was less than two months after he was moved to Guangdong Provincial CPPCC. And on that very day, March 27th, Wen Jiabao, the former premier, made a highly visible public appearance visiting the Institute of Geographic Sciences under the Chinese Academy of Sciences. So those two events happened on the same day, March 27th. And then one week later, boom, Ma Xinrui's downfall was officially announced. So that sequence is hard to ignore because it points to something bigger. Ma Xinrui's removal is not just another purge. It marks a turning point, a direct confrontation between two centers of power inside the CCP. On one side, Xi Jinping's leadership. On the other side, an elder-backed central. That's just one aspect of the story. Okay, now going back to the question why I believe the downfall of Ma Xinrui is Xi Jinping's Waterloo moment. Another reason, what I gave you so far is just the political, now the personal dimension. Because Ma Xinrui's fall doesn't just affect Xi politically. It hits much closer to home. One claim describes Ma's wife, Rong Li, as the top... First of all, Ma Xinrui's wife is very close to Xi Jinping's wife. Mrs. Ma is called the top insurance broker among Politburo families. According to these reports, the large insurance policies she had, quote-unquote, handled were not ordinary financial products. They were allegedly, quote-unquote, sold to the children of senior Politburo members. I shouldn't say senior Politburo members. Two Politburo members. There are two dozens of them. There isn't like senior members and junior members. They're all members. And those insurance policies typically range from 6 million to 20 million Hong Kong dollars. But in reality, these insurance policies are less like purchases. They're more like transfers of value. These policies reportedly carried no retroactive tracking. And the 6 billion Hong Kong dollar policy could be quickly converted into roughly 5 million cash. And in many cases, these transactions were set to take place in the presence of Madame Xi Jinping. And that creates a serious problem for him. Because the close ties between Ma and Madame Xi, because the two are allegedly family relatives, and Ma's political rise coincided with Xi Jinping's rise to top leadership. So Ma Xinrui and Madame Xi cannot be easily separated. So if Ma falls, the pressure doesn't stop with him. And that gives Xi Jinping opponents a powerful leverage or a leverage point, that is, whether or not to go after the First Lady. What has happened after Ma Xinrui's downfall was officially announced on April the 3rd? Two key regions responded very differently. Xinjiang, where Ma last served, moved quickly. The day after, on April the 4th, the regional leadership publicly declared its full support for the Central Committee's decision to investigate Ma, even though the Central Committee was not even announced in the announcement. But Guangdong, where Ma built much of his political career, has remained silent. That tells you the political divide. Let's take a look at who are the party secretaries in those two provinces. Now, Xinjiang, remember I said that last July, Ma Xinrui was replaced. Who was he replaced? Well, he was replaced by a guy whose name is Now, this guy is not from Xi Jinping's faction. He comes from the water resources system within the government, a background closely associated with Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. Because Hu Jintao's academic training was in water resources management. Wen Jiabao went to college for geology, but Wen Jiabao worked in irrigation and agriculture irrigation and water resources system for a number of years. So both Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have strong ties to the officialdom in the water resources system, and they promoted officials from that system, the official that who Xi Jinping does not trust at this point. So when Xinjiang speaks, it may not be speaking for Xi. Now look at Guangdong, its party secretary is Wang Kunming, a close ally of Xi Jinping, and part of his Zhejiang network, because he worked under Xi in Zhejiang. And that's why Guangdong has said nothing. That contrast is telling, because it suggests that the CCP is no longer a unified system responding to a decision. This is a divided system.