SpaceX ULA Genius Solution to Launch Blue Moon Solving What BO Impossible Now

We may have found an optimized way to send Blue Origin's Blue Moon lander to the moon. After New Glenn's explosion in late May, the search for an alternative launch solution has become more urgent than ever. At first glance, SpaceX's Starship seems like the obvious answer, but there's a catch. Starship and Blue Moon rely on completely different fuel systems, creating a logistics chain that could require dozens of tanker launches and multiple orbital refueling operations. But what if there were a simpler way? The answer may lie in a three-stage architecture that combines Starship, Blue Moon, and a technology NASA recently selected for its own Artemis program. This little-known mission concept could eliminate much of the refueling complexity and potentially put Blue Moon on the lunar surface years sooner than expected. Following New Glenn's explosion on May 28th, Blue Origin suddenly faces a major problem. There is currently no obvious launch vehicle available to support future Blue Moon Mark 1 and Mark 2 missions. Several alternatives have been suggested, but each runs into serious architectural limitations. The first candidate is SpaceX's Falcon Heavy. As the most powerful operational rocket currently flying, Falcon Heavy is the closest match to New Glenn. It also has a proven track record, having launched numerous high-value national security and scientific missions. The problem is that Blue Moon was never designed for Falcon Heavy. Its 5.2-meter payload fairing is simply too small to accommodate the lander's wide base. Blue Moon was engineered specifically around New Glenn's larger 7-meter fairing, making a direct transfer far more complicated than it appears. There is also a fueling mismatch. Falcon Heavy relies on kerosene-based propulsion, while Blue Moon uses liquid hydrogen. SpaceX's launch infrastructure was not built around hydrogen refueling operations for Blue Origin's lander. That leaves ULA's Vulcan Centaur as another potential option. Vulcan's hydrogen-powered upper stage makes it more compatible with Blue Moon's architecture. However, Vulcan carries its own risk. Its fairing is not wide enough to carry Blue Moon. More importantly, if investigators ultimately trace New Glenn's failure back to the BE-4 engine Vulcan, could face scrutiny as well, since both rockets depend on the same engine family. Then, there is Starship. On paper, Starship appears to solve many of the physical constraints. Its enormous payload bay, roughly 9 meters in diameter, can easily accommodate Blue Moon without major redesigns. But fitting the spacecraft inside the rocket is only the beginning. The real challenge is logistics. Starship's lunar architecture already depends on extensive orbital refueling, using liquid methane and liquid oxygen. Blue Moon, meanwhile, relies on liquid hydrogen and oxygen. Combining the two systems means managing two separate cryogenic fuel chains, simultaneously each with its own storage transfer and boil-off challenges. Even before Blue Moon enters the picture, a cargo Starship would likely require 10 to 15 tanker launches just to reach lunar orbit with sufficient propellant. NASA's lunar Starship architecture also depends on demonstrating large-scale cryogenic propellant transfers in Earth orbit and preserving that fuel for extended periods before departure to the Moon, capabilities that have yet to be proven operationally. Blue Moon introduces another layer of complexity. Under Blue Origin's planned architecture, a reusable cislunar transporter developed by Lockheed Martin must rendezvous with the lander near the Moon. Before that can happen, the transporter itself must be fueled using multiple launches carrying hydrogen to orbit. Once in lunar orbit, the transporter transfers roughly 100 metric tons of liquid hydrogen and oxygen into Blue Moon, providing the propellant needed for the final descent to the lunar surface. Coordinating dozens of tanker launches, managing long-term storage of two different cryogenic propellants across multiple orbits, and executing a chain of autonomous docking and fuel transfer operations would create one of the most complicated logistics campaigns ever attempted in spaceflight. At that point, the challenge is no longer launching Blue Moon, it is orchestrating an entire orbital supply chain without a single critical failure. However, in the case Starship is ultimately called upon to replace New Glenn, the most practical path may not involve Starship's own lunar architecture at all. Instead, the answer could come from a much older concept, an Earth Departure Stage. An Earth Departure Stage is designed to do one thing exceptionally well, take a spacecraft that is already in Earth orbit and send it directly toward its destination. Rather than relying on a complex chain of orbital refueling operations, it provides the final push needed to escape Earth and begin the journey to the Moon. Under this alternative architecture, Starship would serve primarily as a heavy-lift cargo vehicle. An expendable Starship variant would place a fully-assembled lunar stack into low Earth orbit, consisting of a fully-fueled Centaur V upper stage and a modified weight-reduced Blue Moon Mark II lander. The numbers are surprisingly favorable. A fully-fueled Centaur V weighs approximately 60 metric tons, including about 54 metric tons of propellant. Combined with a roughly 45-ton version of Blue Moon Mark II, the total payload reaches approximately 105 metric tons, comfortably within Starship's projected payload capability to low Earth orbit. The key difference is what happens next. Instead of requiring Starship itself to travel to the Moon, Centaur V would take over the mission. Once in orbit, the upper stage would ignite and perform the translunar injection burn, sending Blue Moon directly toward lunar space. This is exactly the type of mission Centaur was designed for. Powered by the highly efficient RL-10 engine, which delivers a specific impulse of roughly 465 seconds, Centaur V is one of the most efficient upper stages ever built. Its lightweight, pressure-stabilized structure allows more than 90% of its launch mass to be dedicated to propellant, maximizing the amount of energy available for deep space missions. The advantage is simple, but significant. Because Starship would already have delivered the fully-fueled Centaur V into orbit, Centaur would not need to spend any of its propellant reaching space. Every kilogram of fuel could instead be devoted to accelerating Blue Moon toward the Moon. More importantly, this architecture dramatically reduces operational complexity. Rather than maintaining two separate orbital refueling networks involving dozens of tanker flights, mission planners could eliminate most of the Earth orbit refueling campaign entirely. Blue Moon would still require propellant transfers later in lunar orbit, but the largest and most difficult portion of the logistics chain would disappear. There is, however, one major constraint. Centaur V's performance is not unlimited. Current estimates suggest it can send approximately 47.6 metric tons toward the Moon. That means the standard 54-ton Blue Moon Mark II would exceed its capability. To make the concept work, Blue Origin would likely need to develop a lighter version of the lander, removing unnecessary mass while preserving mission-critical systems. Even with that limitation, the approach remains attractive. In essence, Centaur V becomes an extremely efficient expendable propulsion module attached to a spacecraft launched by Starship. By combining Starship's enormous lifting capacity with Centaur's deep space performance, Blue Origin could potentially continue lunar mission development without waiting for Launch Complex 36 to return to service. The same strategy could also be applied to Blue Moon Mark I. Although the smaller lander does not require orbital refueling, launching it alongside a dedicated Earth departure stage could simplify mission operations and reduce overall program risk during its first lunar mission. Perhaps most importantly, this approach avoids the fundamental incompatibility between Starship and Blue Moon's fueling system. Starship's launch infrastructure is designed around methane and liquid oxygen, while Blue Moon relies on liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. Supporting both systems at the same launch site would introduce significant operational complications. Instead, the entire Centaur V and Blue Moon stack could be integrated and fueled at facilities already equipped to handle liquid hydrogen. Once fully fueled, the stack would be sealed, protected, and loaded into Starship's payload bay. Starship itself would then be fueled separately with methane and liquid oxygen at the SpaceX launch site. In fact, the idea of using Centaur V as a deep space propulsion stage is not new. NASA recently selected Centaur V to replace the long-delayed exploration upper stage for Artemis IV and V as part of a broader restructuring of the Artemis program. EUS was originally intended to power the upgraded SLS Block 1B configuration, but after nearly two decades of development and more than $4 billion in spending, it remained significantly behind schedule. Its deployment also depended on the completion of Mobile Launcher 2, another project plagued by cost overruns and delays. At the same time, NASA's evolving lunar strategy reduced the need for the additional performance EUS was designed to provide as cargo missions increasingly shifted to commercial launch providers while SLS focused on carrying Orion crews. NASA evaluated both ULA's Centaur V and Blue Origin's New Glenn upper stage as potential replacements. Centaur V ultimately prevailed because it offered the lowest risk path forward. It shares proven RL-10 engines, cryogenic propellants, and significant system heritage with the interim cryogenic propulsion stage already flying on SLS. Just as importantly, it could be integrated with existing launch infrastructure with minimal modifications. By contrast, New Glenn's upper stage was still in early development and would have required extensive changes to both the launch tower and the vehicle assembly building. NASA's decision highlights a simple reality. When schedules become critical, proven hardware often outweighs more ambitious but less mature alternatives. The same logic could make Centaur V an attractive solution for supporting Blue Moon missions if New Glenn remains unavailable.