EXCLUSIVE: Inside Iran's VAST Subterranean Missile Fortress Defying Destruction | TBN Israel

Commercial ships have once again come under attack in the Strait of Hormuz. The United States responded with two nights of strikes against more than 170 targets inside Iran, including coastal radar systems, air defenses, missile facilities, drone storage sites, naval infrastructure, and command centers. American forces are now holding their fire while diplomats meet in Oman. Washington is demanding that Iran open the Strait of Hormuz, stop attacking ships, and guarantee free passage. Tehran still insists that it has the authority to manage shipping routes and control how vessels move through the area. But after more than 170 American strikes, how can Iran still threaten ships, American bases, Israel, and the entire region? I'm Eir Pinto, and this is your Ground Report. And today, we're going beneath the surface of Iran's military machine to understand how the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps hides its missiles, protects its launchers, and prepares to keep fighting even after its bases are attacked. The current crisis began with a series of attacks on commercial vessels in the was struck and later reported a fire near the engine room. Saudi and Qatari tankers are also attacked, and another vessel was reportedly hit by a drone. These incidents took place after Iran and the United States had already reached a temporary understanding intended to restore a safe passage through the Strait. At least four commercial vessels were attacked or damaged after that understanding was announced. The American response was rapid. United States Central Command launched a new air campaign against the targets along Iran's southern coast and around the narrowest parts of the Strait. Explosions were reported near Bandar Abbas, Sirik, Qasem Island, and Karag Island, Iran's most important oil export hub. The first wave of strikes took out more than 80 targets. A second wave followed, bringing the total to more than 170 strikes. The Americans targeted radar stations, coastal surveillance systems, missile and drone storage sites, naval facilities, logistics centers, and air defense positions. The purpose was not to simply destroy individual weapons. The United States was trying to break the military chain that allows Iran to locate a ship, track its movement, issue an order, launch a missile or a drone, and then hide the crew and the equipment before another strike arrives. Iran answered by launching missiles and drones towards areas in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, and other parts of the Gulf. Air defense systems intercepted many of them, and the attacks did not cause the level of damage that Tehran had intended and threatened to do. They did, however, force several countries into maximum alert and demonstrate that Iran still had weapons available after the American strikes. This is where the underground system becomes important. A radar station on the coast can be photographed from the air. A naval facility can be mapped. A warehouse above ground can be tracked over time and destroyed when it is full. An underground missile city is a different kind of target. Most of the facility cannot be seen from the air. The mountain itself provides protection. The entrance visible in a satellite image may lead to a network of tunnels extending deep into the rock. Inside Iran can store missiles, launch vehicles, fuel spare parts, communication, equipment, and the machinery that they need to maintain the entire system. Some complexes may also include command rooms, workshops, medical areas, and living spaces. The crews are not expected to enter for a few hours, launch one missile, and leave. The facilities are built to support continued operations during a long campaign. And this idea is not new. The roots of the modern underground missile bases go back more than 80 years to Nazi Germany and the development of the world's first operational ballistic missile. In late 1942, Germany began building infrastructure for the Aggregat 4 missile, better known as the V2. The weapon was developed under the engineer Wernher von Braun. While many of its components were produced by forced laborers that were working under horrific conditions, the V2 was unlike anything that had come before it. It climbed high above the atmosphere and then descended toward its target at enormous speed. There was no formation of bombers to detect and no practical way to intercept it with the technology that was available at that time. Adolf Hitler wanted to use the missile to terrorize British citizens. His commanders wanted mobile launch units that could hide in the forests of occupied Europe, fire from temporary locations, and move before Allied aircrafts arrived. Hitler rejected that approach at first. He wanted a massive permanent base protected by concrete and designed to assemble, prepare, and launch missiles in large numbers. The first major site was constructed near the town of Watten in northern France. Allied intelligence identified the project through aerial photographs and reports from local agents. Bombers repeatedly attacked the construction area, destroying equipment and slowing down the work. Instead of abandoning the idea, Hitler ordered the construction of a much more heavily protected site about 14 kilometers away. The new complex was called La Copole, meaning The Dome. It was built into the side of a quarry, a railway line that was supposed to carry V2 components directly into the mountain. Inside, the missiles would be assembled, serviced, fueled, and prepared for launch. The plan included a network of underground corridors, workshops, storage rooms, offices, and living areas. Finished missiles would move on rail-mounted transport platforms towards several launching exits. Above the central section, the Germans constructed an enormous reinforced concrete dome. It was approximately 84 meters wide, around 5 meters thick, and weighed an estimated 55,000 tons. The curved design was intended to deflect conventional bombs and protect the sensitive areas below. German engineers believed that the concrete dome combined with the surrounding rock would allow the facility to survive almost any air attack. British intelligence eventually understood the purpose of the site. In the spring of 1944, large formations of heavy bombers attacked that area. The strikes damaged construction equipment and delayed the project, but ordinary bombs struggled against the concrete and against the mountain. The British then used the Tallboy, a heavy bomb designed to penetrate the ground before exploding. Its purpose was not only to strike a building directly. The underground explosion created a powerful shock wave that could shift the earth, damage foundations, and collapse nearby tunnels. The attacks blocked several passages and caused major damage around the La Capelle. The site never became operational, and no V-2 missiles were launched from it. Germany was forced to rely on the mobile launch method that military commandos had proposed from the beginning. Mobile crews transported missiles into forests, prepared them, launched them, and disappeared. This approach proved much harder to stop. Allied aircraft struggled to locate the launch teams in time. The launchers did not need a massive bunker, a permanent tower, or a large visible runway. The Allies eventually focused on railways, production plants, fuel supplies, and the logistical chains supporting the missiles. Instead of trying to locate every mobile launcher, they attacked the systems that allowed the launcher to continue operating. Iran has combined both German approaches. Its missiles are protected inside large underground complexes, but many of the launchers remain mobile. A missile can be stored and maintained inside a mountain, moved through an internal tunnel network, loaded onto a launch vehicle, and sent towards one or several exits. The crew can launch from outside the main complex and then return to cover. In some facilities, Iranian footage has shown launchers operating from large internal holes or from openings built directly into the mountain. This gives the Revolutionary Guards protection without sacrificing movement. A fixed base offers storage, maintenance, power, and command facilities. Mobile launchers allow the Iranians to change positions, use different exits, and complicate the enemy's targeting process. After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union adopted underground missile bases for their nuclear forces. The Soviet Union constructed the Blokstiny missile base in Lithuania with deep vertical silos of R-12 ballistic missiles. The United States built its own missile sites across several states. Later facilities housed increasingly powerful intercontinental ballistic missiles, protected inside hardened silos beneath the ground. However, both superpowers understood that the permanent missile base could not remain secret forever. Large construction projects leave visible signs. Roads are built, earth is moved, communication systems are installed, and security zones appeared around the site. Once the location of a silo was known, it became a target in any future war. The deeper the silo became, the more accurate and powerful the weapons designed to destroy it also became. And this led both sides to preserve other launch options. Nuclear weapons were deployed on submarines, on aircrafts, and mobile ground vehicles. Mobility reduced the chance that the entire force could be destroyed in one surprise attack. Modern Iranian missile cities follow the same basic logic but serve a different mission. Cold war nuclear silos were designed to survive long enough to launch one weapon before being destroyed. Iran's underground facilities are designed to support repeated launches over a much longer period. The objective is to absorb attacks, repair damage, move surviving equipment, and continue firing after the first wave of the strikes. This affects how the complexes are built. Different sections can be separated by blast doors. Corridors may turn sharply to reduce the forces of an explosion. Storage areas can be divided so that the destruction of one missile does not automatically ignite every weapon nearby. Rock absorbs the heat, the fragments, and the shock. Even a powerful explosion inside one section may not destroy another chamber located further through the mountain. A visible blast at the entrance can therefore be misleading. It may mean that the tunnel has been blocked. It does not necessarily mean that every missile, launcher, command room, and maintenance area behind it has been destroyed. Israel and the United States have already caused serious damage to Iran's missile infrastructure. Production sites at locations including Khujir, Parchin, Hakimiyah, and Sharhoud have been attacked. Buildings used for missile assembly and fuel production were damaged or destroyed. At least 29 known launch bases were also struck during the wider campaign. Some stored shorter-range missiles aimed at Gulf countries and American bases. Others supported longer-range missiles and weapons that are capable of reaching Israel. These attacks matter. Destroying fuel production equipment slows the preparation for new missiles. Damaging a maintenance center keeps launch vehicles out of service. Blocking a tunnel entrance delays the crews and the forces that are needing to come and create alternative routes and solutions. Still, delaying a missile system and completely eliminating it are not the same thing. So if you love TBN Israel and want to be part of what God is doing in the Land of Israel, we have something special for you. You can visit our official online store at shop.tbnisrael.com and there you will find high-quality TBN Israel merchandise just like this shirt that I'm wearing now. I mean I have like 10 of these because I love them. These are items that can help you stay connected, share the message, and support our mission of bringing truth, hope, and faith straight from Israel to the nations around the world. 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Satellite images can show that a known entrance has collapsed but they cannot automatically reveal what is happening hundreds of meters inside the rock. Even specialized bunker busting weapons have limitations. They work best when intelligence officers know the exact position of the important chamber, its depth, the structure above it, and the correct angle of the attack. If the internal layout is unknown, a bomb may penetrate the mountain and explode in an empty corridor. It can cause enormous damage while missing the missile storage area on the other side of the complex. This is why intelligence is as important as the weapon itself. Analysts need to know where the launchers move, where the crews walk, where the power and the ventilation enter the mountain, and which tunnels connect the different areas. Small details can become valuable. Fresh tire marks may show that vehicles are using a damaged entrance. Construction equipment can reveal that Iran is trying to reopen a tunnel. A new antenna may indicate that a command center has returned to operation. Aircraft, satellites, drones, electronic surveillance, and human intelligence all contribute different parts of this picture. None of them can solve the problem alone. The latest American strikes also targeted the infrastructure surrounding the missile system. Cruise missiles were launched against railroad bridges in northern Iran, including a bridge connected to the corridor running towards Turkmenistan, Russia, and China. This may appear disconnected from a missile base hundreds of kilometers away, but logistics determine how quickly Iran can recover. Missile plants need machinery, fuel components, electronics, replacement parts, and industrial materials. When a bridge is destroyed, supplies must be delayed, redirected, or moved through a more exposed route. The missile inside the mountain may remain undamaged, but maintaining and replacing the system becomes much harder. That is the same lesson that the Allies learned while fighting the V2 of the Germans. A mobile launcher is difficult to find at the exact moment it is preparing to fire. The railway, the factory, the fuel depot, or the maintenance center supporting it may be easier to identify and then, later on, to strike. Iran has also developed methods to protect missile facilities from surveillance aircrafts and helicopters. One of these weapons is the Saker 358, an Iranian system that looks like a small missile but behaves more like a loitering air defense's drone. The Saker is approximately 2.7 meters long and about 150 millimeters wide. A rocket booster launches it from the ground and a small jet engine carries it towards its operating area. The thermal camera in the nose searches for the heat signature of an aircraft. The flight control system keeps the target inside the camera's view and guides the drone towards it. The weapon carries a fragmentation warhead estimated at around 10 kilograms. It could be sent directly towards a known target or ordered to circle above a specific area and wait. This second method creates an aerial ambush. The drone does not need to know when or who is the target, a helicopter or a surveillance aircraft. It can loiter nearby and attack when a suitable target enters its field of view. Unlike traditional surface-to-air missile batteries, it does not require a large radar constantly transmitting from a fixed location. A radar can be detected and attacked with anti-radiation weapons. A small launcher hidden on an ordinary truck is much harder to identify in advance and this makes the system useful around missile facilities. Drones and helicopters often need to remain near an area while searching for tunnel entrances, mobile launchers or repair teams. That gives a loitering air defensive weapon time to wait for them. Iran has transferred versions of this concept to allied organizations in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq. Several drones have reportedly been lost to these systems, although individual Iranian claims are not always independently confirmed. For Iran, even an unsuccessful interception can still be useful. If a surveillance aircraft must change its routes, reduce the time it remains over the target or avoid the particular area the missile crews on the ground gain more freedom to move. The missile city is therefore not only a tunnel, it is part of a wider military network that includes air defenses, mobile launchers, decoys, vehicles, communications equipment, repair teams and logistics routes. So what you see on YouTube is only part of the story. Get closer to first-hand reports, behind-the-scenes moments and stories of faith, resilience and hope from Israel. You can visit www.tbn.org slash journeys slash boots. Again that's tbn.org slash journeys slash boots or text boots b-o-o-t-s-2-3-1-6-3-1-6 for direct updates from TBN Israel. With Mati and myself, Yair, reporting directly about what's happening, giving you the information that you need in order to pray for the situation. And TBN Israel brings honest first-hand coverage from the ground to all of you around the world. We are sharing what's happening so that you will know how to pray for the peace of Jerusalem. This is a war for the truth and we need all of you with us. So the current negotiations in Oman are taking place under the shadow of this surviving military system. Washington wants Iran to declare that the Strait of Hormuz is open and that commercial vessels can move without being threatened or forced to follow the Revolutionary Guard's instructions. Iran knows that its position at the negotiating table depends partially on weapons that it still controls. Its ability to threaten shipping is supported by coastal missiles, drones, surveillance equipment and underground bases spread through southern Iran. The attacks of the past week damaged that system, but they did not erase it. Some launchers were destroyed, others were moved, some entrances were blocked, while additional tunnels may still be usable. A ceasefire gives diplomats time to speak, but it also gives military engineers time to work. Repair teams can clear debris, reconnect electricity, move surviving missiles and prepare alternative launch points. Israel and the United States will therefore continue watching the sites even if no aircrafts are currently attacking them. A pause in the fighting does not mean that the activity inside the mountains has stopped. The most important question is not whether every missile city can be destroyed in one strike. No military has ever found a perfect solution to that problem. The real objective is to prevent the system from operating at the speed and scale that Iran needs. If production is slowed, logistics are disrupted, exits are watched, command centers are damaged and launchers are attacked, when they emerge, the underground network becomes far less effective. Israel's layered missile defenses add another part of this equation. Even when an Iranian missile survives the attacks on its base and successfully launches, it still has to pass through several interception layers before reaching its targets. No defense system is perfect. However, every successful interception reduces the military's value of Iran's expensive underground infrastructure. Revolutionary guards can hide missiles beneath mountains, but they cannot attack Israel or American bases while those missiles remain underground. At some point, a launcher must move, a crew must communicate, an entrance must open and the weapon must rise into the sky. That moment is where the underground advantage begins to disappear. For now, the American aircrafts are waiting, the Iranian repair teams are working and the diplomats in Oman are trying to prevent another round of escalation. The next missile that emerges from the mountain could determine whether this pause becomes a real agreement or only the silence before another attack. So keep spreading the truth, follow us and most importantly do not forget to click on the subscribe button so that you stay tuned to the truth in real time and never miss another update of Ground Report. Keep looking for us on social media platforms Mati Shoshani and Yair Pinto to see life through our eyes. And now to the most important part of this report, let's pray. And when we pray, let's make it personal. Let's pray for the air defenses systems, the people that operate them. Let's pray for wisdom to our leaders. And this is a hard one. Let's pray for our enemies not to succeed in their attempts to destroy us. Let's pray for them to have a change of heart and that God will turn their hearts to his heart, that they will love what he loves. And let's keep praying for the peace of Jerusalem. Hello, this is Mati here in Jerusalem with TBN Israel. This is Yair Pinto from TBN Israel here in Jerusalem. TBN Israel is keeping viewers informed with Israel-focused news, culture and what God is doing in this land. Support TBN Israel today online at tbn.org Israel. Thank you.