The Beidaihe meeting is underway, but a leaked revelation has sent shockwaves: according to the leak, the entire outcome of the 20th Party Congress could be overturned. Some have even drawn a clear line under the past four years, characterizing them as a period of “coercive seizure of power and unlawful continuation in office.”
Hu Jintao’s public removal from the congress hall, the forced early retirement of Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, and Hu Chunhua’s last-minute exclusion from the Politburo are all being directly described as a “backroom coup.” By that logic, the 20th Party Congress itself was fundamentally illegitimate. And if so, Hu Chunhua’s return to the political fray today can be framed as an effort to “correct past wrongs, restore order, and reclaim what was taken away.” If the procedures of the 20th Party Congress were formally declared illegitimate, it would be as though a pair of scissors had already been prepared to tear up Xi Jinping’s “edict of accession.” But why would the party elders dare to reopen a case of such enormous consequence—one that calls into question the legitimacy of the entire 20th Party Congress?
00:00 - Introduction 01:13 - Has Xi Jinping’s Exit Become the Consensus? Was His Re-election at the 20th Party Congress Illegitimate? 08:11 - RUMOR: Military Has Made Its Move! Xi Jinping Attacked in Beijing, Nearly Killed? 09:42 - What Does the U.S. Know? Notice Sends Shockwaves Through Public Opinion
Reports suggest a severe political crisis within the CCP, with party elders and \"Second Generation Reds\" allegedly challenging the legitimacy of the 20th Party Congress. The narrative describes a coordinated effort to force Xi Jinping from power, citing military unrest, the potential return of Hu Chunhua, and warnings from the U.S. State Department regarding civil unrest.
The Beidaihe meeting is underway, but a leaked revelation has sent shockwaves.
According to the leak, the entire outcome of the 20th Party Congress could be overturned.
Some have even drawn a clear line under the past four years,
characterizing them as a period of
coercive seizure of power and unlawful continuation in office.
Hu Jintao's public removal from the Congress Hall,
the forced early retirement of Li Keqiang and Wang Yang,
and Hu Chunhua's last-minute exclusion from the Politburo
are all being directly described as a backroom coup.
By that logic, the 20th Party Congress itself was fundamentally illegitimate.
And if so, Hu Chunhua's return to the political fray today
can be framed as an effort to correct past wrongs,
restore order, and reclaim what was taken away.
If the procedures of the 20th Party Congress were formally declared illegitimate,
it would be as though a pair of scissors had already been prepared
to tear up Xi Jinping's edict of accession.
But why would the party elders dare to reopen a case of such enormous consequence,
one that calls into question the legitimacy of the entire 20th Party Congress?
Has Xi Jinping's exit become the consensus?
Was his re-election at the 20th Party Congress illegitimate?
According to John Feng's analysis, after the fourth plenum in 2025,
party elders approached Hu Chunhua to discuss succeeding Xi Jinping.
But Hu was hardly eager to take over as general secretary.
On the contrary, he reportedly turned them down several times
and set only one condition—
I can take the job, but I must be allowed to settle accounts with Xi Jinping's faction.
Hu Chunhua understood the stakes perfectly well.
Ten years earlier, when Hu Jintao stepped down,
he had handed over power completely.
Yet at the closing session of the 20th Party Congress,
he was still publicly escorted out of the hall.
If your enemies remain intact,
then even if you manage to sit in the general secretary's chair,
they can bring you down again at any moment.
And the leverage Hu Chunhua allegedly used to force the party elders to give ground
was not his own personal grievance,
but a name with the political force of a nuclear bomb—
Li Keqiang.
Li Keqiang's family has repeatedly demanded some form of public statement.
Even if the matter cannot be fully explained within the party,
they argue there should at least be a public call
for an investigation and a full disclosure of what happened.
Those said to support Li's family include Wang Yang, Liu Yuan, and Hu Chunhua.
Hu reportedly put the question directly to the elders.
You want me to take power on day one?
Official reporting has also revealed two details concerning Hu Chunhua's recent movements.
The final Politburo meeting before the Beidai gathering was held on July 30.
On July 31, Wang Huning chaired the CPPCC's biweekly consultative meeting.
The final line of the official report stated,
Hu Chunhua, vice chairman of the National Committee
Then, on August 1, Hu's name appeared again in official coverage.
For a CPPCC vice chairman who had been sidelined for years
to be mentioned by name in official reporting just 48 hours before Beidai began,
was, according to the political signaling conventions of the Chinese Communist Party,
a deliberate sign that he was being brought back into public view.
This would also explain something else.
Why has Zheng Qinghong, now well into his 80s, suddenly become so anxious to intervene?
The man who once helped carry Xi Jinping into power is now supposedly trying to force him out.
According to the leaked account after something happened to Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli,
Zheng Qinghong, Jia Qinglin, Zhang Dejiang, and other former members of the Politburo's
standing committee personally sought an explanation from Xi Jinping.
Xi refused to meet them and repeatedly changed his account of what had happened.
At first, the accusation was
undermining the responsibility system of the chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Then it became collusion with foreign forces.
Finally, it turned into corruption involving enormous amounts of military funding.
Zheng Qinghong reportedly asked to visit Zhang Youxia in person,
but Xi rejected the request on the spot.
That, according to the account, set off an uproar throughout the entire generation of
Second Generation Reds, the descendants of senior revolutionary leaders.
If Zhang Youxia could be accused and detained today, they wondered,
then which of them could consider themselves safe tomorrow?
What Zheng Qinghong allegedly did next amounted to a full-fledged act of forcing the ruler's hand.
Bypassing Xi Jinping, he approached members of the Politburo one by one with a warning,
do not confront the party elders in the military and do not cut off your own route of retreat.
In effect, this meant dismantling Xi's outer ring of political support
and forcing every Politburo member to confront the same question.
The military is no longer on his side, the party elders have turned against him,
and the Second Generation Reds are an open revolt.
Do you really intend to go down with him?
On February 5, Zheng Qinghong reportedly presented Xi Jinping with a final set of
negotiable terms. First, power must be handed over according to the original plan.
Second, Xi must make absolutely no attempt to remain in office for another term.
Third, among Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and others involved,
someone must be held responsible for the Zhang Youxia affair.
By this point, the argument goes Zheng Qinghong's position could hardly be clearer.
He was acting on behalf of the Second Generation Reds
and had come to force Xi Jinping into immediate submission.
The reason, according to this account, is that seasoned political operators such as
Zheng Qinghong fear one outcome above all others,
a struggle at the very top that tears the Communist Party apart completely.
Zheng's supposed final proposal, therefore, was this.
The Communist Party itself must be preserved,
but Xi Jinping should be reduced to something resembling the Hua Guofeng model,
allowed to retain a measure of dignity and formal status,
while being compelled to surrender real power.
On the other side of the table, the terms put forward by Wen Jiabao were even tougher.
The 20th Party Congress had forcibly altered the Politburo lineup,
and Hu Jintao had been publicly escorted out of the hall.
There had to be an explanation for that.
Li Keqiang's death in October 2023 had to be clarified.
And by January of this year, the cases involving Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli
also demanded an explanation.
According to Zhang Feng, it was no longer a matter of Xi Jinping saying what would happen
and everyone else falling into line.
Instead, those two elderly statesmen were now determining what the next step would be.
At that point, the broader outcome was finally being settled.
The reformist camp wanted Xi to step aside,
and the military was no longer obeying his orders.
Hu Jintao was arranging for Hu Chunhua to take over.
Yuan Jiajun was being moved into the CCP Central Committee's general office
to replace Cai Qi as the gatekeeper.
And even the red families that had once helped propel Xi to power
were now pointing directly at him and saying,
Enough. Hand over power.
In 2022, Xi said he had been elected at the 20th Party Congress.
Now, some are declaring that the process itself was illegitimate.
He says he represents the red political order.
Now the second-generation reds have joined forces to demand that he step down.
He says he is chairman of the Central Military Commission,
but the military's actual chain of command has long since shifted into other hands.
Really?
Military has made its move.
Xi Jinping attacked in Beijing, nearly killed.
China is indeed at a moment that some are describing as the eve of unrest,
with acts of retaliation among the public also becoming increasingly frequent.
A video circulating online on August 9th
shows waves of black smoke rising near the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall in Beijing.
Although the cause remains unknown,
the memorial has been under tight security ever since it was built.
In recent years, even ordinary visitors to Tiananmen Square
have had to make reservations in advance and undergo identity checks.
If a fire really did break out there, it would undoubtedly be a major incident.
Many netizens commented,
Isn't that already close to Zhongnanhai?
At this rate, it may not be long before the flames reach Zhongnanhai itself.
The ex-account China News Hotspots claimed that on August 9th,
more than 1,000 officers from the Central Theater Command
Subsequent reports alleged that Xi Jinping encountered a protest by military personnel
in Beijing's Qigongzhuang area, where clashes broke out.
Several of Xi's bodyguards were reportedly taken out,
and Xi himself allegedly came close to being killed.
These claims are said to align with recent rumors
that multiple military units have been converging on Beijing.
However, the information remains unverified at this stage.
What does the U.S. know?
Notice sends shockwaves through public opinion.
On August 10th, the U.S. State Department issued its latest notice,
strongly urging all U.S. citizens planning to travel to China,
as well as those currently living there,
to enroll promptly in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program.
Through the system, U.S. embassies and consulates in China
can send security alerts directly to American citizens in the country.
They can also make contact quickly in the event of natural disasters,
civil unrest, or other sudden crises.
STEP can additionally help family members get in touch with U.S. citizens in China
during an emergency.
The notice immediately stirred intense discussion on social media.
Many people argued that this was the first time
civil unrest had been explicitly included among the potential dangers,
leading to speculation that Washington may have information not yet known to the public.
Fang Wei, a commentator with the program American Common Sense, said,
My sense is that all of this is directed at the Chinese Communist Party's
newly introduced immigration and border control regulations,
the instability they could potentially cause,
and the U.S. government's concerns about them.
They have made it very clear that the CCP enforces the law arbitrarily.
Under those circumstances, there's really very little the U.S. government can do,
especially when it does not even know what is happening.
Some analysts have also argued that the phrase civil unrest and other crises
clearly goes beyond an ordinary travel safety reminder.
The possible scenarios could include changes in China's domestic social situation,
a rapid deterioration in U.S.-China relations, and other unpredictable political risks.
Even more concerning is that the impact of the CCP's new immigration and border control rules
may no longer be limited to Chinese citizens and overseas Chinese.
Because many of the relevant provisions are vaguely worded,
with considerable uncertainty surrounding enforcement standards in the scope of their application,
foreigners in China could also face heightened risks
involving entry and exit restrictions, as well as personal safety.
Against the backdrop of reports that Chinese leader Xi Jinping is expected
to visit the United States on September 24, where will U.S.-China relations go from here?
We will have to wait and see.
Thank you for watching.
See you next time.