China's Fifth Plenum Raises Questions About Xi's Power and Hu Jintao's Comeback

Hello everyone, welcome. I was reading your comments before this live stream and someone said that he was looking for a live Tuesday night and couldn't find one. Well, I must tell you that part of the reason that I skipped last night's live stream was that I needed to take care of my aging parents. So that was part of the reason. Okay, so I'm back. Now, I've been talking about CCP politics and discussed extensively about Xi Jinping, Wen Jiabao, Hu Chunhua, a whole bunch of, a whole cast of characters in Beijing. But there's one man I didn't really talk about, or I didn't talk much in the past two years, and that's Hu Jintao. Whatever happened to him, remember this picture? Yes. This is when the former CCP leader was unexpectedly escorted out of the 20th Party Congress in October 2022. It was one of the most extraordinary scenes in modern Chinese political history. There was Hu Jintao sitting right next to Xi Jinping when suddenly an attendant approached him and tried to get him to leave. The former leader appeared reluctant, but eventually he was escorted out. All of this happened in front of more than 2,000 party delegates and international media or international media cameras. The incident triggered a wave of speculation. Had the world just witnessed the dramatic power struggle between Xi Jinping and his predecessor? Now, four years later, the political drama surrounding the two leaders may be far from over. Since that extraordinary day, Hu Jintao has made just one documented public appearance, and that's this one. Let me make this bigger. Now you can see. In December 2022, he attended the funeral or the farewell ceremony for his predecessor, Jiang Zemin. And then, nothing. No speeches, no public appearances, no word from the former leader himself. And, oh, by the way, the young man who Hu Jintao was seeing being escorted or assisted by a young man who I circled in red. And some people believe that it was the same security guard or the same bodyguard who escorted him at the party congress. I cannot tell because he was wearing a mask, but they do look very similar. All right. And that was the last time he was seen in public. Since then, Hu has disappeared from public view. However, his political shadow has not. Now, let me tell you a little bit about Hu Jintao. He has always been something of an enigma, I should say. People say he's a typical Capricorn, low-key, disciplined, reserved, patient, but remarkably resilient. And even ambitious. And here's an interesting piece of political folklore. You know, he holds an unofficial record among all CCP leaders. You know what that is? For surviving death rumors the most. Someone has counted. He has been declared dead at least eight times by rumor mills. Yes, eight times. And yet he's still around. Now, while the elder Hu remains invisible, two young Hus have taken his place in the political spotlight. And one is his son, Hu Haifeng, and the other is this man, Hu Chunhua, his former political prodigy and once-designated successor. Their appearances and disappearances have become something of a political barometer. Every time one of the two junior Hu's shows up somewhere unusual, people wonder, is Hu Jintao's political influence returning? And every time one of them disappears from the spotlight, a new round of rumors begins. Now, let me give you a few examples. In June 2025, this is one. In Shanghai, Hu Haifeng, the son, appeared at one of China's most prestigious financial gatherings, the Lu Jiazui Forum, and he stood alongside Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jinning, a Politburo member, and some of China's most senior financial officials to inaugurate a new national capital markets organization. Organization. Now, think about that. Hu Haifeng was a relatively junior vice minister. At the Ministry of Civil Affairs, what exactly did civil affairs have to do with launching a major capital markets institution? And why was Hu Haifeng standing alongside such powerful financial and political figures? Was he there simply sending a political signal? This picture fueled speculation that the relationship between Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao might be changing. Then came another cautious episode. That's last year, September 2025. Turkey's ambassador to China visited Hu Haifeng at his office. And afterward, the Turkish official or diplomat released the photo of the meeting. Again, observers raised questions. Why was a foreign ambassador paying a visit to a relatively junior official in the Ministry of Civil Affairs? That does not seem like diplomatic, building a diplomatic relations. Or maybe it was another sign that the Hu family's political standing was improving. All right, and that brings us to the other younger Hu. And this one is famous because I have mentioned him many times, Hu Chunhua. Now, his political fortunes have attracted even greater scrutiny. Throughout 2025, his increased visibility gave rise to speculation that he might be regaining political influence. But then came a sudden silence following Zhang Youxia's downfall in January 2026. This junior who became less visible, and when he failed to appear at the major Long March anniversary ceremony a few days before the Fifth Plenum, people began worrying about his safety. Had something happened to him? Then, at the Fifth Plenum's closing session, he appeared in CCTV's footage. There he was, on the far right, in the front. So for those following the rumors, it was a moment of relief, but the relief didn't last. New allegations immediately surfaced claiming that Hu Chunhua and members of his family had been detained for investigation. There was no credible confirmation of those allegations. And then just yesterday, Xinhua released another photo. This time, Hu Chunhua was seated on the presidium at a CPPCC meeting. And once again, his appearance helped quiet the rumors. So you see the pattern? One appearance, one disappearance, another rumor, another photo. And behind all of it stands a man who we haven't seen in years. And that is Hu Jintao. Now, the man has vanished from public view. Bring him up. There he is. But the political intrigue surrounding him has never stopped. And now something even more interesting is happening. Hu Jintao is suddenly relevant again. Not because he appeared on TV, not because he delivered a speech, but because of something the CCP itself had just put in writing. A major new party document is reviving a political framework and approach to governance closely associated with Hu Jintao and his era. And one of its most striking messages? A warning against demanding personal loyalty to the individual in charge. Think about that. For more than a decade, Xi Jinping has built his political authority around loyalty to himself as the party's core leader. Yet now we're seeing language that appears to point in a very different direction, away from personal rule. And that brings us to the question I want to explore tonight. Is Hu Jintao making a political comeback? Could we be heading toward another confrontation between Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao? All the political forces associated with them at the next year's 21st Party Congress. So I want to examine these extraordinary developments, what they review about China's political direction, and whether Hu Jintao or the political system he once represented may be quietly making a comeback. All right, so let me begin with one of the most important documents. That has emerged from the Fifth Plenum. And no, I'm not talking about the communique. I'm talking about a resolution. So on November 1st, Xinhua published a major resolution adopted at the Fifth Plenum on the last day of the session. The title of this 17,000-word document is heartily exciting. It's called Resolution on Certain Major Issues Concerning the Continued Advancement of Full and Rigorous Party Governance. All right, whatever that means. Now, what's interesting is buried inside this lengthy document are two provisions that deserve our attention. And both bring us straight back to Hu Jintao. The first one is that the resolution devotes an entire section to what the CCP calls democratic centralism. So for those of you unfamiliar with CCP terminology, democratic centralism is supposed to combine internal discussion or group discussion with unified decision-making. But what's striking about this new document is how strongly it emphasized collective leadership. And the resolution doesn't just emphasize this democratic centralism or collective leadership. It even tells officials or party members how to practice it. And there's one passage in particular I want you to pay attention to. In the third part of this section, the resolution lays out specific rules governing how party leadership bodies must make decisions. And here's what it says. It says, strictly implement the rules and procedures governing decision-making and deliberation by leadership bodies. Uphold the combination of collective leadership and individual responsibility based on the The Division of Duties and Adhere to Scientific Democratic and law-based decision-making. Now, I know these jargons don't mean much to you, but the language, I must tell you, is very unusual because buried inside this similarly routine CCP bureaucratic passage is a political landmine. It's the requirement that party leadership bodies must follow established rules and procedures when making decisions. And what principles must guide these decisions? There were three of them. Scientific decision-making, democratic decision-making, and law-based decision-making. Together, they're known as the three decision-making principles. Now, why is that important? Because these three principles were a hallmark of Hu Jintao's governing philosophy, his scientific outlook on development. He formally introduced them in his report to the 17th Party Congress and reiterated them at the 18th Party Congress. They were governing principles, political symbols, and defining features of the Hu Jintao era. But when Xi Jinping came to power, the three decision-making principles virtually disappeared from Chinese media and public documents. Why? Because they were associated with Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping simply stopped mentioning them. And for more than a decade, that political language remained absent until May last year. Suddenly, the People's Daily brought the three decision-making principles back to its front page in May 2025. It was such an unusual development that it even attracted attention in Japan. Nikkei Asia found it puzzling. Why would a political formulation that had been absent for more than a decade suddenly reappear on the front page of the CCP's flagship newspaper? And it has nothing to do with Xi Jinping, and it has everything to do with Hu Jintao, right? So if you look back, the timing is especially interesting because May 2025 was Precisely when rumors were circulating that Xi Jinping had been forced to retreat to Luoyang for closed-door self-criticism, some even claimed that he was under tremendous pressure to step down. If you remember that time, it was a time when political rumors were flying everywhere. And this was also one month before Beijing formally announced the Central Decision-Making and Coordination Body. Reportedly involving retired senior officials associated with Hu Jintao's camp, including Wen Jiabao, Wang Yang, etc. Now consider what all of this could mean. If the return of Hu Jintao's signature political framework reflects a genuine change in how the party operates, the implications are enormous. It could mean that the machinery of Xi Jinping's one-man rule is being dismantled and the collective leadership system associated with Hu Jintao is being restored. And of course, you may ask, well, who's driving this change? Was it simply an effort to improve party governance? Or was it also an attempt to constrain Xi Jinping's authority? To understand why I'm asking this, we need to look at the second provision. And this one is even more explicit. And the Fifth Plenum Resolution devotes an entire subsection to regulating the authority of what the Chinese call yi ba shou. Literally, the number one guy, the top guy. And that's the term for the top official in a party organization, the person in charge. And the language here is unusually direct. It says party secretaries must listen carefully to different opinions, respect minority views, and refrain from making decisions that should be made collectively. It explicitly prohibits, listen to this, one-man rule. It also warns against what you call a paternalistic style of leadership. And then comes the line that really caught my attention. The document says party organization must not demand that officials at every level uphold the personal authority of the number one guy. Let me repeat that. They must not demand that officials uphold the personal authority of the number one. Think about the implications. Xi Jinping's political system It is. has centered on his absolute authority as the party's core leader, and officials are routinely expected to demonstrate their political loyalty to him. Yet here we have a major party resolution explicitly warning against promoting the personal authority of the top leaders within party organizations. Now, there's an important distinction here. The resolution did not mention Xi Jinping, nor does it explicitly challenge his position as the party's core leader. On paper, The provision is not directed at Xi Jinping. But here's the problem. When party officials across China read language warning against one-man rule, paternalistic leadership, and demands for personal loyalty, who do you think comes to mind? Xi Jinping. Because these are precisely the characteristics that are associated with his leadership style. And after all, he's the ultimate number one, number one guy. And that's what makes this document so intriguing. Look at these two provisions together. On one hand, we have the revival of decision-making principles closely associated with Hu Jintao. On the other, we have explicit restrictions on how party secretaries can exercise personal authority. Put the two together and a fascinating question emerges. Is the CCP moving away from Xi Jinping's highly centralized leadership model? And if so, who's driving the change? Xi Jinping himself or Hu Jintao? Because this is another twist to the story, and it makes the whole situation even more puzzling and even bizarre. According to the party's own official media, Xi Jinping personally chaired the drafting group responsible for preparing this resolution. Yes, Xi Jinping himself. So if these provisions really do represent a political shift, we have to ask, is Xi Jinping voluntarily placing limits on the exercise of his own power while embracing Hu Jintao's governing principles? Or are we witnessing something very different? Could another political force powerful enough to influence Xi Jinping and his team have pushed for these provisions? And if Xi Jinping remains fully in control, with the kind of unchallenged authority that many people believe he still enjoys, why would he oversee a resolution containing language that appears to contradict his own governing style while promoting his predecessor's legacy? And there's another detail worth examining. State media reported that the drafting process included consultations with retired senior party officials. Who were those officials? Was Hu Jintao among them? And did they have any say or any influence over the final language? We don't know. The official media outlets didn't. But the question remains, why would Xi Jinping personally oversee a resolution that appears to place limits on the very style of leadership he has spent more than a decade building? Well, I think there are only two possibilities. The first is that Xi Jinping is responding to pressure from within the party leadership. The language may reflect concerns, negotiations, or political compromises. that emerged behind closed doors. In other words, Xi may have chaired the drafting process without having complete freedom to dictate its contents. And the second possibility is even more consequential. The party may be preparing for a post-Xi Jinping political system. The renewed emphasis on collective decision-making could provide a foundation for a less personal A style or less personalized leadership structure in the future. Of course, we don't know. That remains highly speculative. Speculative. But if that's what's happening, it would represent a significant shift in China's political direction. Um... Now, I know some of you may be thinking, maybe these restrictions aren't intended for Xi Jinping at all. Maybe he drafted it. And they're aimed at provincial and local party chiefs. Perhaps Xi Jinping simply wants to prevent powerful officials from building their own political kingdoms while preserving his own authority as the party's core leader. In other words, collective leadership for everyone else, centralized authority for himself. Well, that's certainly one possibility, but I have a problem with it. If Xi Jinping merely wanted to discipline local officials, why would he need to revive Hu Jintao's signature political framework to do it? It's not Xi Jinping's style. Why suddenly reach back to his predecessor's political legacy? That doesn't fit Xi Jinping's political style. And that's why I tend to believe the resolution isn't Xi Jinping's idea. He was forced to compromise. Now, there's something else in this resolution that makes the situation even more intriguing and potentially much more consequential. Who will watch the number one guy? You see, the resolution doesn't stop at just telling the number one guys what they can and cannot do. It also spells out how these powerful officials are supposed to be monitored going forward. And that brings us to another important part of the document. The resolution calls for tighter supervision of party officials and a stronger role for China's powerful anti-corruption apparatus. So I've talked about the CCDI or the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection for the party and its counterpart for the government. That's the National Supervisory Commission. It's essentially the same organization. One name is for the party and one is for the government. So together, they form the backbone of China's party state anti-corruption system. Now, this is where the story gets ugly. For years, most people have associated the CCDI with one thing. That's investigating corrupt officials. But now this anti-corruption apparatus has evolved into something much more powerful. It now monitors officials throughout their careers, before appointments, during their time in office, and even after retirement. And the new resolution reinforces that authority or clarifies that authority even more. It calls for closer scrutiny of officials' personal finances, including suspicious family assets. As well as business activities of their spouses and children. And listen to this. This is really funny. It even requires party and government leaders to obtain organizational approval before publicly publishing personal works. Now, let me ask you, who is the most prolific publisher of political works in China today? Or in the world today? Which world leader has authored the most? Political books, it's Xi Jinping. OK, by one account, as of early 2024, at least 140 books have been published under Xi Jinping's name. And compare that with his predecessor. It's enormous. Let me just give you the numbers. Mao Zedong, who is widely believed as a thinker, a military strategist, a poet. And the author, he wrote, he published 22 books. Deng Xiaoping wrote 10 books. Jian Zemin, eight. Hu Jintao, four. And Xi Jinping penned 140 books. And that's as of early 2024. 24. So when the resolution emphasizes prior approval for officials who want to publish personal books, people immediately think of Xi Jinping. So these restrictions may eventually reach those who were once considered politically untouchable. Now, the CCDI is now charged with the responsibility of personnel appointments and the supervision of the number one. And this is a newly reinforced rules as a result of the fifth plenum. And that's tremendous because... The resolution now reinforces the role of discipline inspectors in personnel decisions. When an official is being considered for promotion, an assessment of that person's integrity must be jointly signed by the party's secretary and the discipline inspection officer. And this is now a formal request. They both have to approve his promotion. Why does this matter? Because in the CCP, personnel appointments are powerful. If the party secretary wants to promote someone, but the discipline inspector raises objection, that person is not getting a promotion, right? So think about who actually controls the future leadership. And the second is the resolution strengthens supervision of the number one, the top guy. Now, under the party's dual leadership system, local discipline inspectors answer both To their local party chief and to higher level disciplinary authorities. And now the resolution requires them to report regularly at least once every six months on how local leadership teams, especially their number one guy, exercise power. In other words, the number one guy is supposed to be watched closely. And the people watching him can report upward through the disciplinary system. That's a potentially important check on all party chiefs. Uh, pop. I think including Xi Jinping, because there's a boss sitting above him and that's the central coordination and decision-making body. In Chinese, we say that's his mother-in-law, That means you have. A superior, a superior authority sitting above you. Okay, now you may remember an old saying in CCP politics, punishment does not reach the Politburo Standing Committee. Those, the top seven guys are exempted from disciplinary, how to say, disciplinary actions. I shouldn't say inspection. They are being inspected, but they're really brought down due to disciplinary violations, except Zhou Yongkang. But that's changed. This resolution adopted at the Fifth Plenum suggests that the rule may be changed and punishment can reach the very top. So I know you're thinking, so who actually controls the CCDI today? From the outside, it's hard to tell. There's one way we can tell, that is, take a look at all the officials who have been removed in recent months before the Fifth Plenum. It seems that Xi Jinping's allies are the biggest group of victims of CCDI in the past month. This suggests that Xi Jinping may not control the CCDI. I think that's a very gentle way to put it. I do not think Xi Jinping controls the CCDI. Because if he does, there's no way that so many of his loyalists have fallen in the past couple of months. So let's put all three developments together. First, the resolution revives collective decision-making principles closely associated with Hu Jintao. Second, it. Explicitly restricts the personal authority of top party leaders. And third, it reinforces the disciplinary apparatus tower to supervise officials, especially the top ones, scrutinize their finances and influence personnel decisions. So their appearance together in a major central committee resolution raises an intriguing question. Who is driving these changes? Remember, according to Xinhua, Xi Jinping personally headed the group that drafted this resolution before the Fifth Plenum. The Plenum then deliberated on and adopted the document. So here's the million-dollar question. Why would Xi Jinping oversee a resolution that revives His political rival's legacy and placed this restriction on his personal authority and strengthened the very disciplinary machinery that could restrain his power, including the number of books he wants to publish. Was that really his own initiative or was he responding to pressure from someone else? And if there was another political force behind those changes, who could it be? There can only be one man, in my opinion, and that's Hu Jintao. Because, after all, Hu is a formal party leader. He's the only living formal CCP leader with a rank and political legacy comparable to Xi. Now, still, there's another rule. There's another detail, I should say, that's interesting. And this one concerns Xi Jinping's political authority. Remember, I told you about this political slogan called 2442, right? It refers to the two establishes, four consciousnesses, four confidences, and two upholds. And at the heart of this formula is the requirement to recognize Xi Jinping as the party's core leader and uphold his authority. So for many years, this language has been one of the most important expressions of Xi Jinping's political standing. When it appears or disappears from major party documents, people say attention. So it's called the 2442 formulas. And I told you that the Fifth Plenum communique omitted, for the first time, omitted the explicit expression. 2442 formulation, even though it had appeared in previous plenary communiqués. But here's the interesting part. The full resolution adopted at the same plenum retained the 2442 slogans. So why did one document include it while the other left it out? Because when people saw that, people say, some people. Who believe that Xi Jinping is firmly in full control, argues that, see, the 2442 is back. Xi Jinping has fought back. That's proof that Xi Jinping has not lost control. He's able to retain the 2442 slogans in the party's resolution. But I have a different view. Because we, the answer. may lie in how and when the two documents were prepared. Now, what is a resolution? Think of the resolution as the party's equivalent of a legislative bill. It was drafted before the plenum by a team personally headed by Xi Jinping, then submitted to the Central Committee for deliberation and adoption. The draft retained the familiar language affirming Xi Jinping's authority, and that's the resolution. The key here is it was drafted before the plenum and adopted at the plenum, but the communiqué is different. It's the party's official statement announcing the outcome of the plenum, reflecting the conclusions and the political priorities of the four-day meeting, or four-day closed-door meetings. And when that communiqué was issued on October the 29th, The explicit 2442 formula was missing, and there were a whole bunch of other key phrases missing, like the military and the Chinese people should rally around Xi Jinping's leadership were missing. So did you see the difference? One document was prepared under Xi Jinping's leadership before the plenum. The other announced the outcome of the plenum itself. The first one retained 2442, the other one left it out. If that omission reflects a deliberate shift in political emphasis, it could offer an important clue about what actually happened behind closed doors during those four days. So are we witnessing the beginning of a shift away from Xi Jinping's highly centralized leadership model and a return to Hu Jintao's collective leadership system? Now, remember what happened four years ago as you're looking at this picture. Hu Jintao was escorted out of the 20th Party Congress in full view of the world. Now, as the party approaches its 21st Congress, Hu Jintao's governing principles are once again gaining prominence, while questions are emerging about the future of Xi Jinping's highly personalized rule. So four years ago, Hu Jintao was the man being escorted out. But at the next party Congress in 2027, could the roles be reversed? That's my question. I do not know, but we still have a year to figure it out. All right. So that's my talk tonight. Have I put people to sleep? What do people say? All right. Okay, let me come back. Any questions, comments, headaches? Thanks. I really never had, really never talked about Hu Jintao until now. I think now is the time. There have been many signs about his return, but I mean, mostly from the two junior Hu's. But I think with the fifth plenum behind us, I think the signals are very strong. Yeah. So that's the time I decided to do a program on that. Alright, let me see. What do people say? Questions for me? Comments? Disagreement? All right. People like my video on Puma Shen. Do you like that story? Yeah? I think that's a phenomenon in Taiwan. Yeah. Alright, Chris forwarded a question from Andrew Skaggs. How can who's splitting loyalty from the upper echelon and lower echelon and she do anything for her? She? Huh? What's so quick? How can who's splitting loyalty from the upper echelon, lower echelons, and she do anything for she? I'm not quite, I don't quite get the question. What do you mean? You're saying that Hu Jintao is taking away the official's loyalty from Xi Jinping? That's, that's a fact. That's certain. Yeah. People miss the Hu Jintao time. I'm not saying that Hu Jintao's time was better, but at least, I don't know, at least it feels better than what's happening now. I'm sorry, if you can elaborate the question in a different way, I will answer you. Someone says, okay, either she is writing constantly and not leading or he... He has many hack writers writing books for him. Yeah, 140 books. Someone said that Xi Jinping has amassed hundreds of billions of yuan in royalties from his publishing because his books are pushed to all the CCP organizations at all levels. They're all required to buy copies of his books. So he's made a lot of money from these books. Someone did the math. Yeah, yeah, it's a lot of money, substantial amount of money, income for his 140 books. And oh, and there are also English, not just English, foreign language versions of his books. Yeah, so, all right, retirement. Okay, Andrew Skaggs is asking, Lei, how can who's splitting loyalty from the upper echelon, lower echelon, and she do anything for she? I'm sorry, can you ask the question again? What do you mean? How can you choose splitting loyalty from the upper echelon, lower echelon? She do anything for she. Something is missing. Try again. Sorry. Sorry. I… Okay, here's a question from Nick Nichols. Party loyalty and financial loyalty, which one is more important in China? Officially and publicly, political loyalty. Privately, financial loyalty. All right. It's always financial loyalty. But the public loyalty, the political loyalty is just for show. Someone said, Lei, who is in charge of the communique? That would explain a lot. The communique is almost like a press statement, right? The communique is a press statement. And it's the organizer of the plenum. It would have to be, the statement would have to reflect The mood of the meeting, because you can't just put in something that people didn't agree, you know, so I don't know who actually drafted that, but think of you had a meeting and you want to issue, you want to jointly issue a statement. It's almost like a bilateral statement, you know, after two heads of state met. I mean, the statement would have to reflect. I mean, if they issue a joint statement, that joint statement would have to be agreed by both parties. So the communique has to reflect the mood of the majority of those in attendance. Okay. Okay. Okay. And furry boss, a Chinese inner Mongolian girl named. I don't know. I have not heard of this story. A Chinese inner Mongolian girl named this, born in the U.S. So she's American-born Chinese. I mean, yeah. Slapping a man and tried to kill a Jewish girl. Is she CCP brainwashed? She could be brainwashed by... by both by Chinese state media and also some very progressive outlets, right? I don't know. I think she could be subject to many different types of influences and the CCP Thank influence can certainly be one of them. If Hu Jintao has increased power and influence, why are his prodigies not being promoted more clearly into positions of formal authority? Personnel seem to be the core of power in the CCP. you. That's a very good question. The answer is to protect the regime from falling apart. Because if, let's say, let me just tell you, if Hu Jintao is promoted into Politburo, Um, everybody knows Xi Jinping's time is numbered. He's out. It's so clear. You don't need to say anything. If Hu Chunhua is put back into the Politburo, which he was, I mean, he was part of, um, four years ago, everyone knows he will be, he is the successor to Xi Jinping. It's loud and clear. It's clear that Xi Jinping is on his way out. And I don't think the two sides are ready for that, to announce that yet. Maybe it's a sort of a protection for Hu Chunhua, who knows? But maybe they're not ready to, in Chinese we say, like to, I think they still want to somehow let the whole world to believe that Xi Jinping is still the top guy. Yeah, so either that or Hu Chunhua is not interested in the job. They don't have a candidate. They want to at least steer the giant sinking ship away from Xi Jinping style and back to the collective leadership style without a firm successor on the table. Because they are saying that Hu Chunhua has made it very clear that And if they want him to take the job, he wants to investigate into the death of Li Keqiang. And he wants to investigate into the arrest of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhengli, the two generals. He's not going to let these issues disappear or being swept under the rug. And that's the expression. He will bring those responses. He will seek justice, at least for the former premier. So, would the party allow him to do that? Because once that begins, then Xi Jinping is not going to look very good. His prestige as a former leader is not going to be preserved. So, maybe Hu Chunhua isn't interested in the job. Maybe they can't find a successor. So, that's why they still have a year left to figure out what to do. All right. Someone said, Leigh, are the leaders becoming disillusioned with almost Xi Jinping, Xi dictator-like leadership? Yeah, are all the leaders become disillusioned? It's hard for them to step outside, to think outside the box because they're all, yeah. I always say the world is full of smart people, but we don't have enough truly courageous people who are brave enough to say what they believe. And to practice what they preach. We have a lot of talking heads, but we have very few leaders who are truly full of actions. Same with the CCP leadership. They all see the problem. They know exactly what went wrong. But do they have the courage to bring the ship back or save the ship from sinking? Do they have the courage to end the regime and start anew? That's the question. You need to have a lot of courage to do that. All right. All right. Someone said, Leigh, woman spirit, could you please do the program on basic needs, preparation for wartime and another pandemic? There are over 30 plus governments now telling their citizens to stockpile daily basic needs. Yes, I read that. Do you think I should do a program on that? Maybe I'll do that for the Leigh's Looking Glass channel. But I think stockpile... My biggest, I've been saying for years, I don't know, those of you who have followed me since, what, four or five years ago, should remember me telling you, my biggest fear is power outages and the loss of internet. I always say the internet will become several intranet, huge intranets. And then once we lose power, there's no AI. E.I. is, I think, a... An overstated technology because it relies on power and the power grid is very fragile. So I was telling a friend that in some American families, can openers are electrically powered. They have electric can opener. So when they have a power outage, they can't even open a can of food. So make sure you have some man can open and cash. Yeah. So yeah, maybe we'll go back to growing vegetables in our backyard and exchange goodies with each other. You know, I have fruit. Maybe I grow fruit. I have a fruit tree and you have vegetables and someone raised chickens. I don't know, but who knows? Survival skills. People need to have real survival skills. Yeah. All right. I reached the bottom of All the questions. Where's the tennis champ Peng Shuai? Yeah, there's a report about her in Western media. Which one was that? I don't know. I think it was the European media about Peng Shuai. She's disappeared from the public ever since her post about her affair with Zhang Gaoli. The retired former Politburo Standing Committee member. And she appeared once during the winter Beijing Olympics to give an interview. And then since then, we have not heard from her. I mean, we have not seen her in public at all. All right, the day after tomorrow. Watch land before time. I think the world is getting very complicated. It is very complex. Geopolitics is very complex. The world is slowly descending into a bigger chaos. And yeah, I think it's, but individually, I think we have to hold on to something that's dear to our heart to survive in this difficult time. Whatever that is, maybe your family, your faith, but something deep in your heart will help you navigate through this difficult time. Technology will not help you. Money will not necessarily help us. It's what's deep in your heart that matters. So that's my advice. All right, that's all for tonight. I thank you for joining me. I'll be back tomorrow. Well, two live streams back to back. All right, stay well and I'll see you tomorrow. Bye.