A Reuters investigation uncovered a vast Iranian military procurement system that used thousands of undisclosed government-linked entities, foreign intermediaries and proceeds from oil sales to acquire weapons components, explosives and vehicles during the U.S.-Israeli war.
By yourNEWS Media Newsroom
Iran has maintained an extensive covert military procurement network involving more than 5,000 defense-linked agencies, allowing the country to import billions of dollars in missile components, explosives, industrial machinery and military vehicles despite Western sanctions, American airstrikes and a U.S. naval blockade.
An investigation published by Reuters on Oct. 29 revealed that the network has operated through numbered entities connected to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, using foreign intermediaries, shell companies and overseas funds to obtain equipment essential to the Islamic Republic’s missile and drone programs.
The investigation, conducted in collaboration with Israeli-American risk consultancy 240 Analytics, examined thousands of Iranian government and banking documents, corporate registrations and approximately 19,000 import records. The findings identified shipments totaling at least $2 billion since January 2025, with one major procurement agency alone accounting for approximately $2.3 billion in imports through June 2026.
The system has enabled Iran to continue acquiring materials used in ballistic missiles and unmanned aircraft even after the United States and Israel began military operations against Iranian weapons facilities on Feb. 28.
The covert entities operate under names beginning with MOD, an abbreviation for the Ministry of Defense, followed by five- or six-digit identification numbers. In Persian-language records, the agencies use the corresponding abbreviation VODJA.
Investigators found that the organizations share the same registered address in Tehran as the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, known as MODAFL. Their corporate records also list Feb. 11, 1979, the date of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, as their incorporation date, although most were actually established around 2013.
That period coincided with significant economic pressure on Tehran as international sanctions reduced Iranian crude oil exports and weakened the country’s currency.
Some of the agencies are linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, while others are connected to powerful economic foundations known as bonyads, which control extensive commercial assets and maintain close relationships with Iran’s political and military leadership.
Miad Maleki, a former senior official at the U.S. Treasury Department who helped develop sanctions against Iran, described the procurement structure as a central component of Tehran’s military operations.
“What you have here is the regime’s military lifeline during this conflict and for many years before,” Maleki told Reuters. “This is the complete ecosystem of the Iranian military’s trade business.”
The network’s financial arrangements are particularly significant because they allow Iranian procurement agents to make foreign purchases without relying on conventional international banking transfers that might trigger sanctions enforcement.
According to the investigation, approximately 97% of the reviewed shipments were settled without cross-border currency transfers.
Instead, trusted intermediaries operating outside Iran used money already held in foreign accounts, including proceeds from Iranian oil sales conducted outside established sanctions restrictions, to purchase equipment and arrange delivery.
These intermediaries, described as trustees, operate through foreign companies and other commercial arrangements that can obscure the ultimate purchaser.
Maleki said the system functions as a parallel international trading network, enabling Iranian military institutions to spend foreign earnings on weapons-related materials without directly transferring funds from Iranian financial institutions.
The investigation also uncovered substantial balances in accounts belonging to the numbered agencies.
Records from Iran’s state-run Bank Sepah showed that 36 agencies held approximately $1.2 billion in foreign exchange deposits at the end of 2024. Other entities collectively maintained about $1.8 billion in local currency.
Bank Sepah handles salary and pension payments for personnel associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Telephone numbers registered to 91 of the procurement agencies also appeared in banking records associated with IRGC personnel, providing another connection between the organizations and Iran’s military establishment.
The banking information helped researchers identify the network’s structure and trace individual transactions through government identity numbers, corporate filings and shipping documents.
Noam Binstok, a senior analyst at 240 Analytics, initially discovered the agencies in June 2025 while examining Iranian banking documents made available through Telegram and WikiIran, a website that publishes leaked Iranian government records.
He identified recurring account names, registration dates and addresses that connected thousands of previously unrecognized entities.
Binstok subsequently returned to the records in August 2026 and linked the accounts to more recent imports of military-related materials and money derived from oil transactions.
“These numbered agencies are the plumbing behind the Islamic Republic’s global sanctions evasion network and so much more,” Binstok said. “The amount of money going through these agencies is staggering, and no one has noticed them before.”
One organization, identified as MOD 346428, emerged as a particularly important importer.
Customs statistics showed that its foreign purchases increased from approximately $442 million during the 12 months ending March 2023 to $988 million the following year, placing it among Iran’s 10 largest importers.
Between January 2025 and June 2026, the agency imported approximately $2.3 billion in goods, including chemical ingredients for rocket propellants, explosives, aircraft engine components, precision manufacturing equipment and heavy-duty vehicles.
The materials originated from several countries, with shipping records frequently identifying China, Russia and Germany as sources.
Among the most significant purchases were chemicals used in the manufacture of solid rocket fuel.
Between January and April 2025, MOD 346428 imported 886 metric tons of chemicals through Iran’s Bandar Abbas port complex, with customs classifications covering sodium chlorates and perchlorates.
Three days after the final recorded shipment, a massive explosion occurred at the port on April 26, 2025, killing at least 70 people and injuring more than 1,200.
Two people familiar with the incident told Reuters that sodium perchlorate ignited inside shipping containers at the facility.
Iranian state media reported that the chemicals were stored by Sina Port and Marine Services Development Co., a business owned by Bonyad Mostazafan, a major economic foundation controlled by Iran’s supreme leader.
The company’s chief executive at the time attributed the explosion to a “false statement” concerning the contents of a shipment that arrived without proper documentation or identification.
Reuters could not determine whether chemicals in the final 75-ton shipment identified in the import records were responsible for the explosion.
The United States sanctioned Bonyad Mostazafan in 2020, alleging that the organization was used to enrich the supreme leader’s office and provide financial benefits to political allies.
The foundation is led by Hossein Dehghan, who served as Iran’s defense minister from 2013 to 2017, overlapping with the period when most of the numbered procurement agencies were established.
Dehghan previously commanded IRGC forces in Lebanon during the period surrounding the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings, which killed 241 American service members and 58 French paratroopers. The United States has attributed the attacks to Iran.
Reuters said Dehghan did not respond to questions concerning the procurement network, the port explosion or his leadership of the foundation.
The investigation also documented substantial imports of vehicles that Iranian forces can adapt for military operations.
Between January 2025 and June 2026, MOD 346428 imported 435 Iveco trucks, according to the records.
Iranian military forces have used Iveco vehicles as platforms for transporting and launching missiles, including disguised mobile launchers designed to complicate detection.
Reuters examined satellite imagery, vehicle identification numbers and social media footage to trace some of the trucks to a customs facility near Tehran.
Earlier records showed that an Iranian vehicle dealer living in Italy purchased six Iveco Eurocargo trucks in 2022 for 426,000 euros. The vehicles were transferred through a Dubai-based company before reaching Bandar Abbas.
The final purchaser’s government identification number matched MOD 346428, while shipping documents indicated that the trucks were destined for Sahara Thunder, an Iranian organization involved in drone production and sales.
The United States sanctioned Sahara Thunder in 2024 for its involvement in manufacturing and supplying military drones to Russia.
In March 2026, U.S. Central Command released footage showing what it described as an attack on an Iranian mobile missile launcher.
Defense analysts at Janes identified the vehicle in the footage as an Iveco model of a type imported by Iran, although Reuters could not establish whether it came through MOD 346428.
Iveco denied knowingly supplying prohibited military users and said its authorized distributors are contractually required to prevent vehicles from being used for military, chemical, biological or nuclear purposes.
The company said it could not control vehicles resold by unrelated third parties and maintained that the presence of its trucks in Iran occurred outside its control.
Toyota vehicles also appeared in the records.
MOD 346428 imported thousands of Toyota Hilux and Land Cruiser vehicles, models that Iranian forces and allied armed groups have modified to carry heavy weapons.
The agency also purchased four Toyota Tundra trucks in January 2025, a model used by Iranian military units to transport drones.
Reuters identified footage showing Iranian security forces operating armed Land Cruisers during domestic protests and IRGC units transporting a Shahed drone aboard a Toyota Tundra.
Toyota said it does not conduct business in Iran and had no involvement in or knowledge of the purchases identified by Reuters.
The procurement system also continued acquiring specialized industrial materials immediately before the war began.
On Feb. 9, 2026, a vessel arrived at Bandar Abbas carrying 93 metric tons of unwrought titanium from China. Titanium is used in aerospace manufacturing and can be incorporated into missile airframes and rocket motor casings.
During February, additional shipments included 268 metric tons of nitrocellulose and 276 metric tons of chemicals classified under customs categories that include perchlorates.
Such materials have civilian industrial applications but can also be used in explosives and rocket propulsion systems.
The military-related imports continued after hostilities began.
Iranian import values initially fell by approximately 47%, dropping to $54 million in March from the previous month, according to the examined records. By May, monthly imports had increased to approximately $77 million.
In June, Iran received approximately $1.9 million worth of Russian detonators, the fifth identified shipment of similar materials from Russia since January 2025.
Together, those shipments were valued at approximately $7.6 million.
Detonators can be used to initiate explosive charges, including those incorporated into missile and drone warheads.
Other purchases included computer-controlled lathes, electron-beam furnaces and specialized industrial equipment capable of manufacturing precision components.
While such machinery has legitimate civilian uses, the technology can also support the production of missile structures, drone components and other military systems.
Peter Salisbury, an adjunct assistant professor at Columbia University who researches Iranian weapons transfers, said the imports indicated a sustained effort to replace or expand Iran’s military inventory.
“This looks like an industrial-scale effort to rebuild or expand Iran’s existing fleet” of drones and missiles, Salisbury said. “This data clearly shows the Iranian ecosystem’s adaptability and its ability to find new routes.”
The shipment routes extended across several regions.
Documents indicated that military-related goods entered Iran by cargo vessels crossing the Caspian Sea from Russia, trucks traveling through Central Asia and cargo aircraft arriving from China.
The investigation also identified goods recorded as originating in European Union countries, including Germany.
Hundreds of millions of dollars in trucks, aircraft components and electronic equipment appeared in the records as European-origin imports. Approximately $34 million involved Iveco vehicles.
European sanctions prohibit specified military-related trade with Iran, although customs records identifying a country of origin do not necessarily establish that the manufacturer knowingly participated in a prohibited transaction.
An EU spokesperson said member states are responsible for enforcing applicable restrictions and that European authorities continue examining information concerning Iran’s missile and drone programs.
The investigation also identified approximately $27 million in goods recorded as originating in the United Arab Emirates after the war began.
Most were delivered by sea, including an electronics shipment dated June 27, nine days after the United States temporarily suspended its naval blockade. The blockade resumed in mid-July.
The UAE government rejected allegations suggesting that it facilitated unlawful procurement.
An Emirati official said the country “categorically rejects and refutes these baseless allegations,” maintaining that the claims misrepresented its policies and actions.
China also disputed suggestions of involvement in Iranian military procurement.
Responding to Reuters, China’s Foreign Ministry said it was “unaware of the situation you describe.”
“We firmly oppose attempts to maliciously link regional hostilities to China or smear China’s reputation,” the ministry added.
The findings contrast with statements made by President Donald Trump concerning possible Chinese and Russian assistance to Iran.
On Oct. 12, Trump said he did not believe either country was materially supporting Tehran’s military operations.
“If they are, it’s at a very low level, but I don’t believe they are at all,” Trump wrote on social media. “They have too much to lose, and we would know about it, and know about it very fast!”
The import records establish that goods identified as originating in China and Russia reached Iranian military procurement entities. They do not, by themselves, establish that either government knowingly authorized every transaction or that manufacturers were aware of the ultimate military destination.
American officials defended the effectiveness of U.S. economic restrictions despite the findings.
A Treasury Department spokesperson said Washington “has severed the regime’s economic lifelines.”
“While the regime may continue its desperate attempts to evade our powerful sanctions, fund its military and weapons programs, and access foreign currency, we are always 10 steps ahead,” the spokesperson said.
Reuters reported finding no evidence that Western governments had individually sanctioned the numbered MOD agencies identified in the documents, despite longstanding restrictions on Iran’s military institutions.
The investigation also connected the procurement system to organizations involved in domestic security operations.
One agency, MOD 424000, appeared in a 2021 financial document involving IRGC Brig. Gen. Hassan Shahvarpour, a commander sanctioned by the United States over alleged human rights abuses.
The document involved a request to transfer funds toward construction of an IRGC facility in Khuzestan province.
Other records connected the procurement agencies to the Foundation for the Preservation of Relics and Publication of Sacred Defense Values, an organization responsible for promoting the Islamic Republic’s military history and ideological messaging.
Reuters reported that the foundation received shipments of electronics and refrigeration equipment through MOD 346428 and maintained financial relationships with other numbered agencies.
The findings illustrate the extent to which Iran’s military procurement operations overlap with financial institutions, commercial foundations and government organizations.
They also demonstrate the limitations of maritime restrictions when military-related materials can be transported through multiple international routes and purchased through intermediaries outside conventional financial channels.
Although Reuters identified substantial shipments involving materials used in weapons production, the investigation could not independently confirm the precise contents or final military applications of every transaction.
Some goods had legitimate civilian uses, while other records contained incomplete descriptions or relied on customs classifications that did not identify specific products.
Nevertheless, the financial and shipping documents provide evidence of a procurement system operating throughout the war, including during periods when American and Israeli forces were targeting Iran’s military manufacturing capabilities.
The network’s continued activity raises questions about how effectively existing sanctions and the U.S. blockade have restricted Tehran’s access to the imported materials needed to sustain its missile and drone operations.
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