Xi's Power Struggle with Zhang Youxia Takes a Dangerous Turn, 2 Paths to Decide China’s Fate

At present, China is experiencing an unprecedented political instability not seen in over a decade. Since Xi Jinping came to power and consolidated almost all authority into his hands, the party-government military system has become completely unified. However, since late 2024, this unity began to fracture as a series of leaks revealed that the powerful military figure, Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, has gradually been cutting away Xi's power and is slowly emerging as the true controller of the Chinese military. The question raised by international analysts is, where is Zhang Youxia leading China? Is he a leftist, supporting the revival of Mao Zedong's ideology? Or is he a pragmatic technocrat, ready to shift right, open up, and democratize? This question not only pertains to Chinese politics, but also affects the entire geopolitical structure of East Asia and even the global order. Leaning Left? Military Adherence to Mao Zedong's Ideology? Recently, a surprising and controversial phenomenon within the PLA has attracted the attention of observers. Large-scale political education sessions focused on Mao Zedong's ideology are being reintroduced in the Chinese military. This immediately raised concerns that Zhang Youxia, the man in control of the military's real power, may intend to return to Mao, leading China back to the far-left political path of the 1960s and 1970s. Former Naval Lieutenant Colonel Yao Cheng was the first to make this information public on the X platform. According to him, military friends revealed that the current political education sessions emphasize preserving the red country forever, a slogan directly originating from Mao Zedong. Commentator Kai Schenken suggests that this could be a signal of a Mao revival in the new era, amid growing nationalism and tightening social control. However, to make a fair assessment, it's important to analyze why the military would choose Mao over other ideologies, and whether this truly indicates that Zhang is leaning towards the left. An important analysis from commentator Dai Yu highlights that, Within the Chinese Communist Party's theoretical system, aside from Mao Zedong, no leader has established a significant military doctrine for real combat. Hu Jintao was famously colorless. Zhang Zemin emphasized technology, but lacked military strategy, and Deng Xiaoping focused on economic reforms. As for Xi Jinping, he developed his own ideology, which is more political than military, stressing absolute loyalty, the party controls the gun, but offering no effective combat doctrine. In contrast, Mao Zedong directly commanded guerrilla warfare, people's war, and counter surrounding campaigns, experiences which were systematized in Mao's selected works and military lectures. In the eyes of military officers, even if they don't like Maoist politics, they must acknowledge that Mao's military theory still holds combat effectiveness. Therefore, studying Mao does not necessarily indicate an embrace of far-left political ideology, but could be because the PLA needs a practical theoretical framework to retrain its command system. That said, it cannot be denied that the choice of Mao for political training indirectly rejects Xi Jinping's ideology in the military, which centers more on loyalty, control, and propaganda than on actual combat. According to information shared by the Times media account, Xi Jinping once referred to Zhang Youxia as Zhang Shuiliang, a reference to a military mutiny. This indicates that the relationship between the two has reached an irreparable point, and Zhang may be using Mao as a symbol to gain support from PLA officers, who view Mao as a military strategist rather than just a political leader. While this approach evokes the Mao era, its meaning may have changed. So is Zhang Youxia truly leaning towards leftist ideology, or is he merely using Mao as a shield to navigate through the political minefield? The answer may lie in the fact that he has never publicly supported the planned economy model, has not called for opposition to private property, and has taken no steps to return to the totalitarian social control of Mao's time. Why Zhang cannot be a true leftist? A thorough analysis reveals that Zhang Youxia cannot, and does not want to, become a true leftist leader. One, no motivation to challenge the current elite. The fundamental difference between a genuine leftist and Zhang Youxia is that while leftists oppose the elite, Zhang needs their silence. In contemporary China, the elite class, comprising the princelings, red capitalists, and high-ranking officials, controls the nation's wealth and political influence. Their greatest fear is the party returning to Maoist thought, controlling assets, abolishing privileges, and suppressing private property. As Zhang Shunzhi analyzes, most of the current elite are anti-American in speech but send their children to Harvard, a lifestyle that benefits from the system while simultaneously protecting themselves with foreign passports. The fact that Wahaha's owner, Zhang Qinghao, has an illegitimate child in the US shows he doesn't place his trust in the party or the future of China, just like many other billionaires who have quietly moved their assets abroad. If Zhang were to truly lead China back to far-left policies, the elite would be the first to oppose him, and if he lost their support, his entire military power could collapse overnight. A pragmatist would not act foolishly 2. There is no place for the left in the current power structure. Even if Zhang wanted to, practically, he has no space to implement a leftist model. The simple reason? The left has long been sidelined from power. For years, Maoist factions like Bo Xilai's group, Qingming Xinwen, and left-wing intellectuals have either been controlled or suppressed by the CCP. Xi Jinping, although he once borrowed Mao's slogans, is, in reality, a leader who has personalized power, not a Maoist. Even his 2021 Common Prosperity campaign quickly failed, forcing him to reassure private enterprises and tycoons. If Xi, who controls the party, state, and military, cannot implement a leftist agenda, then Zhang, who only controls the military, stands even less chance of doing so. 3. Returning to Mao means returning to poverty, something the PLA will never support. The PLA today is no longer a proletarian army like in 1949. It is a technocratic, technologically advanced, and modernized force, with officers earning high incomes, accessing Western technology, and regularly trained to modern standards. If China were to return to Maoist models, people's war, self-reliance, closed-door development, it would mean the PLA losing its budget, modernization, and soft power. This directly contradicts the professionalization process of the military that Zhang Youxia himself is currently implementing. A general restructuring the military for efficiency cannot turn back to the days of carrying sticks to fight tanks. Zhang Youxia, the man shaping the future of China. According to commentator Xiao Shuojia, Zhang Youxia stands at a historical crossroads. He will not relinquish control of the military until the campaign against Xi Jinping is successfully concluded. It is expected that at the 18th Central Committee's fourth plenary session, he will officially become the chairman of the Central Military Commission. After that, Zhang will have to choose between two paths. The first path is the nationalization of military. That is, separating the PLA from the party's leadership, making the military an independent national defense force that only answers to the national constitution and stays out of party political struggles. If he chooses this direction, Zhang Youxia could become the father of China's military nationalization, paving the way for democratic reforms and modernization of the system, potentially earning a place in history as a groundbreaking reformer. The second path is, after neutralizing Xi's influence and stabilizing the political situation, Zhang could choose to continue serving the party and hand military power over to the next general secretary. In this scenario, the PLA would return to its former role as a tool of the party's subordination, and the opportunity for institutional reform might once again be buried. Zhang would then be merely a gatekeeper during the power transition period. The most crucial question now is not what the party will do, but which path Zhang Youxia will take. For he holds the key to shaping China's destiny for the next twenty years. Whether the country will escape the trajectory of autocracy or return to a cycle of control all depends on Zhang's upcoming choice. Commentator Zhang Shanjie argues that the nationalization of China's military is not like the process of military nationalization in other countries. In fact, this would be an act of opposing the principle of the party controls the gun, and preventing Central Military Commission chairmen with no military background from heading the military. Unlike political leaders such as Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, or Xi Jinping, who ascended from the administrative system, party organs, or policymaking paths, Zhang Youxia is a pure military man. Coming from a revolutionary family, he is a Red Second Generation, the descendant of high-ranking generals from the Mao Zedong era. His father, Jiang Zongkun, was a general in the People's Liberation Army, PLA, and a close associate of Mao during the founding of the People's Republic of China. Zhang grew up in the military, spending years on the frontlines, rising through the ranks from division-level positions to regional military command. He has held roles such as commander of the Shen Yun military region, commander of the Western Theater, and later vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission. As such, he understands every corner of the PLA system, from technology and operations to personnel. He knows who can truly lead, who is a paper general, and who is loyal to the country versus those who serve personal interests. This understanding made him dissatisfied when Xi Jinping launched a major military reform in 2015, including reorganizing the seven traditional military regions into five theater commands, consolidating command power, and placing numerous loyalists in key positions. For Zhang and many other senior officers, this reform disrupted the hierarchy within the military, removing experienced battlefield commanders and replacing them with people close to Zheng Nanhai but lacking real military capability. Paper generals and office-bound officials became common. According to Zhang Shanzhai, Zhang Youxie represents the aspiration to restore the principle that the military belongs to the soldiers, meaning that the military should be led by those who understand war, the soldiers, and the value of sacrifice. It should not be a political tool for general secretaries to decorate their authority, nor should it be a weapon to solidify individual leadership. This mindset has earned him strong support from mid- and senior-level officers, especially those who were overlooked during Xi's personnel reforms. This trust has allowed him to quietly rebuild his power network within the PLA, especially after many of Xi's tiger generals were taken down in 2024. While Zhang has not openly challenged Xi, recent leaks suggest that he has been gradually dismantling Xi's influence in the military, from reversing the five theater commands back to seven traditional military regions, restoring the four strategic general departments, to removing the requirement for absolute loyalty and replacing it with a standard of absolute effectiveness. Is Xi Jinping Zhang Youxie a historic showdown? Currently, China is approaching a model of three powers in the shadows. The party, the government, and the military are no longer tightly intertwined as they once were. Xi still nominally holds control over the party and the central government, but he no longer has real control over the military. Since the removal of loyal generals like Miao Hua and Heiwei Dong, Zhang has become the only one with the authority to issue military orders. This has created a constitutional vacuum. Theoretically, Xi is still the chairman of the military commission, but the real power has shifted to Zhang, similar to the situation Mao Zedong faced with Lin Biao in the early 1970s. The situation has become even more intense as articles in Liberation Army Daily, the official mouthpiece of the PLA, have begun openly criticizing the leadership for concealing mistakes and avoiding responsibility. Such is the article Only Through Correcting Mistakes Can We Succeed, published on July 18, 2024. Although unnamed, it is clear that the target of this critique is Xi Jinping, who is famously conservative and never admits failure. The conflict between Zhang and Xi is irreconcilable. It is like two trains heading toward each other, and the issue is no longer whether a conflict will occur, but when it will erupt. An interesting point is that both Xi and Zhang are products of the centralization of power mechanism that followed the reform era. However, while Xi has used the party to position himself at the center, Zhang, through his own power, is shifting that central role from the party to the military. They represent two completely different models of power. Xi Jinping, legitimate power, absolute politicization, top-down totalitarianism. Zhang Youxia, real power, technocratic law, military from the bottom up. If Xi is the political king, Zhang is the commander-in-chief without a throne. To conclude today's program, I will reiterate. Zhang Youxia does not belong to the left. He does not carry the ideals of class struggle, nor does he intend to fully restore Maoist models. He is also not from the right, as there is no sign that he supports democratization, the rule of law, or institutional reforms in a western direction. So who is he? He is the one who maintains the balance of power, acting according to an absolute pragmatic principle. When necessary, he studies Mao to legitimize his control over the military. When needed, he discards ideology to restructure the command. He is not attached to any ism, but to the one thing he understands fully, military power and how to protect it. At a time when the party is weakening, the government is divided, and the military is discontent, Zhang Youxia has become the holder of the historical key. But the door he opens, whether it leads to democracy, Maoist revival, or a neutral military model, will depend not on ideology, but on the pressures surrounding him and his ability to maintain balance. At this moment, he has not turned left nor right. He stands at a crossroads, but a historical crossroads never allows anyone to stand still. What do you think of Zhang Youxia's choice? Please leave a comment below. Thank you, and we look forward to seeing you again in the next program.