Can Ukrainian strikes inside Russia inflict lasting damage on the Kremlin’s war machine?

Donald Trump has expressed frustration at the lack of an end to the war in Ukraine. One way for Kiev to break the deadlock might be to strike deeper inside Russia. But Ukraine has been getting mixed messages from the White House. The war that defies all attempts at peace. Despite several rounds of talks over three years, Ukraine and Russia are no closer to a ceasefire, let alone an enduring agreement. While on the front line, the war rages on. And Russian drones and missiles rain down on Ukrainian cities. U.S. President Donald Trump recently encouraged Ukraine to get more aggressive against Russia. In a social media post, he wrote it's very hard, if not impossible, to win a war without attacking an invader's country. It's like a great team in sports that has a fantastic defense but is not allowed to play offense. But that encouragement isn't matched by military support. Reporting from the Wall Street Journal says the U.S. Pentagon has secretly forbidden Ukraine to use U.S.-made weapons to strike inside Russia since this past spring, in an effort to help the peace process. At the same time, Washington is sending mixed signals. Just this weekend, the Wall Street Journal also reported that the U.S. will sell Ukraine more than 3,000 long-range ARAMs, air-to-surface missiles, which are fired from F-16s and other jets, to be paid for by NATO countries. ARAMs can fly up to 450 kilometers. That would, in theory, allow Ukraine to strike deep inside Russian territory, even to the outskirts of Moscow, as well as hitting Russian military assets on the Crimean Peninsula. Though Ukrainian pilots avoid flying too close to the border to avoid being shot down, which could reduce their range. The ARAMs would reportedly be delivered in the next six weeks. Ukraine has been pushing for longer-range capabilities almost since the war began. When the previous administration sent HIMARS multiple rocket launchers and ATAKMS longer-range missiles, it feared that Russia would escalate if attacked on its own territory. Ukraine was only allowed to use those weapons against Russian forces inside occupied Ukraine. Eventually, Ukraine was allowed to fire into specific sites around Russia's Kursk region, which was briefly held by Ukraine last summer. Ukraine has made some brazen moves without coordinating with the U.S. Operation Spider's Web was a long-planned drone assault that took out bombers deep inside Russian territory. And it continues to hammer oil refineries and depots with drones and missiles, as well as shutting down Russian airports. And Ukraine has been building its own capabilities in the meantime. It says it's developed a cruise missile with a 3,000 kilometre range that will go into mass production this winter. That would be a major step for Ukraine towards breaking its dependence on U.S. support, making those mixed messages a lot less important. Let's pick up some of those points with Simon Diggins. He's a military analyst and former British Army officer. Welcome to DW. Ukraine's been attacking targets inside Russia for some time now. What sort of effect have these strikes had? Good evening to you. I mean, quite effective, particularly against their oil refineries. I mean, the major support that Putin's got now in terms of keeping the war going is around his ability to keep the oil money coming in and at least his refineries. And the Ukrainians have been effective in damaging some 10 to 15 percent of that. That will have an effect on what they're doing. We also know, of course, they've been very imaginative in terms of their use of combining drone attacks, missile attacks and others against other targets, including targets well inside Russia and into the territories even east of the Urals. So the Ukrainians are very effective in the way they use them, but they are limited by their ability to maintain this on a persistent basis. And your report very clearly laid out some of the limitations being put on them by America. And, of course, the ongoing debate about whether or not Germany would supply them with terrorist missiles, which I think we understand at the moment they are not planning so to do. Right. So tell us more then about how those limitations imposed by Ukraine's allies have held the country back militarily. Well, overall, I mean, the analysis would tell you that the support to Ukraine has been one dollar too little, one day too late. And that seems to be the issue. So we've been in an absolutely absurd position whereby Russians are able to conduct attacks against Ukraine from well inside Russian territory. But the Ukraine's been limited, only able to hit targets that would be essentially within Ukraine, their proper territorial boundaries in Ukraine. That's allowing the Russians to, if you like, to regroup, reorganize and to resupply at its leisure. Now, more recently, they've been able to hit back at some of those things. But it's been basically tying that one hand behind their back. And this is, of course, the country that has less resources and less ammunition, less forces than Russia itself. So they have been very much hamstrung by the way in which the West has supplied and then tried to control the use of Ukrainian missiles against the Russians. And now we're seeing in the report Ukraine is just about to start mass producing its own long-range missile, this Flamingo. How is that likely to change the situation? Well, because we haven't seen it used yet operationally. All we hear about are the reports and all we've heard about is what they're offering to do. If it's all as it says it's going to be, it's going to be significantly different. We're talking about a weapon system that has a range of up to 3,000 kilometers, which takes you well to the east of the Euros. To give you some idea of comparison, Kiev to Moscow is about 670 kilometers. So it gives you some sense what 3,000 kilometers gives you in terms of range. It does mean they can hit some of the Russian targets that are well into the country itself. So it will make a change. The really important thing is this gives them, will start to give the Ukrainians what they've been after for a while, which is a strategic non-nuclear deterrent. That was the basis of the request that was given to Chancellor Max, to Prime Minister Starmer, and to President Macron earlier on this year, and indeed to the Americans at the moment. The Americans weren't really talking to the Ukrainians. Essentially to give Ukraine an independent sovereign deterrent that could deter Putin from further aggression, all of which of course is premised on a ceasefire. It's proving very difficult to get the kind of missions they need to do. The Americans put restrictions on the use of ATAKMS and HIMARS missiles. The Germans have decided not to supply tariffs to Ukraine. While Britain and France have been happy to supply STORM, SADAT, SHADOW and SCALP, its range, those missiles ranges, which are about 500 kilometers, does not give you the range and depth you need to hit some of these industrial targets to the east of Russian territory. So if Flamingo, which is the name they're using, turns out to be as effective as they hope it to be, it will start to provide them with the fact that they do support the need. That's very clear. Thanks for talking us through that, Simon. Military analyst, Simon Diggins. My pleasure. Well, I'm joined now by John Foreman. He's a security analyst and former UK defense attache in Moscow and Kyiv with direct experience advising on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. John, it's good to have you on the program. Do you consider it a mistake for Ukraine's to repeatedly impose restrictions on the use of their missiles inside Russia? Yeah, hello, Brent. Yeah, I've said from the beginning of the war three and a half years ago that it was a mistake for the West to force Ukraine to fight with one hand tied behind its back to enable Ukraine to defend itself, but not able to take the battle, shall we say, to the Russian state itself. And what we've seen, as your report set out, is a whole series of steps by the Biden administration, now the Trump administration, to stop Ukraine using weapons supply to it to reduce their effectiveness. I think those steps taken by the Americans being paid by Ukrainian blood. Yeah, if you say it's a mistake, do you see a strategy at all behind the mixed signals that have been coming from the Biden and now the Trump administration? Yeah, I think the Americans have put restrictions on both the use of weapons and the supply. That's played through. I think for the Biden administration, it was much more about the fear of escalation. Jake Sullivan, the previous national security advisor, used to speak about escalation management. But what he ended up doing was deterring himself and not allowing the Ukrainians to fight properly. I think for Trump, it's much more about the so-called peace process, which has so far been stillborn, not really wishing to rock the boat in the hope for a win-win deal with the Russians. But who knows with Trump? One minute he's saying encouraging Ukrainians to attack Russian targets, and next minute he's putting on restrictions. So very much mixed messages by the Americans for the last three and a half years. And beyond the Americans, how do you explain the fact that Western allies, after more than three years of war, remain hesitant to allow Ukrainian strikes inside Russian territory? Well, I think we've had that rather sterile debate about Taurus. I didn't think there was any chance whatsoever of Germany allowing Taurus to be used inside Russia. And also, because of the way that these systems work, a lot of them are dependent on both American intellectual property and American intelligence support to the Ukrainians to be used against military targets. So unfortunately, I think the French, the British, the Germans, the Italians have taken the lead from the American position. Sometimes they've hidden behind it. That said, when they're actually used in Crimea, in occupied Ukraine, and also in Russia itself, they prove to be effective. And I think what the American policy and the European dithering has led to is Ukraine developing its own sovereign capabilities, which I think is the right way ahead. Yeah, our report actually touched on that, mentioning Ukraine's new domestically produced long-range missile known as the Flamingo. Could this weapon, in your opinion, could it replace the restricted systems provided by Ukraine's allies? Well, I'm encouraged by the development of Flamingo, this long-range missile, also the Neptune 2, which is the evolution of a Ukrainian cruise missile used against the Moskva cruiser in 2022. But I think the real problem for Ukrainians is making sure they have enough weapons to conduct a deep battle strike against Russian targets consistently. I mean, it's all well and good using drones here and drones there on occasional strike, but what Ukraine really needs to do is have a sustained targeted campaign against key Russian military targets, which support the Russian war machine. I think if we look at the metric, has the Russian attack been slowed down? I would say it hasn't been so far. So about production and sustained production by the Ukrainians will help them perhaps degrade Russian capabilities further. Yeah, let me just pick up on that. Do you think that Ukrainian strikes inside Russia, could they truly inflict lasting damage on the Kremlin's war machine if we're talking about looking into a year net from now? Yes, I think they need to go deeper. I mean, I think it's clear that the Russian economy is in a very powerless position. We know about the problems with energy supply. We also know about problems as highlighted recently about gas refineries, etc. I think Ukraine could have an effect if over the next year, these targets are struck consistently, not just within, say, 300 kilometres of the border, much, much deeper inside Russia. Of course, Russia will then use that to say this is all about escalation and start to wave the nuclear escalation card. I think we should be mindful that Russians have tried that for the last three and a half years. I think Russia does fear sustained Ukrainian targeting of their military infrastructure inside Russia. And it's a legitimate military tactic, unlike the Russian tactic against Ukraine, which is to target Ukrainian citizens and civilians to affect morale and to weaken support for the war. Defence analyst John Foreman. John, as always, we appreciate your time and your valuable insights. Thank you. Thank you, Brian. For more now, I'm joined by Christopher Morris. He's a military analyst focused on Russia's war in Ukraine. He is with the defence company Kaloyan Europe. Mr. Morris, it's good to have you with us. So how do you read these mixed signals coming from Washington? On one hand, we've got President Trump saying you have to be on the offensive to win. On the other hand, he's reportedly blocking Ukraine from using U.S. missiles to strike targets inside Russia. Absolutely confusing. Now, whether or not this is some high-level bargaining technique, I certainly couldn't comment on that. Yes, on the one hand, we do have the fact that the Pentagon is kind of quietly blocking Ukraine from using its U.S.-made weapons systems and similar weapons systems to strike within Russia, often requiring high-level approval for each strike. Now, this, of course, is a policy shift from earlier, more permissive stances. And yes, and simultaneously, you have Donald Trump probably suggesting that Ukraine now is the time to go on the offensive. And you can understand that this is going to take, it's somewhat difficult to grasp exactly what the intention is here. And this ambiguity certainly risks complicating Ukraine's strategic planning. And it may critically undercut morale in this critical junction as well. If U.S. weapons are off limits for strikes inside Russia, what other options does Ukraine have for these kinds of attacks? It's very interesting because Ukraine is currently ramping up its production of long-range weapons systems, including drones and missiles, that it is manufacturing somewhat effectively locally. In terms of drones, we've seen Ukraine become very proficient at using long-range deep-strike drones. And in fact, you've seen that drones become responsible for about 60 percent of Ukraine's deep-strike operations taking place in Russia. We also have some new missile capability kind of entering the scene now. Flamingo is drawing a lot of attention as a cruise missile. Well, it's capable of basically significantly extending Ukraine's reach within Russian territory. So whether or not that's a game changer remains to be seen. But it's certainly promising from the Ukraine perspective. If it's not a game changer, then what is it? Well, like I said, it's going to take an awful lot of technology to shift the strategic calculus in Ukraine at the moment. So whilst we can certainly say that this innovation is positive, is it going to fundamentally rebalance the war in Ukraine? Unfortunately, probably not. You can certainly inflict some pain and suffering on the Russian side. But unfortunately, unless this production ranks up incredibly significantly, and the Flamingo, to be fair, it's a very significant weapons system. We're talking a 3,000 kilometer range here, and we've already seen it used effectively against Russian targets. But fundamentally, this war has been going a long time. Russia has proved to be incredibly durable. And whilst this, again, it's fundamentally a positive innovation, is it fundamentally going to shift the balance of power? Unfortunately, probably not. And Mr. Morris, let me just ask you, though, if the Ukrainians are able to get production of the Flamingo at a level that could sustain their war effort, how does the Flamingo compare to the longer range weapons already being supplied by Ukraine's allies? Is it just as good? Oh, it's certainly a very effective weapons system. And at the moment, we're looking at production of around 30 missiles a month. Of course, that could expand as time moves on. And indeed, I would expect this production to step up in the coming months. Now, comparing it to other long range weapons systems supplied by the West, we've got lots of missiles coming in from places like the UK and France. We've got Storm Shadow. We've got ATAKMS from the US. Now, these have been strategically useful, although they have been constrained in their use by policy options. Now, the advantage of Flamingo over this, and I suppose it's roughly comparable to something like a Tomahawk Block 5, although its range is significantly beyond that, it also has a very good payload in terms of, we're talking about 1100 kilos of warhead here, which is a significant payload. The real benefit here is that this is something that Ukraine controls all on its own without Western involvement. So, it's a very significant Western system. Is it as advanced as some Western weapons systems? Probably not. In terms of stealth technology and its ability to evade radar, it's not quite on the level of something produced in the US, for instance. Is it significant? Absolutely. Is it a game changer? Is it new tech that we're dealing with here? Unfortunately not. Okay. Military and security analyst, Christopher Morris. Mr. Morris, as always, we appreciate your time and your insights. Thank you. Absolute pleasure. Thank you.