Who really commands China’s military?

Who controls the world's largest communist regime is arguably the most important question in geopolitics. Xi Jinping's grip on power, and especially his control over the military, has been the subject of intense speculation. The central question is, what's Xi Jinping's true relationship with his vice chairman Zhang Youxia? Which one of the two actually controls the PLA? Hopefully we'll come to a conclusion by the end of this program. Actually, this question has dominated attention for more than a year. One camp believes Xi Jinping has already lost control of the military to Zhang Youxia. Their case rests on the downfall or disappearance of Xi's most trusted generals. The other camp insists Xi Jinping is still firmly in charge. They argue it is precisely Xi Jinping's insecurity and paranoia that drove him to purge even his closest allies, cutting down generals who once formed his inner circle. So for months, both sides looked to the September 3rd military parade as a weathervane, hoping it would reveal the balance of power between the two. Now that the parade has come and gone, the debate has only intensified. Let me walk you through the arguments from both camps, so you can decide for yourself what's really happening inside the Chinese military. So let me start with those who believe Xi Jinping is still in power. All right, so for them, the strongest evidence is symbolic but powerful. Xi Jinping's presence on the Tiananmen rostrum with Putin and Kim Jong-un, followed by his solo review of the troops. That image is the strongest evidence. In the weeks before, speculation had been rampant, claims that PLA generals were refusing to march, that Xi Jinping would not be allowed to inspect the troops, even that Zhang Youxiang might replace him. They were everywhere. In the end, none of that happened. Xi Jinping appeared in full command, inspecting the army as commander-in-chief. So to this camp, that was proof enough that his authority remains unchallenged. The second piece of evidence is what happened on August 26, 2025, when the Chinese military held what it called the All-Army Academic Symposium to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory of the war against Japan. That symposium was held in Beijing. What caught observers' attention is that Zhang Youxiang not only attended, but also in his speech explicitly cited Xi Jinping's thought. Now, prior to that point, we hadn't heard Zhang Youxiang mentioning Xi Jinping's thought for a year. So at this event, he declared the need to, quote, thoroughly study and implement Chairman Xi's important instructions to genuinely learn, truly understand, firmly believe, and fully apply Xi Jinping's thought. Okay, so this was the first time in a year that Zhang had publicly mentioned Xi Jinping's thought. So for those who believe that Xi Jinping is still in power, this was a strong signal that Zhang Youxiang had yielded ground to Xi. But for those who do not believe this, they think his comments were almost satirical or comical. Their third argument rests on photos and videos of Xi Jinping's younger brother, Xi Yuanping, hosting a banquet for the CCP princelings' families. Here in the image, Xi Yuanping, he's the one in that white shirt in the center. So here he is hosting a banquet for the CCP Red aristocracy at a Beijing hotel after the parade. In the images or the videos, people could tell that in attendance were Mao Zedong's daughter, Li Na, and then Zhou Enlai's niece and the son of founding marshal Chen Yi. So for Xi Jinping supporters, these images and videos prove that Beijing's political elite have rallied around Xi Jinping and his family in exchange for his promise to safeguard their privileges and wealth. Okay, their fourth argument focuses on the conspicuous absence of Hu Jintao from the parade. Until now, Hu Jintao had never missed a military parade under Xi's rule. So this camp says his absence proves that the reformist faction has been completely sidelined, especially after Beidaihe. According to their account, Xi Jinping admitted to policy mistakes at the summer retreat, but struck a deal he would step back or step down in three years at the 21st Party Congress. In reality, though, his plan is to install a puppet successor and continue ruling from behind the scenes after 2027. So let's now switch to the other side and walk through their arguments. Okay, their argument number one is about Hu Jintao's absence. They say that the fact that Hu Jintao didn't attend the parade isn't proof that his influence has faded. It could just as easily be Hu Jintao's outright refusal to participate in Xi Jinping's event. This camp says Hu simply didn't want to be seen alongside Putin and Kim Jong-un. They argue Hu's influence is actually growing, not shrinking. Judging by the high-profile activities of his prodigy, Hu Chunhua, and his son, Hu Haifeng, these two, often called the Junior Hus, are exactly the people Xi Jinping has tried hardest to suppress. Remember just a week before the parade, Hu Chunhua showed up at unusually prominent events in Tibet and then in Jilin, in Changchun, Jilin, receiving treatment usually reserved for the party's top leader. And also Xinhua and People's Daily even showered him with poetic praise, calling his presence spring blossoms and autumn fruits, in Chinese, Chunhua Qiushi. And meanwhile, Hu Haifeng, the son, who is just the deputy minister in the ministry of, I think it's called social services, suddenly appeared at a high-profile financial forum in Shanghai and was even spotted in that large delegation that accompanied Xi Jinping to Tibet. Now his job doesn't require him to go to Tibet, so why did he send the two Junior Hus there? So the fact that both men have been so active recently, this camp argues, shows Hu Jintao's influence is very much alive and well. Okay, and their second argument is that they addressed the Xi Jinping banquet photo. They say that none of the heavyweight princelings were there. Not General Liu Yuan, son of Liu Shaoqi, not Deng Pufang or Deng Rong, son and daughter of Deng Xiaoping. The son and the granddaughter of Chen Yun were not there, and not the children of Hu Yaobang. All of these above-mentioned names are well-known princeling heavyweights whose political power are tremendous, but they were all absent from this event. So this suggests Xi Jinping's gathering was limited to Maoist-era loyalists. They were the princelings, they were the Maoist faction princelings, and none of the politically powerful princelings showed up. Okay, and their point number three is about the parade marshal. Now if Xi Jinping were truly in full control of the military, he wouldn't have waited until the last minute to announce the parade marshal, nor would he have chosen a lieutenant general. Normally, that honor would always go to a full general, such as the commander of a central theater command, or the central theater command, or even defense minister. So why didn't that happen? Even if Xi Jinping personally favored Lieutenant General Han Shengyan, so let's say Xi Jinping just really, really likes him and wants to name him the parade marshal, he could have promoted him to full general before the parade to keep protocol intact if the choice had really been his. The fact that the marshal was not a top-tier officer suggests Xi Jinping is not the one calling the shots. And this, they argue, was Zhang Youxia's way of signaling that she is no longer the true chief commander. Right, and another sign they say is Zhang Youxia's seating arrangement. He was placed alongside current and former members of the Politburo Standing Committee, treated as if he were one himself. This shows his political standing has risen. And in this view, Xi Jinping reviewed the troops not because he holds power, but because the opposition allowed him to. Both sides struck a temporary truce to project unity and prevent the regime from collapsing. For this camp, their strongest argument is that, they say that you have to look at the bigger picture. Their strongest argument rests on the military purges and re-emergence. The massive downfall of Xi Jinping's loyalists in the military over the past year is problematic. Beyond the four generals I mentioned earlier, the overwhelming majority of those purged have been Xi Jinping's people. This cannot be Xi Jinping's own doing, they say. As suspicious as Xi Jinping is, he isn't crazy enough to wipe out so many of his own people while still dreaming of taking Taiwan by force. At the same time, former military leaders once sidelined by Xi have reappeared. At this year's PLA anniversary reception, three generals once targeted by Xi were seated at a main table. Liu Yuan, the heavyweight princeling, whose talent and intellect intimidate Xi Jinping. And then there's another guy, Wang Guanzhong, who was Hu Jintao's former executive assistant in the CMC's general office. And then there's Cai Yingting, former deputy chief of the PLA's general staff, who was demoted eight ranks by Xi Jinping after Xi Jinping found out his daughter married a Frenchman. Anyways, so these three retired prominent generals, their re-emergence spoke volume. So now think about it. Xi Jinping's most trusted generals keep disappearing, while his adversaries keep resurfacing at high-profile events. So to this camp, that's the strongest evidence that Xi Jinping's influence is fading. Now there are more arguments, but those are the main ones from both sides. So what do you think?