China’s Mysterious Troop Movements: War Prep, Power Struggle, or Intimidation?

Hello, everyone. Welcome to Lay's Real Talk. Well, another week has begun. All right, sorry for the late start. Chris was exporting. My team put together a video. They worked very hard to produce actually two videos for you which gathered all the military moves that we've seen in the past two weeks. I just say past week, and I'll play that for you, okay? So something is happening inside Beijing, and it looks anything but normal. The atmosphere in the city is tense. A storm feels like it's gathering. Now, let me first share the latest and most shocking development in Beijing. Two nights ago, residents filmed fiery explosions in the city while fighter jets flew low overhead with deafening roars, and the sky lit up. So let me play this first clip. It's really short. Where is it? I think here we go. Yeah. Let me start from the beginning. Okay, so that's clip number one. So as you can see, the person in the video was saying the sky is exploding. Did you see that? That's what he said. And then in the second clip, it shows troops in small-sized streets. And prior to that, I had played a video clip showing artillery fire in the suburbs of Beijing at night. So it's been more than 10 days since Beijing announced the downfall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. Since then, rumors, speculation, and analysis have flooded the internet. Right now, there are three competing theories trying to explain what actually happened. At the same time, clips showing PLA movements across China are spreading online. I have been asked by people, are these videos real? Who ordered these deployments? And what's going on inside China's military? Are they preparing for war in Taiwan? These are all burning questions on our mind. So tonight, let's get to the bottom of this. Now, before we analyze these military movements, let's step back and look at the three main theories or explanations people are debating right now because the answers matter in explaining the military movements. So let's get to that first. Let me bring these two. Can you see? Yeah, okay. Let's just put them on the screen. It's theory number one. Okay, this is the view held by most Western experts. They say Xi Jinping's power remains unchallenged. In this view, Xi has always been fully in control of the military. He took down Zhang Youxia because Zhang disagreed with him over using force against Taiwan. Actually, I should move to this slide. It's between the two of them. So Zhang is seen as anti-war. He doesn't believe the PLA would win, and he doesn't want to see hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers die in a losing war. Another major rift is over reckless personnel decisions inside the military. The general opposed Xi's many appointments, and his views reportedly had broad support among the PLA officers. That in turn intimidated and threatened Xi, and this ultimately led to the general's downfall. That's view number one, or theory number one. Theory number two, which is very interesting. It says, Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia staged a good cop, bad cop performance to deceive the United States and the West. The idea here is that the apparent power struggle inside the PLA is the performance itself. Supporters of this theory point to what happened immediately after Zhang's alleged arrest, right? We suddenly see PLA movements across multiple theater commands and service branches, rocket units, fighter jets, helicopter drills, and ground troop mobilizations. So in this view, the entire drama around Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, is strategic deception, meant to hide war preparations. The two generals are missing from public view, not because they were taken down, but because they're supposedly busy preparing for war to take Taiwan. This isn't the most popular view, but quite some people believe it. Theory number three. This was Xi Jinping's last-ditch coup attempt to retake control of the military. And according to this view, Xi Jinping lost real power at the third plenum in 2024 after suffering a health episode, most likely a stroke. After that, Zhang Youxia, backed by party elders, took effective control of the military, even though Xi Jinping still remained the top leader on the surface. And a new decision, meanwhile, a new decision and coordination body was formed to counterbalance Xi's authority. After recovering, Xi Jinping tried repeatedly to claw his way back, but failed. As a result, a whole class of generals, seen as loyal to Xi Jinping, were taken down, including Miao Hua and He Weidong, among others. So in this theory, the move against Zhang Youxia was Xi Jinping's final gamble to regain military control. This is the view predominantly held by many Chinese political commentators, including myself. Now, let me walk you through why I find the first two theories weak. First, why theory number one doesn't hold up. The claim that Xi Jinping holds absolute power has always been in full control of the military. Well, the problem with this theory is the political risk Xi Jinping took by moving against Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhengli, the way he did. Right now, his biggest vulnerability is legitimacy and procedure. If he were truly in full control, there was no need to gamble politically with such a sudden high-risk move. There is well-established CCP playbook for taking down senior officials. You quietly open an investigation, let it run for a month, get consensus to remove him or her, and only then make a formal announcement months later, by which point the outcome is already locked in. This is how they usually do it. But this time, she went for a high-profile, high-risk takedown of Zhang Youxia that no one is ready for. And what followed is an awkward, unprecedented silence from both the military and the party. No ritualized pledge of loyalty, no coordinated chorus of support, and that silence is the tell. If she were fully in control, he wouldn't need to take such a gamble and risky move to take down someone. And he certainly wouldn't be facing this kind of collective hesitation afterward. So the way this unfolded suggests he was not in full control when he made the move. Now, why theory number two is not realistic? Well, the claim that Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia staged a good cop, bad cop act to deceive the Americans while secretly preparing for war, the fatal flaw here is the assumption that Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia operate as one coherent team. But based on everything we've seen over the past two years, their relationship is openly strained. You can't even tell by their body language. They disagree on personnel decisions, they disagree on war, they disagree on how the military should be run. There's no credible basis to believe Zhang Youxia would cooperate with Xi Jinping on such a sophisticated deception campaign tied to war planning. It's a beautiful theory on paper, but in reality, it assumes a level of unity and coordination between two rivals or between these two men. That assumption simply does not exist. So that's why out of the three, theory number three is closest to reality in my opinion. But that's just my view. Other people could hold different views. Because this theory explains why Xi Jinping took such a political risky gamble, why the response inside the PLA has been so hesitant and abnormal, and why the aftermath looks chaotic rather than choreographed. And once you see this as a power struggle over control of the military, not a controlled purge or a staged deception, the sequence of events makes much more sense. So it's important to tell you this or to lay this out, because it brings us to an important conclusion. Whatever these troop movements turn out to be, we can root out the idea that they represent coordinated war preparation for Taiwan. What we're seeing looks far more like internal turbulence and repositioning, not a disciplined, centrally coordinated march toward war. Why do I say that? Well, let's turn our attention to the military movements themselves. We started seeing signs of large-scale troop movements across multiple regions in China after Zhang Yuxia's arrest. So let me play you the second clip. And this one is four minute long. Where did that go? Okay, here we go. There's a plane over there. Oh. Check it out. Is that a military vehicle? There's a plane in the air. These two people are talking about how many buses and military vehicles were moving along. Is that all? Oh, that's the top vehicle. Look. They're saying that. They said, what's going on? All right. So these clips are compiled by my team. The next section is visual only, no audio. So these videos show missile launch vehicles, tanks, and armored vehicles moving along highways in different parts of China, like Yixing, Xuzhou, Taizhou, which are all in Jiangsu area under the Eastern Theater Command. And then we've also seen footages from Guangdong, Fujian, Anhui, Shandong, Inner Mongolia, even Tianjin. And they also show heavy activity like military trucks, troop carriers, engineering vehicles, and even armed helicopters. Do we have a helicopter clip here? Some clips even show fully armed soldiers on city streets with temporary nighttime assemblies and road closures. And then February 2nd, I don't know if you've... Yeah, February 2nd, there's a clip showing Guangxi. They show large envoys of military trucks racing down highways. Public information show that the units stationed in Guangxi belong to the PLA Southern Theater Command's 74th and 75th Group Armies. Still playing, yeah. Some, we can't identify the date and then the location. All right, so the obvious question is who authored these movements? Who ordered these military moves? Okay, I think that's the end. Okay, all right. Let me come back, right? So that's a good compilation of all the video, of all the military video clips that we've seen that I haven't played for you. There's some earlier clips that are already played and they're not included here. So was it Xi Jinping's order? If commanders across theater commands and service branches have not publicly declared support for Xi Jinping, how could Xi Jinping personally trust them to authorize such large-scale cross-regional deployments? So some people offer their opinions. Former PLA Navy Lieutenant Colonel Yao Chen, he analyzed the videos and his argument is simple. He said this is a nationwide synchronized deployment and deployment on this scale would be impossible without coordination across multiple chains of command and they are unlikely to have been ordered directly by Xi Jinping. And he goes even further. He claims that Beijing is now effectively surrounded. He believes, according to him, units from the Northern Theater Command, Shandong, and the Central Theater Command, I should say, have been mobilized in a way that will cut off Xi Jinping's routes of retreat. And the whole idea is similar to encirclement, which is a strategy the CCP has discussed in Taiwan war planning. So, and he's not alone. Many people echo this view. They claim that forces loyal to Zhang Youxia are moving to Beijing and are surrounding the capital waiting for a signal to move against Xi's loyalists. There are even whispers that commanders in the Central and Eastern Theater Commands are coordinating with Liu Yuan, who is said to have become a de facto leader of anti-Xi forces. Let me just put name to the picture, add to state. Here we go. Remove, where we go? Here we go. Yeah, they say General Liu Yuan is coordinating between the party elders and then the two commanders who are loyal to Hu Jintao. So they are the commanders in the Central and Eastern Theater Command. And General Liu is known to be close to Zhang Youxia and both are princelings. So according to this narrative, these deployments were approved by a small decision and coordination body made up of senior CCP leaders. Or I should say past and present standing committee members. It was a seven-person decision and coordination body. And it's led by former premier Wen Jiabao. And now the purpose is to pressure Xi Jinping to cooperate, not to overthrow him yet. They want Xi Jinping to turn over the two generals, alive or dead, but so far Xi Jinping hasn't cooperated. So this narrative would explain why we're seeing movement and pressure, but no open confrontation because the two sides are still negotiating. So here's the key question. Will this actually or eventually turn into a coup or rebellion the way many people are hoping? Let's bring this back to reality. There's a political commentator by the name of Du Wen, now based in Europe. He recently launched what he called a rescue action for families of rebelling PLA soldiers. His idea is to help protect and extract families of soldiers if they decide to go against the regime. And he said the response was strong and the active duty PLA personnel, even at high levels, have contacted him. Du Wen has relayed what a group army commander told him about inside the PLA right now. A group army commander has told him the real situation on the ground inside the PLA. And he's blunt. He said an armed rebellion in China is extremely difficult. According to this commander, the biggest obstacle is that generals don't actually control large numbers of troops that they can move directly. He said the only unit he could command without intermediaries was his guard company, just over a hundred soldiers. To move real forces, a group army commander has to go through division commanders, then regimental commanders, then battalion and company commanders. The chain is long. Not everyone is loyal. And with today's communications, one leak blows the entire operation and there's almost no room for secrecy. And there's also a logistics problem. The PLA tightly controls ammunition. Even if you have weapons, large-scale ammo supplies are not stored locally. You need cross-province and cross-theater coordination, which is nearly impossible to hide. So now the commander said, so that's why he said rebellion at the theater command level is extremely difficult. But he did say this. He did say if Xi Jinping personally showed up for an inspection, an attack would happen. Or he said an attack could happen in a moment of opportunity. But that's the point. It would require a rare, unpredictable opening. It's not something you can plan and execute across multiple theater commands. And he also said everyone in the military is now being forced to declare loyalty to the Party Central and to Xi Jinping. Not just verbally, but through written pledges, guarantees, and ideological reports. But what people are doing is privately, they say they are willing to support Xi Jinping, but formally or publicly, they refuse. They don't want to make public statements to show their support. The reason is they fear retaliation from Zhang Youxia's remaining network, which is formidable. And he said this quiet refusal is widespread. It has left Xi Jinping and then the political commissars at every level feeling embarrassed and alarmed. And he said that's why you're not seeing public loyalty statements from officers in the media. And the commander also explained why Zhang Youxia still cast such a long shadow. He controlled real power for decades, from group army commander to military region commander, to head of the CMC's Equipment Development Department, to vice chairman of CMC. Every one of those posts controlled careers, promotions, and resources. And anyone he promoted or worked with, or anyone promoted by his people is now labeled part of Zhang Youxia's network. And this network is extensive. And according to his assessment, he said over 60% of rank and file soldiers and more than 80% of CCP military officers sympathize with and support Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the two fallen generals. Again, let me repeat the numbers. Over 60% of rank and file soldiers and over 80% of officers sympathize with and support the two fallen generals. Even if that number is exaggerated, the direction of sentiment is clear. The resistance inside the PLA is real and deep. And he's also said that many of General Zhang's former subordinates have been ordered to take leave. And others have requested leave, those requests have been approved, but no one is allowed to transfer out of the military. So here's the bottom line. Those troop movements are very unlikely to be open rebellion by theater commands. That would be suicidal and almost guaranteed to fail. So what we're seeing is either coordinated PLA moves by the anti-Xi factions through people like Liu Yuan and Wen Jiabao, the central committee's coordination and decision body at the very top. So either there are coordinated moves by them or random acts that look more like repositioning and internal turbulence. Either way, it's not a coordinated coup or a real war mobilization. Now, having said that, we need to consider one possibility. What if some of these military movements are staged for show? Because the CCP, they're very good at staging drama or performance. In other words, they're not real war preparation, they're not coup, but theater meant to intimidate people sent down from Beijing. Multiple sources have said that Xi Jinping has dispatched working teams to different theater commands to pressure commanders into publicly endorsing his decision to take down the two generals. So far, no one has gone on record to support that decision. Instead, commanders and political officers are using all kinds of excuses to delay, to dodge, and to push back. Now, these working teams technically represent Xi Jinping, but they're still officials, right? And officials are human. So they think about their own safety, their own careers, and their own political future as well. Now, think about this. If a working team shows up at a command headquarters and everything is quiet, everything is very peaceful, no activity, no drills, no movement, that's one atmosphere. But if they arrive and see the command center buzzing, troops mobilizing, armored vehicles moving, artillery visible, live fire drills underway, which scene is more intimidating? Obviously, the second. So one interpretation is that some of these movements and exercises are being initiated locally, not because war is coming, but to create an atmosphere of force and readiness to signal, don't push too hard, don't cross certain lines. In other words, this isn't about overthrowing Beijing. It's about raising the psychological cost of Xi Jinping's envoys. It's a way for local commanders to say, without saying it out loud, we're not as weak, isolated, or compliant as you think. Don't push too hard. And that fits where we're seeing so far, right? Pressure from the center, resistance on the ground, movement without open rebellion. All right, so where does that leave us? My view is this. The military movements we've seen across different regions are like a combination of several dynamics we just talked about. Coordinated move from the top to pressure Xi Jinping, resistance on the ground, signaling to signals sent to the working teams, and internal repositioning. So whatever the mix, they've already produced visible effects, in my opinion. You can see that, I mean, since they made the announcement on the 24th, you could see Beijing's messaging has gradually shifted. So after the heavy-handed, I mean, the messaging we've seen so far is the PLA Daily, right, it's the PLA Daily and then the Defense Ministry, and primarily the PLA Daily. It's only through that media. And then the other state media just copied whatever the PLA Daily says. But if you study the four articles that have been published since then, the first one came out on the day of the announcement, which was very strong. It accused the two generals of undermining Xi Jinping's authority as chairman. I mean, the tone was severe. But then from January 31st to February 2nd, the PLA Daily ran three consecutive days, three front-page commentaries in three consecutive days. And the messaging evolved day by day. January 31st, the paper said investigating Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhengli was necessary to eradicate poisonous roots. Let me put the pictures back. It demanded that the entire military resolutely support the party, the party's decision, and remain highly aligned with Xi Jinping in thought, politics, and action. And then the next day, in another front-page article, doubled down, framing the cases as proof of the CCP's resolve to safeguard the military's political nature and to win a protracted, all-out anti-corruption battle inside the armed forces. And then on February 2nd, a third front-page commentary labeled Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhengli as corrupt elements and roadblocks and stumbling stones. It again emphasized that officers and soldiers must unify their thinking and actions with the party. And Xi Jinping. So despite the harsh tones, the pattern is interesting if you read carefully between the lines. Day one, urge the military to support the decision. Day two, justify the decision aggressively. Day three, tell the entire PLA to recognize the overall situation and stop wavering. So the sequence is revealing. First, the accusations were downgraded. The narrative quietly shifted from political disloyalty or even treason and challenges to Xi Jinping's authority. It has downgraded from those accusations to a more familiar and safe charge. What is that? Corruption. So the language has shifted from undermining Xi Jinping's chairmanship to now corruption. And the second, the shift indirectly confirms that the case shook morale inside the PLA. When you have to repeat loyalty demands three days in a row, something isn't landing. When you keep telling people to recognize the overall situation and pledge your loyalty to Xi Jinping, it means they're not buying the story. So in CCP's political language, that phrase is usually a warning sign. It points to internal resistance or pushback against decisions from the top. So when you put the troop movements together with the sudden messaging shift, one conclusion stands out. Whatever's happening inside the PLA right now, it's not business as usual. The two sides are locked in a dangerous standoff. So you may ask, where do we go from here? Like I said, on Sunday, Xi Jinping's biggest challenge right now is the lack of procedural legitimacy in taking down, the generals. After the Politburo failed to publicly back his action on Friday, Xi Jinping is now trying to force legitimacy through the National People's Congress. The NPC Standing Committee announced an emergency one-day meeting on the 4th to review the qualifications of certain deputies. They didn't name names, but that's very unusual because these meetings normally happen at the end of the month. And there's already a scheduled session in late February to prepare for the full NPC meeting in early March. So why rush such an ad hoc meeting now? Many people believe the real agenda is to remove Zhang Youxia as vice chairman of the state's Central Military Commission and remove Liu Zhenli as a member of the state Central Military Commission and strip both of their NPC deputy status. So you should know that in CCP China, the party CMC and the state CMC are essentially the same people with two different titles. There are two CMCs. One is the party CMC and one is the government CMC, but it's the same thing. Xi Jinping is trying to strip their titles on the government side through the People's Congress. And if he succeeds in pushing this through, he scores a major procedural win. It would appear as if he retroactively paper over the lack of due process in the arrests. But if he fails, he will lose a big one. So we'll see what happens. And the meeting was announced yesterday and scheduled for tomorrow. So, well, actually it's already 10 o'clock in the morning on the fourth. So it's, yeah, it's today in Beijing. So we'll see what comes out of that, what will come out of that meeting. That's what I have for you. I primarily want to focus on the military movements because so many people have asked me about that. And my team spend a lot of time collecting these clips and hopefully I offered you some explanation as far as why they're happening. And that's all I have for you. All right, let's see what people say. Okay, wow, 8,000 people online. Well, I appreciate everyone for joining me. If you haven't subscribed, please do so. I worked very hard to bring you the latest news concerning CCP politics. So I'd explain what's, not only I explain what's happening, I also explain why they're happening. So if you haven't subscribed, please do so. Well, let me thank the people who gave me super stickers. I really appreciate that. And if you have questions for me, put my name in the front. Hopefully I'll catch your question, but because there's so many messages online, I may not be able to catch them all. But let me first acknowledge the people with super sticker questions. Oh, I have things I want to show you. Some of you gave me money and asked me to buy, remember these? I talked about them in one of my programs. They went viral in China because the Chinese New Year is coming and it's gonna be the year of the horse. So China was selling these happy, smiling horse plush toys online, but someone stitched the mouth backward, upside down. And so here we have a crying horse, but guess what? The crying horse was an accident, but it went viral. I bought these on Amazon. The crying horse is actually more expensive than the happy horse. So which one do you like better? I mean, they're exactly the same. The only difference is the mouth. I see the nostrils. They're stitched upside down, but I like the crying horse better. Anyway, someone donated money to me to buy these toys and I did. They came in. It took a while for them to come in. All right. My little friends, for the year of the horse, they'll be standing on my desk for the next year. All right, let me acknowledge the super stickers. Where are they? Wow, there's so many comments. Oh, here's one. Boycott China. Shining Dapu facing the coup. Shining Dapu, huh? What is that, facing a coup? Salute, lovely. Oh, okay, well, thank you. Shining Dapu. You mean Winnie the Pooh? Winnie the Pooh? Sorry, I don't quite get the name, but thank you for the super sticker and the sweet message. All right, let's see. All right, let's see, what else? Wow, there's so many messages. I truly appreciate your time and attention. Here's one. Clippy. Clip pie. It's all for show. The new generals are reacting. The new generals. Are there any new generals? Well, actually, there's a list of 70 generals who are in trouble now. Because before this drama, before Zhang Youxia was arrested, he had a list of 70 people who he wanted to promote. But obviously, before he could promote these people, he was taken down. So people are saying that these 70 people, these 70 officers are in serious trouble now. So when you say new generals, there aren't that many full generals now. Typically, the PLA has like two dozens of full generals, active duty ones, but now they're down to four. So yeah. All right, thank you. All right. Oh, here's one. Clippy. Clip pie. Dominoes falling. Democrats, WHO, UN, EU, Greenlands, Panama Canal, Venezuela, Iran, Cuba, and China's hold on anything. The US can reach. All right, yeah. That's a true observation. It's a chain effect. Yep. There's a force behind all of that. Okay. All right. There's so many messages. Oh, here's one. JB, sorry, I can't pronounce your name. Thank you for your excellent content and impressive delivery. Your audience learned so much from you. Well, thank you, Jay. Sorry, I can't pronounce your name. Jim, is that Jim? Yeah. Well, thank you, Jim. All right, well, thank you for the super sticker. I really appreciate it. Oh, here's a question from Duido Migs. Lei, wouldn't you say in China, the leader always loses power when he loses respect and the country falls into warlordism? Xi's mistake is that he can North Korea the military. I think Xi Jinping has done something that no CCP leaders before him has ever tried. I mean, he broke all the rules. I mean, even when Mao Zedong tried to take down his vice chairman of CMC, Lin Biao, I mean, it wasn't easy. He had to coordinate. He had to make coordination with other people. I mean, he tried very hard and even had to stage a false appearance of a fleeing scene, right? Some people say Lin Biao wasn't trying to flee to Russia. He was only flying down to South and somehow Mao staged it so that it appears the family was trying to flee to Russia and was then shot down. So Mao had to work so hard to create a false crime scene to make the accusation and Xi Jinping just went ahead and just did it. So they say that it's quite outrageous even according to CCP's own standard. And that's why he's in so much trouble right now. Coffee and Paul, we are doomed to live in interesting times. Please take a question from the chat. Thank you, I will. I am doing that. Okay, here's a question from pick one. I don't see a lot of questions that don't have my names in front. So, oh, do I have one? Oh, here's one. Lei, have you read The Art of War by Sun Tzu? Yes, I did a program on that. If you take a look at one of my earlier videos in the channel called Lei's Looking Glass, I did a program based on the book. Thank you. All right, here's one. Oh, that's not addressed to me. Okay, Lei, skip eight, seven, six. Ma, does the CCP deserve any credit for bringing out 800 million people out of poverty and becoming the second largest economy in the world? No, because any government, any government would do a better job than that. That's precisely the false narrative the CCP has been using to justify its legitimacy. See, Chinese people work very hard. It is the Chinese, it's the 800 million of Chinese people who work so hard, who brought China to the second largest economy. And CCP didn't leave behind any good policy or legacy. The only thing that can be remembered from the era of reforms and opening up is the hardworking labor of China. There was no credible policy that worked. Is there any good policy that could be said as a legacy from that time? The real estate bubble busted, right? The banking system is on the brink of collapse. There's nothing left. The only thing that sustained China for decades is the hardworking Chinese people. So any government, any political system would do better than what China has already accomplished. So I don't give that credit to the CCP at all. Michael Estrada, every role shaking my head, every, oh, eye roll. Eye rolls shaking my head, sigh. I share that sentiment. I agree with you. It's crazy. All right, here's one question from Teacher Make Easy. Teacher Make Easy. Lei, do you think the Central Committee and the Military Commission need to have more women to avoid all these purges by the tough guys? I don't think there are any real women generals in the Chinese PLA. The women in the Chinese military serve other purpose. They're not meant to, they serve other purpose. Purpose reserved for the bed chamber as opposed to battlefield. So I don't think there will be any women in the CMC, no. If they do, if they ever climb, I don't, I can't imagine that. All right, okay, here's a question from Roska, forwarded by Nicole. Do you know if PLA officers have a reliable means of communicating amongst each other confidentially? Do they have a secure messaging service with which to discuss? It was said earlier that they have, the military has their own communication channel and that channel is controlled only by, that channel is not controlled by political commissars. They're controlled by the military commanders. So, and some people allege that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the two fallen generals, control that communication system. So with them gone, the question is, well, who's controlling that system and who's still using them? We don't know. All right, someone just not happy. What would a democracy in China look like? I'm not so sure if China is ready to embrace democracy right now, not until the political infrastructure is completely revamped. If we, let's say, if we have an election, it's gonna be manipulated, right? China is gonna turn out to be a supersized Venezuela. And on the surface, they could say, well, we had an election. We have elected a president. In the end, it's just another dictator. So I don't think we should rush China into democracy. I mean, we really need to hold the hands of the Chinese people to really reflect on their past experience with communism and really understand what went wrong. Democracy may work or may not work in China in the immediate aftermath of, in the post-CCP era. Yeah, I mean, as we can see, I mean, democracy needs a strong, democracy requires a high-level integrity in society. Democracy is built on a system, a system of trust. When that trust is not there, democracy is very fragile. It could be easily manipulated by dictators. So that's why I do not believe that China should rush to a Western-style democracy in the aftermath of a CCP collapse. Boycott China. Oh, we need a pool. Oh, okay. She need a pool. Is there such a thing as she need a pool? We need a pool. She need a pool. Okay, I learned something. Thank you. Well, thank you for the donation and the super sticker. All right, that's all. Is that all? That's all. There are a lot of questions. How about we end it here? Oh, here's one. Clip pie. Hopeful prediction, no war. PLA resets with Trump. Hopeful, let's hope that. I don't think the CCP is ready to start a war. Xi Jinping, even Xi Jinping has took control of the military. He needs to rebuild more. I mean, the PLA is not ready to go to war, and it's very dangerous if he launch an attack. When the PLA has control over ammunition and weapons and heavy artillery, who can guarantee that Zhang Youxia's remaining network is not gonna turn against Xi Jinping? It's very likely. So I don't think Xi Jinping is gonna start a war in the near future. So, all right, I reached the bottom. Well, thank you very much for joining me. I'll see you in two days. Bye.