NASA Found a Insane Method to Launch Moon Mission BUTSpaceX Starship is BETTER

NASA has just made a long-awaited and potentially game-changing decision. One of the most expensive pieces of the SLS has been scrapped. And ULA is stepping in with what looks like a much simpler replacement. At first glance, it seems like a brilliant fix. One that could finally make Artemis launches faster, cheaper, and far more practical. But there's a twist. Because even if this new system works perfectly, SpaceX's Starship could still end up replacing it. So what exactly changed? And why does it matter for the future of the Moon program? Find out everything in today's TechMap episode. Finally, the day has come. NASA's Exploration Upper Stage, or EUS, has officially been decommissioned. Instead of continuing to fund a project widely criticized as wasteful and politically driven, NASA is switching to ULA's Centaur V Upper Stage for the Artemis IV and Artemis V missions. This change was revealed in a procurement filing published on March 6th. And the implications are bigger than they might seem at first. Because with EUS gone, SLS Block 1B is effectively dead as well. That version of the rocket was originally supposed to debut on Artemis III. Now Artemis III will fly using the Block 1 configuration, with the ICPS Upper Stage, the same setup used on Artemis I and Artemis II. NASA says this shift is part of a broader strategy to move toward a standardized near-Block 1 SLS configuration, paired with a new Upper Stage that could support roughly 10-month launch intervals and potentially annual lunar missions starting in 2028. But make no mistake, the cancellation of the EUS is more than an administrative change. For many observers, it marks the end of one of the most controversial programs in modern NASA history. For over a decade, EUS was supposed to be the centerpiece of the SLS upgrade plan, enabling Orion to send larger payloads toward the Moon. Instead, critics say it became a classic example of pork-barrel spending. Billions of dollars were poured into the program in large part because it supported jobs in states like Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Florida, where key SLS contractors operate. And the numbers tell the story. Congress initially allocated $85 million in 2016 for early development. Since then, the project has absorbed more than $3.5 billion. What makes that figure even more surprising is the technology involved. The stage relied on the RL-10 engine, a design that has been flying reliably for nearly 60 years. This wasn't experimental propulsion. It was well-established hardware. Yet after more than a decade of development, the stage still remained years away from flight readiness. Boeing's original contract to build EUS started at $962 million, but costs quickly ballooned far beyond that. And the spending didn't stop there. Because EUS was larger than the existing SLS configuration, NASA also had to build a new launch tower at Kennedy Space Center, known as Mobile Launcher-2. Originally estimated at $383 million, the tower's cost has now surged to over $2 billion. Add it all together, and the ecosystem built around EUS has consumed more than $5.5 billion. All while other options already existed—options that were cheaper, simpler, and in some cases already flying, like ULA's Centaur V, or alternative engine systems such as Blue Origin's BE-3U. The situation only began to change recently, after NASA's new administrator, Jared Isaacman, took office and began asking some straightforward questions. Namely, why are billions being spent on a system designed largely to support the Lunar Gateway Station, when that station doesn't directly help astronauts land on the Moon? That line of thinking ultimately led to this decision, and many analysts see the shift toward Centaur V as a far more practical path forward. Compared to Blue Origin's proposed alternative, Centaur V is smaller, simpler, and far easier to integrate with existing SLS infrastructure. Blue Origin's upper stage, for example, would likely be too tall to fit inside the assembly building when stacked on top of the SLS core stage. Solving that problem would require designing a shortened version of the stage, essentially creating an entirely new variant that has never flown before. Centaur V, on the other hand, fits neatly within NASA's existing systems. It also avoids major modifications to Mobile Launcher One. Blue Origin's concept would require moving the upper stage access arm, relocating Orion umbilicals, modifying the crew access arm, and building new ground support equipment for BE-3U engines and sub-cooled liquid oxygen systems. Those upgrades alone could cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Centaur V requires only minor adjustments to existing umbilicals, and it already works with the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen systems at Kennedy Space Center. But perhaps the biggest advantage is something engineers like to call engineering DNA. Centaur V shares a lot of heritage with hardware NASA already understands. It uses the same RL-10 engine family, similar avionics systems, and a flight termination system closely related to what already flies on the ICPS. That means qualification could happen much faster, with far fewer unknowns. Fuel compatibility is another major benefit. Blue Origin's system uses sub-cooled liquid oxygen, which operates at different temperatures than the standard propellants used by the SLS core stage. Centaur V, however, uses the same propellant combinations already handled by SLS ground systems. By relying on proven hardware and minimizing new infrastructure, NASA could finally make more frequent Artemis launches possible, potentially even annual missions to the Moon. And if that happens, the Artemis program could remain operational well into the mid-2030s. For nearly two decades, Orion and the SLS have essentially been inseparable. The spacecraft was designed specifically to fly on SLS, and the entire Artemis architecture has been built around that pairing. But that relationship may not stay exclusive forever, because Lockheed Martin is now exploring a very different business model for Orion. Historically, NASA used what's called a cost-plus contract. Under that system, NASA pays contractors to build hardware, closely supervises the development process, and then takes direct operational control once the spacecraft is delivered. The new idea flips that model. Instead of simply delivering a vehicle, Lockheed Martin would provide Orion as a full service. That means handling everything from ground preparation to launch integration, orbital operations, docking, and ultimately, bringing the crew safely back to Earth. In other words, Orion becomes a commercial service, not just a government-owned spacecraft. And that opens the door to something that once seemed almost impossible. Launching Orion on rockets that are not the SLS. To compete on price, Lockheed has already begun studying the possibility of flying Orion on commercial heavy-lift vehicles, like Falcon Heavy or Blue Origin's New Glenn. But there's another piece puzzle that makes this possible. Lockheed says reusing Orion hardware will be critically important for making this service model affordable. The company plans to build a fleet of three largely reusable Orion spacecraft. Those vehicles would debut sequentially on Artemis 3, 4, and 5, and then continue flying on later missions after refurbishment. If that plan works, the cost savings could be significant. Lockheed's goal is to reduce the production cost of the Orion spacecraft by about 50% between Artemis 2 and Artemis 5. And after that, improved refurbishment processes could push costs down by another 30% or more. At this point, some people are starting to ask an obvious question. If SLS becomes more standardized and Orion becomes more reusable, could NASA eventually reduce its reliance on SpaceX? After all, the agency has traditionally preferred proven, government-controlled hardware whenever possible. But the reality may be a bit more complicated than that. Because in some scenarios, NASA's reliance on SpaceX could actually increase. For example, if Lockheed Martin decides to launch Orion on Falcon Heavy to save money, NASA would still be depending on SpaceX launch hardware. At the same time, NASA's plan to standardize the Near Block 1 SLS configuration is meant to support launch intervals of roughly every 10 months. This internal capability ensures the agency has a proven alternative to SpaceX's Starship system for heavy-lift lunar logistics. But then there's Starship. And Starship plays by an entirely different set of rules. Elon Musk's goal is not just annual launches, it's dozens of launches per year, eventually far more than that. And thanks to full reusability, the long-term cost per launch could be dramatically lower. Payload capability is another major factor. Starship is expected to deliver over 100 tons to lunar orbit. That completely dwarfs the capability of SLS, even with the now-canceled exploration upper stage. In practical terms, that means a single Starship flight could potentially deliver entire lunar landers or large cargo modules, while SLS and Orion are primarily focused on transporting astronauts. So while SLS standardization improves cadence and cost control, it doesn't really close the payload gap. Because of that, many analysts believe that Starship, or possibly a future New Glenn variant, could eventually replace SLS entirely. But that transition probably won't happen overnight. Most projections suggest that SLS will remain essential for the early Artemis missions throughout the late 2020s. The real turning point likely arrives sometime in the 2030s, once commercial heavy lift systems have demonstrated consistent reliability. And that brings us to an interesting interpretation of NASA's recent decision. Some critics have described the cancellation of the EUS as the beginning of a death crawl for the SLS program. Without EUS, and without the massive Mobile Launcher 2 tower that supported it, SLS will no longer receive the huge upgrades originally planned. Which naturally raises questions about its long-term future in a fiercely competitive environment with modern, low-cost rockets. But NASA's current leadership seems to be taking a more strategic approach. Instead of abruptly cancelling SLS, the agency appears to be stabilizing and simplifying the system. In other words, fewer custom parts, fewer delays, and far less money spent on infrastructure. This approach helps NASA retain options. If the SLS slash Orion really has to stop after Artemis 4, 5 or 6, then the transition to SpaceX technology will also take place in a context where NASA has saved billions of dollars by cutting back on boondoggle projects like EUS. In a way, Jared Isaacman's strategy seems designed to prepare for exactly that scenario.