A Deadly Fire, a Succession Leak, and the Battle Over China’s Future

Hello, everyone. Welcome, welcome to Ladies Real Talk. Happy Thursday. Well, there's so much going on everywhere around the world, but I decided to turn our attention to another major disaster in China, one that immediately caught my attention because of how quickly Beijing reacted. On the morning of September the 10th, a serious fire broke out abroad. A cargo ship undergoing repairs at the Qingdao Beihai Shipyard in Shandong Province. I'll show you the picture. Here it is. The fire started at around 11.15 a.m. There were 42 people abroad. I'm sorry, aboard. What I'm saying, abroad, not overseas. They're on the ship, they're on board. 12 escaped, five were injured. And according to the latest report, 25 people were initially identified as missing, but later confirmed killed. The fire burned for more than three hours before it was extinguished at around 2.30 that afternoon. Today's, I mean, this afternoon. But what caught my attention was what happened next. Xi Jinping personally issued what Chinese state media called an important instruction. Premier Li Qiang also issued directives. She ordered authorities to search for the missing, investigate the cause, hold those responsible accountable, and conduct broader inspections for fire hazards. And the announcement came remarkably quickly. Xinhua published Xi Jinping's instructions at around 5 p.m., less than six hours after the fire began. Now, for international media, six hours may not sound fast. It's not fast at all. But for China, especially when it comes to a major accident involving heavy casualties, this kind of top-level response on the very same afternoon is not something that we're used to. It's not usual. So, because if you look back in the past couple of months, China has experienced floods, typhoons, fires, industrial accidents, and many of them are, or were, deadly disasters. Yet you don't see Xi Jinping and Li Qiang responding publicly within hours. So what's strange is this. I should say what's even stranger is this. Xinhua reported Xi Jinping's instruction at 5 p.m. that day, less than six hours after the fire started. Local people in Qingdao were not even aware of the fire because there was no local information spreading on social media. Because social media had been quietly censoring the information. Videos of the fire were removed. People in Qingdao only learn about it, or learn about it only after Xinhua reported it. So the question becomes, why Xi Jinping paid so much attention to a fire when the propaganda machine tried to keep it a low profile? The question became even more interesting when the identity of the ship emerged. The vessel is called the Ocean Melody. It's a 20-year-old dry bulk carrier flying the Liberian flag. Now, before arriving in Qingdao, ship tracking records show that it sailed from Liberia to Taicang, China. Arriving there on August 26, it left Taicang on the 28th, and then arrived in Qingdao on the 31st for repairs. Although the ship flies a Liberian flag, its registered owner is Chinese. It's Huili Shipping Company. Well, its manager, the ship manager, is also Chinese. It's called Yu Yang Kunpeng, something like that, Yu Yang Kunpeng Shanghai Ship Management. In other words, the ship is foreign flagged, but the companies behind it appear to be Chinese. And that has fueled speculation online. And the one Chinese language account on X claimed that the Ocean Melody was actually part of a Chinese-controlled shadow fleet. It alleged that the vessel was secretly transporting materials connected to Russian drone production hidden beneath ordinary mineral cargo. The source also claims that the cargo involved in this fire, actually, it's fire and explosion, was military-related material. The shipment was handled in a highly improbable way. Poorly regulated and highly improvised manner without the kind of safety separation that would normally be expected for a dangerous material cargo. It argues that the ordinary cargo would normally take much longer to become fully engulfed in a fire or fully involved in a fire. And notes that because the vessel was docked at the shipyard, people theoretically had immediate access to shore and could have escaped. But based on videos from the scene, the source claims that it took only about 14 seconds between the initial fire and the explosion resulting in high casualty. So the implication is that the unusually rapid explosion may indicate that the ship was indeed carrying something more combustible than ordinary bulk cargo. It also claimed that Chinese authorities reacted so quickly because foreign crew members were involved, which makes the case much harder to suppress. Beijing fear that the accident could expose a sensitive military supply chain, which will give Western governments evidence to substantiate accusations that China is supporting Russia. CCP's internal discussions have already taken place about offering the families of those killed unusually large compensation payments on the condition that they sign confidentiality agreements. The same source claims that the company behind this fleet controls nine ships with a combined debt weight tonnage of about 490,000 DWT. And its registered address is set to be 3680 Zhangyang Road in Pudong, Shanghai. And according to the allegation, there are more than 200 shipping companies clustered in that area in Pudong. In some cases, three or four companies share the same office address, suggesting that some may be little more than shell companies. These companies collectively control more than 6,500 vessels of various sizes, many of them flying foreign flags and allegedly being used for covert transport operations. The source said that an operation of this scale could not exist in China without approval from the highest levels in Beijing. Okay, now I wanna be very clear here. The above claims came from social media and haven't been independently verified. But the speculation is gaining a lot of attention partly because there is an unusual combination of circumstances here. You have a Liberian flagged ship, Chinese ownership and management connections, a deadly fire inside one of China's major state-owned shipyards, and an unusually rapid response from China's top leadership, while videos of the fire and local information are censored. That makes the ship itself worth investigating. There's also another important piece of context. Now, Qingdao Beihai Shipbuilding is not some small private repair yard. It belongs to China State Shipbuilding Corporation or CSSC, China's giant state-owned shipbuilding conglomerate, and one of the world's largest shipbuilders. The Qingdao facility does repairs, works on offshore engineering projects and produces specialized marine equipment. So this wasn't simply a fire aboard some cargo ship sitting at an ordinary commercial dock. It happened inside an important state-owned shipbuilding facility. And this brings us back to the political question. Because people have noticed that, if you follow China news, you've noticed that there are two recent disasters. First was the Himalayan disaster in Tibet and Nepal, and now this fire in Qingdao. In both cases, Xi Jinping's personal instructions were prominently announced by state media. And in both cases, the incidents had an international dimension because there were foreign nationals involved. So when a disaster can no longer remain purely domestic, when foreign governments, foreign companies, foreign ship registries, or foreign nationals may be involved, does Beijing suddenly have become more concerned because they have, or it has much less room to control the story? If so, then the most interesting part of this fire may not be how it started. It may be why Beijing reacted to it so swiftly. So keep that in mind. It happened today. We'll find out more information. Now let's talk about CCP politics. With the Fifth Plenum approaching, and then ultimately the 21st Party Congress approaching, the succession battle at the top of the party appears to be getting more and more intense. Recently, another supposed personnel list for the 21st Party Congress began circulating online. And the biggest surprise is right at the top. The man on the thumbnail, Hu Chunhua, is listed as the next Party Secretary General. Now, we've already seen several different versions of these so-called 21st Party Congress lineups leaked from Beijing in the past couple of months. And each one seems to reflect the interests of a different political faction. The latest one clearly leans towards what they call the Communist Youth League faction, or Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao camp, or what some people loosely call the reformist win of the party. So let me make one thing clear from the beginning. I don't think we should treat the list as a finalized personnel list. It should be better understood as a proposal or a political wish list, or even an opening bid from one faction in an ongoing power struggle. And that's exactly why it's interesting, because even if the list itself never becomes reality, it tells us how one faction may be thinking about the post-Xi Jinping political order. So let me tell you who's on the list. So according to the version circulating online, Hu Chunhua would become the next Party Secretary General, and possibly the President of China, or the Party Secretary to succeed in Xi Jinping. And then, let me move on to the next one. Current Premier Li Qiang will become Chairman of the National People's Congress. And then this man, Chen Gang, the current Party Secretary of Guangxi, will become the next Premier. Now, another version names Yuan Jiajun, the current Party Secretary of Chongqing, as a possible alternative. All right, and let me move on. Shi Taifeng, the current Minister of Organization Department will become Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the CPPCC. And then, moving right along, Chen Xiaojiang, who was promoted to be the Party Secretary of Xinjiang last year. He's in that position right now. He would become the first Secretary of the Central Secretariat. And then, Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing will become Head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. And the Minister of United Front Work, Li Ganjie, will become Vice President of China. Now, the first thing you notice is very obvious. There are two men missing from this list. Who are they? Well, these two. There's no Cai Qi and there's no Ding Xuexiang. And in fact, most of Xi Jinping's closest political allies are gone. The only major Xi Jinping-era figure who survives is Li Qiang. So to me, this does not look like a genuine compromise lineup. It looks much more like a scenario in which the reformist camp has won decisively and is designing the next leadership on its own terms. But the list depends on two huge assumptions. For this arrangement to have any chance of happening, two things would already have to be true. Otherwise, it would not happen, not even for negotiation. The first arrangement is that Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, these two dynamic duo, all the political forces associated with them would have to be playing a major role behind the scenes already, or it would not happen. And then second, and much more importantly, Xi Jinping will have to have lost the leadership effective control of the military. Without those two conditions, this lineup simply will not happen. There's no chance for this list to even be slightly realistic. Now remember, three people on the list, Hu Chunhua, Chen Gang, and Chen Xiaojiang are not even Politburo members right now. For all three to move into such senior positions within roughly a year will require an extraordinary reshuffling of power. If Xi Jinping still fully controlled both the party apparatus and the military, it is almost impossible to imagine him approving this arrangement. So the list itself is built around a very important assumption. Xi Jinping may still hold his titles, but he no longer has the power to determine the next leadership lineup. Okay, so with that said, let's go over the list one by one so you understand the stories behind them. Okay, let's just start with Hu Chunhua. Now putting Hu Chunhua at the center reflects a particular argument about political legitimacy. Hu Chunhua was one of the leaders promoted during the Hu Jintao era. He was widely viewed as one of the, or as the successor groomed by Hu Jintao under the old system of generational succession. And in terms of preparation, Hu Chunhua is probably the only, I would say the CCP senior leader who has the most extensive central government and provincial leadership experience. So he has been utterly prepared for his next job. So if you believe that the military has moved away from Xi Jinping or Xi Jinping has lost control of the military, and that Hu Jintao's political network is, again, influential, then Hu Chunhua becomes the obvious candidate. That's just a natural event to follow. Now there's a deeper political argument behind this. Xi Jinping broke the old succession rules when he stayed for a third term and dismantled the leadership arrangements that had developed over the previous decades. And then, of course, there was that extraordinary scene at the 20th Party Congress when Hu Jintao was escorted out of the closing session after discovering that his mentee, the junior Hu, Hu Chunhua, was kicked out of the Politburo. So those in the reformist faction see Xi Jinping's third term as completely illegitimate. His rule is illegitimate. So under this narrative, putting Hu Chunhua in charge of the, or putting him in charge at the next Party Congress would not simply be another leadership transition. It will be presented as a restoration of the old rules, a political correction. In other words, Xi Jinping disrupted the succession system. Now the party puts it back on track. And that's the political meaning of Hu Chunhua's name appearing at the top of the list. All right, let's move on. Then why does Li Qiang survive? Because everybody knows Li Qiang is someone that Xi Jinping or someone who follows Xi Jinping closely. And this is one of the more interesting parts. If this really is a lineup designed to dismantle Xi Jinping's faction, then why keep Li Qiang in the next leadership lineup? There may be two reasons. First, there have to be, well, first of all, it has to do with Li Qiang's personality because he is someone who is considered politically flexible, and he has an easygoing personality. And he's not known as an independent power center. He's not overly ambitious. And then secondly, there have been rumors that Li Qiang had reservations about the handling of the Zhang Youxia affair and preferred dealing with the general through normal party protocol or procedures. In other words, Li Qiang kept his distance with the way Xi Jinping dealt with Zhang Youxia. And as a result, Li Qiang could be someone inside Xi Jinping's inner circle who is still considered acceptable by the other factions. So those two reasons, one is his distance from the Zhang Youxia case, and also his flexibility, his easygoing personality all made him more acceptable. So moving him to the National People's Congress gives him a prestigious title without leaving him in control of the government or the party. So keeping Li Qiang may serve as a buffer, which tells the Xi camp, you're not being completely wiped out. But at the same time, Li Qiang would no longer control a major center of executive power. So in that sense, he becomes or he will become a transitional figure. Okay, now let's talk about this guy that you're not familiar with, because I have not mentioned him and you have not heard his name. His name is Chen Gang. So who is he and why is he chosen as premier? Yeah, so for many people, he appears to be the biggest surprise on the list because his name is unfamiliar. He is currently the party secretary of Guangxi and he belongs to the generation of officials born after 1965. So he's a few years younger than Hu Chunhua. His career is interesting because he has worked across a wide range of regions and institutions. He spent many years in Beijing, then served in Guizhou, Hebei, Xiongan, Qinghai, and now Guangxi. So in the CCP personnel system, that kind of resume often suggests deliberate long-term grooming. Like Hu Chunhua, Chen Gang also attended the prestigious Beijing University. You can say that he is a younger version of Hu Chunhua, but unlike Hu Chunhua or some other officials, he does not carry an especially obvious factional label. One interpretation is that he was already being cultivated in the later Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao years as part of a younger leadership reserve and that the central organization system continued to move him through different positions afterward. If the CCP were to return to a model that places more emphasis on technocrats and collective leadership, Chen Gang could be exactly the kind of person that they choose. And therefore, we need to keep an eye on him. He's someone to watch. Now, there are also online claims that Xi Jinping's camp once considered moving against Chen Gang because he represented a political asset left over from Xi Jinping's predecessor, aka Hu Jintao. That claim is unverified, but at the very least, it shows that there's a lot more political interest surrounding this guy than his current political profile might suggest. So he's definitely someone that we need to keep watching. All right, now the next is Cheng Xiaojiang. He is another important name. Oh, wait a minute. Do I miss the Cheng Xiaojiang slide? Where's the Cheng Xiaojiang? Oh, here's the Cheng Xiaojiang. Okay, now let's talk about Cheng Xiaojiang. Cheng Xiaojiang, he is currently the party secretary of Xinjiang. He will take the position of the first secretary of the central secretariat. That's a very important job. The position is essentially the top coordinator of the party's day-to-day machinery, responsible for helping carry out decisions made by the Politburo. Cheng came through the water resources system. Now that matters because Hu Jintao also came, also rise through that system. Hu Jintao, as you know, is a trained hydraulic engineer. His specialty is hydropower systems, the dam, anyway, a number of people associated with his political network all came from the water resources system of China. So in this particular political narrative, Cheng Xiaojiang is viewed as someone connected, or very closely connected to the Hu Jintao, the reformist faction. He later moved into the United Front system and then was suddenly sent into Xinjiang last year to replace Xi Jinping's buddy, Ma Xinrui, who is now in big trouble. He's now investigated. Actually, no, he's already kicked out of the party. Yeah, he's a disgraced official. Now, Ma is reportedly a relative of Xi Jinping's wife. So Cheng Xiaojiang is the man who replaced Ma Xinrui, someone who's extremely close to Xi Jinping's inner circle. But here's the remarkable part. Cheng is not even a Politburo member yet. So if he were suddenly elevated to first secretary of the secretariat next year, that would be a dramatic promotion. Again, this tells us that people behind this list are not orchestrating small adjustments. They're planning a major restructuring of power. Now let's talk about Zhang Guoqing, the vice premier. He is a different kind of figure. He comes out of China's defense industrial system and is usually viewed as a classic technocrat. He has experience in military industry, provincial administration, and now emergency management. Yeah, he's put in charge of emergency management. So he was in Tibet after the mudslide happened. Now, compare him with many highly factional political figures, he carries less obvious political baggage. And this list gives him one of the most sensitive jobs in the entire party. Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. That matters because the CCDI is the party's political knife. Whoever controls the discipline system has enormous power over investigations, purges, and political discipline. So if he were placed there, the implication would be that he is seen as someone acceptable to several competing groups, someone trusted enough to hold the knife without immediately terrifying everyone else. I think he was put in that position, that extremely sensitive position, precisely because of his strong technocrat background or technical skills. He's not overly political. So he's considered a professional. So maybe people see him as less threatening, holding the knife. All right, let's talk about Shi Taifeng. Where did he go? There he is. He will be the oldest one. He is the oldest one on the list. But he makes sense in this scenario. He has long been viewed as politically close to Hu Jintao. Yeah, he's very loyal to Hu Jintao. That's why he was put in charge of personnel's system more than a year ago when he suddenly swapped position with Li Ganjie, the head of the United Front system. So he's 70 years old now. If he stay on for another term, that will make him, what, 71 next year, and then he will be 76. He will work until he's 76. So he had helped manage a transitional personnel reshuffling because the CCP leadership is going through so many personnel reshuffle right now. I didn't cover those because it may be boring to you because there's so many names. People have mapped out who is tied to who at the provincial level. And right now you are seeing so many of Xi Jinping's people or people who are closely tied to Xi Jinping's inner circles being replaced by technocrats or people who are more aligned with the reformists. And all of that is handled by Shi Taifeng. So next year, moving him to CPPCC would actually make sense because CPPCC is a semi-retirement organization. That's where people go there to enjoy retirement while holding a government position. He could help stabilize the new leadership and then move into a more ceremonial position. Under this interpretation, his role would be less about ruling the country afterward, but more about helping complete the transition. So keeping him in a ceremonial position serves that purpose. Now, the most interesting guy on this list, the one that surprised everyone the most is Li Ganjie, this man, who swapped a job with Shi Taifeng. He was chosen to be the head of personnel, but then he was put in to be in charge of the United Front work. Now, he's generally seen as a close ally of Xi Jinping because he has links to Chen Xi. Remember the former Party Central School's president who has disappeared and who is widely rumored to be under investigation because of his role in the attack against Zhang Youxia because Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were attacked at the Party Central School where Chen Xi presided. So Li Ganjie was a close ally of Chen Xi, who was the formal personnel chief for Xi Jinping for over a decade. So the question becomes, why would the reformists keep him? The answer may be the position itself. Vice president is just a symbolic position without much power. So putting Li there could be a form of political reassurance. You leave one recognizable figure from the Xi era inside the new structure. You tell the party that this is not a total purge, but you do not give that person enough power to challenge the new leadership. He becomes a symbol rather than a real power center. That's people's interpretation. The more surprising disappearance is this man, the one on the right, Ding Xuexiang, because he is the only member of the current Politburo Standing Committee born in the 1960s and widely perceived as the most likely successor for Xi Jinping. Under normal age calculations, he would seem well-positioned to remain on the Standing Committee for another five years. But in this list, he's simply gone. That tells us of a scenario in which Xi Jinping's entire political faction loses. Cai Qi goes, Ding Xuexiang goes, Xi Jinping himself leaves, Li Qiang survives only as a transitional figure, and Li Ganjie stays in a largely symbolic role. And that is really the scenario. It's, I mean, if you really step back and look at, if that ever become the scenario, then it's not a compromise, right? It's a post-Xi Jinping settlement written by the winners. But there's a question unanswered by this list. The biggest question is the name that's missing from this list. After you go through the entire list, and the most important thing may not be who's on it. It's what the list refuses to tell us. Who becomes the chairman of the Central Military Commission? There is no answer. And that may be the single most important clue in the entire document, because the military chairmanship is likely to be the most sensitive and most difficult part of any succession negotiation or deal. There's historical precedent for a top leader giving up the party leadership, but holding on to the military chairmanship for a period of time. Jiang Zemin did it for two years. Deng Xiaoping did it. So in theory, Xi Jinping could leave the central, what do you call it? The general party secretary position, and still remain chairman of the CMC. We don't know if that's the case. This document doesn't say. But Xi Jinping's situation is different. His third term is already deeply controversial among his political opponents, and he doesn't appear to be controlling the military. So if the anti-Xi camp really has the upper hand, one of the last things it would want is for Xi Jinping to step down as party leader while keeping control, or while keeping the chairmanship of the CMC. But on the other hand, from Xi Jinping's perspective, giving up both the party and the military at the same time would leave him and his allies extremely exposed. And that's why I believe the military is the hardest part of this entire succession struggle. No matter who gets the military, everyone else becomes nervous. So suppose Hu Chunhua becomes the party secretary, and then gains the CMC membership, I mean, the CMC chairmanship as well. He will then control the party, the state, and the military. At that point, it will not only be Xi Jinping's faction that would feel threatened. The older leftist networks associated with people like Jiang Zemin, Zeng Qinghong could also become extremely uneasy. Why? Because any new leader who truly consolidates power will eventually have to establish authority. And the way to do that, or the easiest way to do that is to address China's, the accumulated, how do you say, decades of unresolved political issues. For example, the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, the persecution of Falun Gong, questions surrounding Li Keqiang's death, the responsibility for a COVID pandemic, and then the whereabouts, the life and death issues of the two generals, and the responsibility for the current economic crisis. So if a new leadership seriously began reopening old political accounts, the consequences could extend far beyond Xi Jinping and his people. A lot of people would have reason to worry. So every faction wants political change, but no faction wants another faction to become too powerful, and that's the fundamental problem. So again, how seriously should we take this list? I think the biggest mistake would be to get trapped in the names. This is not necessarily the final lineup. It's a political signal. It represents one faction's idea of what the next leadership could look like. And the underlying logic is actually very clear. Hu Chunhua returns as the central succession figure. The reformist camp regains major influence. Xi's faction is largely pushed out. Technocrats rise again. A few figures from other camps are retained as political buffers. And the most important issue of all, the military, is still left unresolved. That is what makes this list worth looking at. Of course, the CCP leadership lineups can change right up until the very last moment. Personnel decisions at this level are the product of constant bargaining, factional pressure, compromise, and power struggles. So I suspect it's not just outsiders like us who do not know what the final 21st Party Congress lineup will look like. Xi Jinping may not know either. Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, they may not be certain as well. And the conservative camp, the leftists, they may not know either. And the military itself may not yet have fully settled on an outcome. So everyone may still be waiting. And the fight over CCP's top position, and especially over control of the military, is far from over. So, oh, my earring fell. That's a sign that we should wrap up soon. So if you really think about it, oh, my earring, the question is not about who goes up and who goes down. The real question boils down to where does the military ultimately stand? That is the question we need to keep watching. All right, that's everything. That's CCP politics in a nutshell. 45 minutes. Well, actually, I spent, what, 15 minutes on the fire, and then, what, 30 minutes on this potential leadership lineup. All right, let's just get rid of these pictures. Let me see, what do people say? Oh, people are busy tonight, okay. I have a note from, not Mike Stewart, Lei, before the show starts and the chat gets busy, thank you again for talking about my Canada. It really means a lot. Well, thank you. I have so many Canadian friends. I was just talking to a few of them in the past couple of days. They are genuinely concerned about the direction of their country. Yeah, serious concern, and they see it, they feel it. Like in Ontario, you cannot afford to own a Lexus because if you drive your Lexus to a Chinese restaurant or a popular Chinese restaurant, the chances for your car to be stolen is extremely high. I have a friend who has a landlady whose Lexus has been stolen three times, or it's her third Lexus being stolen. That's how crazy it is, and this is Ontario, outside Toronto. Yeah, it's just unbelievable. Security is a concern. All right, let's see, what do people say? Oh, Chris is our, hi, Chris. Chris is our moderator tonight. Thank you. Melissa, hype, like, and share. Let's get laid to a million subscribers. I like that. I don't know what happened to YouTube algorithm. I had really great upward momentum last year, and then somewhere towards the end of the year, it suddenly stopped. Then I don't see any growth. I don't know what happened. Some people have been saying that the CCP has used AI to build their online infrastructure to manipulate social media platforms algorithm, targeting certain content producers like myself. That's what people have been saying. I don't have time to look into that, but I'm not surprised if that's the case. I hope YouTube do some investigation and come up with a solution. Okay, all right, great. Thank you. Not Mike Stewart. Someone let Mao Xinyu play with that flare gun again. All right, I really enjoy your sense of humor. Maybe we should show a picture of Mao Xinyu one day so that people know what Mike is saying, what he's talking about. Okay, here's a question forwarded by Chris. I'm from India. Where do you see Indochina relations heading on to? Has China mellowed down against anti-India stance after Guowen? Xi Jinping is heading to India, right? He's leaving, what, on the 12th? That's in two days. He's taking the largest delegation ever, what, 400 people strong? Last time he went to India, he took only 200 officials with him. But India, in their preparation to welcome Xi Jinping, gave Xi Jinping a big slap in the face. I think India just announced a launching investigation into Xiaomi, the Chinese mobile phone maker, over, I don't know, I think money laundering or some financial irregularities that the company has displayed in India. But anyway, Xiaomi is being investigated in India right before Xi Jinping, his arrival. So where do I see China's relations with India heading into? China's foreign policy has been a little bit all over the places right now as a result of this political struggle. So you don't know who is directing which policy. Sometimes you feel like you see Xi Jinping's fingerprints all over certain policies, but sometimes you doubt if he's really behind it. It's really hard to say. I would rather wait until the fifth plenum to say that. We'll see, we'll see what happens at the BRICS summit, yeah. All right, PLA tank barrels made of pot metal. Yeah, exploded in Bangladesh, right? There was a military exercise when Chinese-made tank exploded and killed a soldier and injured a couple of them. It's embarrassing, yeah. Why would they want to make made-in-China weapons? I wonder why. I think people should learn a lesson. Okay, all right, let's see. Lei, good morning, watching here from the Philippines. All right. Yeah, everyone loves your defense minister for his performance. Actually, I saw another clip surfacing on social media. People asked him to comment on the remarks that the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson made about him being a good actor. And then he fought right back. He said Wang Yi will be a better actor. Anyways, I think we should see more politicians speaking up like him. Anyway, not Mike Stewart. Why would it be Major General Mao Xinyu's time to shine? When will it be? He could head the CMC, no problem. Actually, the CCP is remodeling or repairing his grandfather's mausoleum. They closed Mao's mausoleum for repair or for remodeling for a couple of months. And people thought that it may not be purely for construction purpose. People believe that it might be closed due to political reasons. So it should be interesting to see when that structure will be reopened, if it will be reopened, yeah. Oh, yeah, yesterday was what the, I don't know, the anniversary, because Mao died on September the 9th. That was yesterday. Assorted subscriptions. Thanks for the important news and commentary coverage as always. Well, thank you very much. Thank you. I appreciate that. Oh, not Mike again. Danny Jones, get on another podcast or several. The people need your information later. I was on Danny Jones and some of the clips went viral. Did you see that? My talk on Chinese population went viral. Yeah, I would love to. Tell Danny to invite me. We really had so much fun talking. You know, at first I was a little concerned. Three hours, I was a little concerned, seriously. And then at the end of that conversation, I could go on for another hour. We really enjoyed our conversation, our talk. So yeah, it'll be good to be invited back or onto some other shows. Lei can talk. All right. If there's anything Lei can do, talking. All right, Carney is China's fleshlight. What's fleshlight? Fleshlight. Everything out of China is garbage. All right, I'm just reading comments. Australia is watching. Canada is going to have lots of electric battery fires from Chinese cars, I'm afraid. I hope Canadians are not hurt. I hope no Canadians will get hurt from these poorly made Chinese EVs. Someone said, Lei, don't be scared of Florida humidity. It wasn't bad. Yeah, I went in spring. It wasn't bad. I guess if I went during the summer months, it would be bad. All right. It's amusing to hear Lei talk about herself in the third person. Christy Bauer. Really? Okay. All right. I don't know. I think I'm one of a kind. Anyway. All right, here's a question. Blame the current Canadian crisis on the uncontrolled immigration. Certain groups carried their own unpalatable baggage. I'm not racist, but that's a sad fact. Watching from Vancouver. Unfortunately, that's what many of my Canadian friends have been telling me. Yeah. I think people really need to understand. People really need to understand. People should not use that word racist as if it doesn't carry weight, you know? Because when you use that against almost everyone, then that word becomes meaningless and people don't really care, right? If you're accusing everyone a racist, then who's not? Then that word, the whole point becomes irrelevant. So I'm afraid that's the direction we're going. All right. 17% of US imports are from Mexico. Mexico is the leader. It's politicized here, Lei. You know that. It's politicized, yeah. But see, people told me that the communists, the reason their ideology will fail is because they go extreme. So those individuals who tend to lean on the left side, or if they go too far on the left, they would end up becoming a little extreme in their views, like accusing everyone a racist. But then when they do that, they're gonna lose credibility because they're defeating themselves. The CCP's biggest ability, other than mind-controlling the populace, is defeating itself. Xi Jinping is doing precisely that. Xi Jinping is taking the CCP down from within. So it's by design. So I think those politicians on the left need to be careful with what they say because eventually they could bring themselves down without knowing it. All right, that's all for tonight. I thank you for joining, and I'll see you over the weekend. Okay, bye.