Why China's Border Crises With India Keep Coinciding With Military Purges

And according to Indian reports, tensions began building in July. Chinese soldiers reportedly set up tents in territory India considers to be on its side of the Line of Actual Control, or LAC. Some reports claim the encampments extended six to seven kilometers beyond India's understanding of the boundary. The two military held several rounds of talks, but the dispute remained unresolved. Then came October the 22nd. Like I said, it's less than six weeks after Modi and Xi reaffirmed their commitment to peace along the border. And then India's Indo-Tibetan border police chief publicly confirmed that military face-offs were continuing at several locations in Arunachal Pradesh. Indian forces or Indian defense Resources, or sources, described the situation as stable. They reported no violent clashes. So it was just a military standoff, no confirmed fighting. And then came the gunfire rumor. Just days after the border confrontation became public, a dramatic video began circulating across social media. It showed soldiers firing weapons in mountainous terrain. One version claimed Chinese and Indian troops were exchanging gunfire. In Arunachal Pradesh and it looked very convincing. By the way, that link is in the description. You can check it out Soldiers, rifles, gunshots, mountains, but was it real? The answer is no. The video was fake Fact checkers traced the footage to a military training exercise in Kazakhstan The soldiers weren't Chinese or Indian. There were Kazakh special forces Someone had taken the footage from an unrelated exercise and presented as evidence of fighting along the China-India border, and then the footage quickly spread. Why is this so significant? Because gunfire along the China-India border is a very serious matter. Back in November 1996, China and India signed a military confidence-building agreement. The agreement didn't prohibit soldiers from carrying weapons, but it prohibited them from firing those weapons in the restricted zone. But let's consider this possibility. What if someone wanted the world to believe the border confrontation was far more dangerous? than it actually was. What if the objective wasn't to start a war, but to create the perception of a war or of a military crisis? Now, to be clear, there's no verified evidence connecting this video to the PLA or any political faction in Beijing. But if someone wanted to magnify the political significance of an existing border confrontation, a false gunfire narrative could serve that purpose. And that possibility becomes much more intriguing when we look at the timing. So let's look at this extraordinary timeline. October 22nd, Indian authorities publicly confirmed ongoing military face-offs with Chinese troops along their disputed border. October 25th, a dramatic video surfaced online, supposedly showing Chinese and Indian soldiers exchanging fire. And then the next day, the 26th, the Chinese Communist Party opened its highly sensitive Fifth Plenum in Beijing, amid an unprecedented shakeup of the PLA leadership. So three developments in just five days, a real border confrontation, a fake gunfire video, and a crucial political meeting in Beijing. Was the timing purely coincidental, or was someone trying to turn a manageable border Orders standoff. into a dangerous-looking military crisis without making it actually dangerous, just as Xi Jinping was confronting turmoil within his own military and party. Now, think about it. A real exchange of gunfire could spiral out of control, but a fake video could create alarm and political pressure without the immediate risk of starting a war. So you might naturally ask, who would have? Who would have an interest in doing that? Well, to explore that question, we need to look at where the confrontation is taking place and who is supposed to be in command. The latest confrontation is happening in the section of the border that falls under the PLA's Western Theater Command. With the Tibet military district's ground forces responsible for frontline operations. But here's where things get interesting. What's happening inside the Western Theater Command? Its commander, General Wang Haijiang, had been absent from public view for an extended period, including last year's fourth plenum. So he has disappeared for more than a year. Until He had been missing for a year until the Fifth Plenary, where his expulsion from the party was confirmed. next And then the theater's political commissar, time, General Li Fengbiao, on June the 26th, have a he lost his seat in China's National People's Congress. great So now think about this. The two senior leaders of the military. Or the military command responsible for the Indian border day. are both out of their previous positions. And Beijing has not publicly confirmed permanent replacements for either of them. Now imagine a border confrontation escalating under these circumstances. Who stands to benefit? Please consider this idea. An external military threat can increase the military's bargaining power. When a country faces the possibility of war, experienced commanders suddenly become indispensable. You cannot fight a war with political commissars. You can't fight one with disciplinary inspectors. And you certainly can't fight one with propaganda. You need generals who know how to command troops. So if elements within the PLA wanted to put pressure on Beijing or CCP leadership, top leadership, Allowing border tensions to rise could theoretically be one way to do it. They wouldn't necessarily have to openly defy orders. They might simply adopt a less restrained posture on the front lines. And suddenly, Beijing would face some urgent questions. Who's in command? And with only two members left on the Central Military Commission, Who would coordinate major military operations if the confrontation escalated? Because Zhang Shimin, the only member left, he is a political officer. He's not a military officer. In other words, a border crisis could create pressure on Beijing to rebuild the PLA's senior leadership and appoint experienced field commanders to key positions. Now, let's also look at the timing. The fifth plenum was about to begin. I mean, it's been over now, but I'm talking about the time when the conflict became top news. It was right before the Fifth Plenum. The military senior leadership had been severely depleted, and right at that moment, right before the Fifth Plenum, tensions resurfaced along the Indian border. Again, the question is, could this have been a form of political pressure from within the PLA, an attempt to play the border crisis card at a critical moment in Beijing? We ask these questions because this isn't the first time a China-India border confrontation has coincided with major political shakeups in Beijing. So let's talk about three precedents. The first one is in 2014. It was September 2014. Xi Jinping was making his first state visit to India as China's president. Modi welcomed him to his home state of... I think it's Gujarat, but while Xi and Modi were smiling for the cameras like they do here, something very different was happening hundreds of miles away. Chinese and Indian troops were confronting each other in the Chumar region of Ladakh. Now imagine being Xi Jinping. You're visiting India to improve relations. This is your first visit since becoming the top CCP leader. Your host is rolling out the red carpet, but at the same time, your own military is confronting Indian troops along the border. Talk about embarrassment. What was supposed to be a diplomatic success was suddenly overshadowed by a military confrontation. And here's where the internal politics become interesting. At the time, Xi Jinping, I mean, just took over. And he was still consolidating his control over the PLA. He got rid of one vice chairman of CMC, and that was Xu Caihou. Okay, here are the two vice chairmen left to him from Hu Jintao. And both were diehard loyalists to Jiang Zemin. So they were, the Jiang Zemin faction was Xi Jinping's biggest political enemy when he first came to power. So he got rid of one Vice chairman of CMC, Xu Caihou, who had already been expelled from the party in June that year. Another vice chairman, Guo Boxiong, came under investigation in the following year. He had deep connections to the old Lanzhou military region, which was responsible for the western border area where the confrontation occurred. And then the next year, Guo Boxiong fell. And then in late 2015, Xi Jinping launched sweeping military reforms. The old seven military region system was dismantled and replaced with five theater commands. The Lanzhou military region disappeared and with its former responsibilities reorganized into the new Western Theater Command. Three years later, something similar happened. In June 2017, Chinese troops began building a road in the disputed Doklam region near Bhutan. India intervened to block the construction. The two armies faced each other for 73 days. So for more than two months, soldiers from two nuclear-armed countries stood on the brink of a potentially dangerous confrontation. Eventually, in August, the two sides agreed to disengage. But around the same time, another drama was unfolding inside the PLA. It has to do with these two men. They are General Fang Fenghui, Chief of Joint Staff Department, who was removed from his position and subsequently investigated. And then General Zhang Yang, head of the CMC's Political Work Department, also came investigation. It was right around that time. When this border clash or clashes resurfaced, so we don't know if loyalists to these disgraced generals staged that to send a message to Xi Jinping, or we don't know. But Zhang later died by suicide, General Zhang Yang, the head of political department work. And then ahead of the 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping reorganized the CMC and replaced these two generals with these two. Li Zuocheng became the new chief of joint staff department, and Miao Hua became the head of the military's political work department. During both times. Some clashes. Broke out near the Indian borders. Okay, I'm not done yet. And then came 2020. The deadly clash during China's COVID crisis. This is what you probably all remember. So in 2020, COVID-19 erupted and then Xi Jinping was facing enormous domestic and international pressure. And last spring, China adopted a very aggressive, I should, yeah, aggressive military posture in several disputed areas, including borders with India. Then came June 15th. That's Xi Jinping's birthday. On his birthday, Chinese and Indian troops fought a brutal battle in Galwan Valley. They used rocks, clubs, and other improvised weapons, but it was deadly. Twenty Indian soldiers were killed. China later officially acknowledged four deaths, but some people say the real casualties are Are higher. So it was the deadliest confrontation between the two countries in decades. There appears to be a link between disturbances near Indian borders and PLA's political purges. So border disputes with India follow a pattern, and they seem to tie to politics. And then what happened after that, what happened after 2020, the deadly clashes of 2020, what happened after that is very interesting. This is a very telling slide. Between December 2020 and September 2021, three successive replacements took place at the top of the command, I mean, the Western Theater Command. First, Zhao Zongqi was replaced by Zhang Xudong, and then came Xu Qilin, and then Xu Qilin has been missing. And then finally, we still don't know what happened to Xu Qilin. And finally, Wang Haijiang. And then Wang Haijiang just fell just recently. So four different generals commanded the Western Theater Command within roughly nine months, but they're all gone now. So what has happened? This is an extremely politically sensitive region. Why have China-India border tensions repeatedly overlapped with major political and military upheavals under Xi Jinping? Could a border confrontation that once gave Xi an opportunity to tighten his control over the PLA now become a source of pressure on Xi Jinping himself? Could the PLA have engineered a controllable crisis to pressure Xi Jinping? What I'm about to explore is a political hypothesis. Okay, it's not a conclusion, but I just want to present an idea. But it's worth considering because of four developments happening almost simultaneously. A real border confrontation, an unprecedented crisis in the PLA leadership, a highly sensitive communist party meeting, and a fake video making the confrontation appear far more dangerous than the available evidence suggested. So let's consider the possibility. Let's suppose some PLA commanders wanted to increase their leverage over Beijing's top leadership. How could they do it? They wouldn't necessarily want to start a war. In fact, starting a war with India or anyone would be an enormous gamble. But what if they could keep the confrontation below that threshold? A patrol pushes into disputed territory. Troops establish an encampment. The other side objects, reinforcements arrive. Commanders hold talks, but the standoff continues. Tensions rise. Fake gunfire videos intensify the crisis. The whole world pays attention, yet neither side fired a shot. That's the whole idea. That's what I mean by a potentially controllable confrontation. Okay, so that type of maneuver is not risk-free, but it could create political pressure without the immediate dangers of shooting war or a shooting war. And that pressure could be useful to someone seeking greater influence in Beijing. Suddenly, the problem of Xi Jinping's purges in the military will become very pronounced because of these perceived external threat. Who's in command? Who has the authority to make decisions? Who coordinates military operations? And who takes responsibility if something goes wrong? Under normal circumstances, Beijing might have time to... I mean under normal circumstances you would have generals answering those questions but now Now, um, they don't. So Beijing would have to rush to fill those vacancies or a sudden escalation of a border crisis could change Beijing's plan or timing. It could increase pressure to appoint new commanders. To fill vacancies and restore the command structure and give experienced officers greater authority. In other words, an external military crisis could become a source of political leverage for the military itself. Suddenly, Beijing has a military crisis that it cannot afford to ignore.