LIVE: State Department Briefing With Miller

As Secretary Blinken has said directly to Austin's family, including in the past few days, we will not rest until he is returned home safely to his loved ones. Second, the United States supports a peaceful transition of power to a representative, accountable Syrian government through an inclusive process led by the people of Syria in the spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. During this transitional period, the Syrian people deserve respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms, the resumption of peace services, and the protection and participation of marginalized populations, including members of minority groups. It was the Assad regime's refusal since 2011 to engage in a credible political process, as well as its reliance on the support of unsavory partners such as Russia, Iran, and groups like Hezbollah for its brutal suppression that led inevitably to its own collapse. It is critical today that the Syrian people be the ones to define the path forward for their country. The United States is committed to working with the Syrian people as they define that path towards a brighter future. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs John Bass and Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Lee are in the region now holding consultations with key partners, and Secretary Blinken will be continuing his conversations with regional players over the coming hours and days, and we will of course read out all those conversations as they happen. Finally, the United States will continue to support Syria's neighbors, including Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel, should any threats arise from within Syria during this period of transition. We will also maintain our mission against ISIS and protect our forces against any threats, and you have seen the Department of Defense carry out military strikes in support of this mission in the past two days. We will not allow ISIS to use this moment to regroup and relaunch terrorist attacks that threaten the interests of the United States. In terms of what Roger Parsons is doing in Tenerife, what exactly is he doing? I'm not going to get into the exact details of the conversations he's having, but I'll talk a little bit about what Roger's approach is, and you can probably draw some conclusions from that. Roger's approach when it comes to returning home Americans who are unjustly detained has always been to really do everything possible to leave no stone unturned, to gather information from wherever he can, and press anyone who is willing to take action to get American citizens home. He is in Beirut to talk with people in the region, to talk with parties in the region, to collect information, and to try to find out where Austin Tithe is and get him home as soon as possible. The President has emphasized that as a priority, Secretary Blinken has emphasized it as a priority, and Roger is there to carry out that important work. Okay, and where are Undersecretary Bass and Assistant Secretary... Barbara, they are in Amman today. They were in Doha meeting with partners over the weekend, they are in Amman. Okay, now there's been a lot of speculation now that HTS is at the vanguard of this, that there should be or maybe could be some kind of consideration of removing them from the FTO list, and I think that's been roundly denied by a bunch of people. I just want to see if you can put a nail in the coffin. So I don't have any immediate actions to announce with respect to any of the sanctions that we have imposed, either the designation on HTS or other sanctions that we have imposed over the past decade plus in Syria. I don't have any announcements to make with respect to those sanctions today. What I will say is all of our sanctions are imposed in response to actions that parties take, and they are designed to be an incentive to different courses of action, and that is true for organizations, it is true for countries, and so we always want to see groups that we have sanctioned take a different path moving forward. That is true here. As you heard the President say, we have heard some hopeful statements out of HTS. We have heard them saying the right things about inclusion and the political process forward, but ultimately we're going to judge them by their actions, and our policy response will be determined by the actions they take. Okay, so there is no review quote-unquote specifically underway right now as it relates to what happened? There is no specific review related to what said. We are always reviewing our sanctions posture with entities based on their actions, so when entities take different actions, of course there can be a change in our sanctions posture, but we have nothing new to announce today. I guess a few follow-ups on that. Actually, can I ask you first about some of the other countries involved there? Russia, of course, is said to have given asylum to the Assad government. The status of Russian military bases is unknown. Does the U.S. have any information about whether the current military will allow this to continue, and does the U.S. actually have the status? We don't have any information about the status of those bases and what the incoming Syrian regime may or may not do with respect to them. What I would say is that certainly Russia has a lot to answer for when it comes to the Syrian people. You have seen Russia prop up a brutal regime that has murdered hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrian civilians and has gassed its own people. You have seen the Russian government launch strikes targeting civilians inside Syria. Now, most recently, you see Russia giving safe haven to the brutal tyrant responsible for those attacks. They certainly have a lot to answer for with individuals across Syria about their history of supporting Assad and their own pattern of behavior inside Russia. It would not surprise me at all if people in Syria are asking those questions when it comes to the Russian facilities that remain inside Syria. Now, with respect to the United States' position on those facilities, it is ultimately a decision for the Syrian people to make, not for the people of the United States. But I don't think you can look at the influence that Russia has had through those bases inside Syria and determine that they have been anything other than disastrous for the Syrian people over the past 10-12 years. I realize it is up for the U.S. to say that they are not there, but just that they are disastrous for the Syrian people. As you said, you are judging them by actions. Is that one of the actions you would be judging them by? We are going to be judging them by the whole range of their actions, but when we talk about the actions that they are taking, ultimately what we want to see and what we are judging them by are the kinds of ideals that are laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 2254. So, an inclusive political process moving forward. Respect for minority groups, either religious minorities or ethnic minorities inside Syria. An ultimate transition towards elections, the cessation of hostilities, those are the types of things we are looking for. Can I just ask you about another neighbor, Israel. Israel has said that, since the first sentence of the aftermath of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254, it has openly gone across the globe and has said that it is what it calls a temporary bubble zone. How do you feel about this? In the U.S., is this a violation? Does the United States agree? First of all, does the U.S. agree that it is a violation? So, let me say a few things about it. Number one, I think it is important to put in context what happened that led up to this event. First of all, the Syrian army abandoned its positions in the area around the negotiated Israeli-Syrian buffer zone, which potentially creates a vacuum that could have been filled by terrorist organizations that would threaten the state of Israel and would threaten civilians inside Israel. Every country has the right to take action against terrorist organizations, and every country, I think, would be worried about a possible vacuum that could be filled by terrorist organizations on its border, especially in volatile times, as we obviously are in right now in Syria. The second thing that is important is that Israel has said that these actions are temporary to defend its borders. These are not permanent actions. Ultimately, what we want to see is lasting stability between Israel and Syria, and that means we support all sides of holding the 1974 disengagement agreement. Do you feel that they are holding a disengagement agreement? Well, look, this is a temporary action that they have taken in response to actions by the Syrian military to withdraw from that area. Now, what we want to see, ultimately, is that agreement fully upheld, and we will watch to see that Israel does that. They have said that this is a temporary action, and we're going to be watching what steps they take in the coming weeks. You've been watching what steps they'll take. Do you want them to do that? Of course, we will be engaging with them as well, but ultimately, it's important that there is security along that border. Right now, there is potentially a vacuum created by the withdrawal of Syrian forces. We don't want to see a vacuum there either that can be filled by terrorist organizations. That's not good, not just for Israel's security, it wouldn't be helpful potentially to the people of Syria. If you see a terrorist group move into the area that was vacated by Syrian forces, it could lead to an outbreak of hostilities across that border, something that we don't want to see either. I mean, just to make sure I'm understanding correctly, you're saying basically that the U.S. wants this Israeli military temporarily? So, look, as I said, we want to see the 1974 disengagement agreement upheld, and that includes the terms of the buffer zone, which includes Israel withdrawing. Just on that, did Israel give you a heads up before doing that? We have been consulting with them about the situation. I'm not going to speak to the content of those. Right, so did they describe what temporary would look like, would be six months, one year, or three years? I'm not going to get into those diplomatic conversations. Okay. Going back to U.S. engagement with some of these Syrian rebel groups, yesterday, a senior administration official talking to reporters said the U.S. was in touch with some of them. Can you explain which one? And given that HDS is designated under the bounty on Jolani's head, is that a 100% impediment for you guys to even indirectly engage with them or not really? So as a legal matter, no, it is not. We do have the ability to engage with organizations that have been designated. You might remember that the previous administration engaged with the Taliban while it was a designated terrorist organization and struck an agreement to withdraw from Afghanistan with the Taliban while the Taliban was a designated terrorist organization. So we do have the ability, when it is in our interest, legally to communicate with a designated terrorist organization. There are things you can't do under the law, but talking with people is not one of them. When it comes to engagement with groups on the ground in Syria, so we have a number of ways of communicating, sometimes directly with various groups, sometimes with intermediaries, either inside Syria or outside Syria. We have been engaging in those conversations over the past few days. The Secretary himself has been engaged in conversations with countries that have influence inside Syria and will continue to do that, but I'm not going to get into the details of those conversations. I will say that there are a couple of key points that we are emphasizing in all of those conversations. One is that we want to see de-escalation moving forward. We don't want to see any organization take advantage of this situation to try and improve their own position, to try and improve their own standing inside Syria. We want to see ultimately a political reconciliation and a political path forward that answers the interests of the Syrian people, not the narrow interests of any one of the various organizations that are active militarily inside Syria. Is the U.S. government trying to engage with Jallam himself? I'm going to make it a rule while we are in this period of somewhat uncertainty to not try to read out all the conversations that we have one by one with various actors inside Syria, but I can tell you that we believe we have the ability to communicate one way or the other, directly or indirectly, with all the relevant parties, and we will make clear the interests that I just outlined both in the top of my remarks and in response to your previous question. We will be making clear that those are the interests of the United States and what we believe are the interests of the Syrian people that we want to see. I have one final broad thing. Over the last four years, we didn't hear a whole lot about Syria from this podium or in briefings. This is clearly an issue that was on the back burner. I'm sure you're going to disagree with the premise of this question, but that is simply a fact based on observation and our experience here. Do you feel that that's undercutting your efforts right now? How much of an influence do you think you have in the waning days of your administration? First of all, let me say most of what I talk about from this podium is not my choice. It's yours. I get up here and I respond to the questions from the reporters in this room. I don't think it's fair to judge my lack of responding to the questions about Syria as an indication of the work that has been going on inside the department and inside the administration. I will tell you that, of course, you will see a lot of the public work around matters that become new flashpoints, matters that require serious political engagement from the senior leaders of this department. But the Syria policy that was developed during the latter stages of the Obama administration, to go back to the point that Matt started his briefing with, that has largely carried through to this day. Ultimately, I would say has led to the situation we're in today. I would combine that with the policies this administration has pursued to weaken Bashar Assad's main backers, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, which is itself backed by Iran. It is the sanctions that we impose on the Syrian regime that weaken the Syrian regime. It is the international coalition that we marshal to hold Assad accountable. Then, the fact that when Assad found himself at a moment of weakness in the past 10 days, the fact that his biggest backers had been weakened by diplomatic and military efforts supported by the United States, that had a role in what happened, too. It had a major role in what happened, too. I would say, despite the oftentimes lack of public conversation about Syria in this briefing room or elsewhere in the United States government, when you look at the policies that we have pursued to take on Iran and to take on Russia, and you combine them with Assad's lack of any meaningful political engagement with his own people, that's what got us to where we are today. Maybe we can have a whole separate Syria briefing now that we're at that point. Sounds like we are. We can have it back and forth, but I'm going to let that rest. Yeah. It never doesn't do. In fact, the guy who the president-elect has nominated to take over the building introduced a bill just a little over a year ago that would require this. Fair. I take it back. An organization... Now, they are a SDGT, but there are different SDGs that require them to do that. So, you're right. Not an FTO, an SDGT. I often get that distinction wrong. That said, the rule about engagement, the ability to have conversation is the same for both of those SDGs. Can you check that? So, I just don't think it's productive for me to do that today. We want to have conversations with the key groups inside Syria, either directly or indirectly. It's obvious that HDS is one of them. We want to make clear to them the same points that you have heard the president make publicly. We also want to engage with any organization that might have information about the whereabouts of Austin Tice, so we can try and bring Austin home. But I'm just not going to get into the details. I wanted to follow up on Tice. Why wouldn't Parsons go to Beirut now that the borders are wide open and people are flowing in? It would seem that he could go right to the U.S. and engage with people in Beirut. He's in Beirut. We all misspeak sometimes. Why wouldn't he go across the border into Damascus? I'm not going to talk about what travels Roger may or may not make in the coming days. He's in Beirut today. He's working to get Austin Tice out, and I'll leave it at that for today. He went in 2020, and he met with the Syrians, and from what we understand, there was no proof of life offered. Can you say whether or not there has been any kind of proof of life since that 2012 video? I think where I'll leave it, where it's appropriate for me to leave it, and I should back up and say that this is a matter that we discussed directly with Austin's family. The Secretary talked to Austin's family on Friday. We believe, we assess that he is alive, and we are working to try and get him home. I think the details that lead us to that conclusion, they did say on Friday that they have new information that he's alive and being treated well. Is there anything new, as far as you understand it? I'm just going to leave it with my previous answer, which is we have reason to believe that he is alive. We are working to bring him home, and when it comes to the details that lead us to believe that, we ought to keep those discussions private with his family. Are there any circumstances in which the U.S. would send a team in, regardless of American detainees, to assist with helping any of the prisoners come out of the cells? Is there a scenario where the U.S. would help that? I just don't want to get into hypotheticals. Obviously, we want to see those who have been unjustly detained, not just Austin Tice, but Syrians who have been unjustly detained for their political views. It is important that they be released, but I don't want to get into hypotheticals about what, if any, assistance the U.S. might offer at this stage. And one on Israel, there have been reports that they have been striking suspected chemical weapons, like guns, against the U.S. Look, we believe it is important that the chemical weapons stockpiles that we know the Assad regime was maintaining be locked down and that they be destroyed. And we will continue to work with our partners in the region to that effect, and we will continue to make clear to the incoming government, the incoming regime, that that is important. Now, look, we have seen the public statements from HDS that they do not want to use chemical weapons. They have no interest in using chemical weapons. That's a productive statement. But we want to see those chemical weapons stockpiles secured, and we want to see them all be destroyed. Why don't we stay on Syria now? Tom, go ahead. We didn't directly see the fall of Assad, but we certainly saw that his regime was incredibly weak. We saw, look, this is what I said a minute ago. We have been very clear going back to 2014 that the path forward was through the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254. And the most relevant portion of that Security Council Resolution for this question is for Assad to do something to engage with his own public, his own people about a political path forward. And we saw him do nothing. We saw him not only do nothing, but he continued to brutally oppress his people. And so when you have a dictator who engages in that type of behavior, their regime is going to be weak. It's going to be brittle. And that's true not just for Assad. It is true for other authoritarian regimes around the world. And so you take that and you combine it with the weakening of Russia's military capabilities and the weakening of Iran's military capabilities and Hezbollah's military capabilities, ultimately, which we played a part in, that gets you to where we are today. Now, it's not to say we foresaw the launch of an offensive 10 or so days ago, but we certainly saw how weak the Assad regime was. And I will note, it was about a year or so ago that we had a conversation in here about other countries in the region readmitting Syria to the Arab League. And what you heard me say at the time, the position of the United States is Assad has done none of the things that the international community collectively asked him to do. And every country has to make their own decisions about how to respond to that refusal on his part. But we, the United States, decided that we were not ready to restore relations with them as usual. We were not ready to lift the sanctions on him. We were not ready to lift the pressure on him because we had seen him take none of those steps. And I think it's the combination of his refusal to engage with his own public and the pressure that we and other countries around the world put on him that ultimately got us to where we are today. I mean, I ask the question... Sorry for the long windedness. No, no, no. But I ask the question because there has been, you hinted at it, there are a lot of the US administration in the last 24 hours were taking the credit for foreign policy decisions that in part created the conditions for this to happen, for example with the case of Iran and Russia. And therefore, there's a sort of, if you break it, you own it part of the foreign policy element, which is what now has been your planning for this eventuality and therefore what leverage do you have, what influence do you have on the players now that are in control of the United States? What can you say now that will influence them to do this kind of thing that they're doing? So, I don't want to totally reject the premise of the question, Tom, because I do respect the question, but I do think that at a time like this, that really is the wrong way to look at the question. It is not a question of what leverage or influence the United States has, because ultimately this is a process that needs to be led by Syrians, not by the United States, not by any other country in the region. And so what we can do is make clear that we will support the Syrian people on this path towards a better future. We're going to protect our own interests while we do that. We're going to make sure that ISIS doesn't re-emerge. But it is not for the United States to try to use its influence or leverage to dictate any path forward for them. We want to see them make those decisions on their own. Now, we're going to be clear in engaging with all of the relevant parties inside Syria and elsewhere in the region that there are a few core fundamental principles that we want to see respected as that moves forward. But ultimately, these are decisions for the Syrian people to make, not for us. I'm just thinking, if you're HTS and you're thinking about the way ahead, and really there is a direction you want them to take and one you don't want them to take, and so I'm asking about what you can do. Yeah, fair question. Look, fair question. So there are sanctions that the United States has imposed on Syria. There are various forms of diplomatic relations that we hold with countries and that we suspend with others. All of those things are the tools that the United States has in its toolbox when it comes to responding to the situation. So when I say that we will judge HTS by their actions and we will respond through our own policies, that is the kind of thing that I am talking about when I make that first statement, when the Secretary and the President make their first statements. And just finally on that point, I mean, the Syrian people who do just utter brutality and put them under Assad and under ravages for several years now, when they – I ask the question about what trust they should have in the U.S. when it comes to this, because the moderate opposition groups that they desperately wanted more U.S. support for years, there was funding programs, there was oil, there was the chemical weapons being used by Assad, and people wanted to see American planes in the sky at some point during that, but didn't see them. They wanted air defenses against Russia's bombardment of Aleppo and hospitals and homes in parts of Syria. And there are people who feel abandoned by the U.S. dignity when it comes to their aid at that point. So what can you say now to sort of – Let me say that first of all, we stand with the Syrian people and we have always stood with the Syrian people and stood against the brutal tyranny of Bashar Assad. Now, we have to make difficult decisions when it comes to direct military intervention, because we know that oftentimes the consequences of direct U.S. military intervention, either in the short term or the long term, outweigh the benefits that that intervention can provide. And so those are the kinds of difficult decisions that we have to make. I know I stand in this room all the time and ask very hard questions about the result of U.S. supplying weapons to parties in the Middle East. So they are difficult decisions that we have to make. But I will say, we have always stood by the Syrian people and we have taken actions to hold Assad accountable and to put pressure on the regime. And it is those actions, in combination with some of the other factors I've gone through today, that ultimately led to the events of the past 48, 72 hours. I have a follow-up and a second question. Is this a timeframe that you want to give Ahmad al-Sharia and Joulani, the former prime minister of the regime, in securing the central bank, doing certain things for the people of Syria? Because if we're talking about weeks or months, that will take us to the next administration. So I can't give you a timeframe today. I do think we all to take a beat and just recognize that we are not even 48 hours now since the Assad regime fell. So we are in the very early days of seeing what's going to happen next and seeing what actions are taken by HTS and other parties inside Syria. So we're going to make ongoing assessments based on their actions, and we will respond based on those actions. But I can't give you any kind of timetable for how that will work. The President said yesterday that the Assad regime or Assad himself should be held accountable. Will you support his application to stand in front of the ICC as a war criminal for committed crimes against humanity? So we support the work of the ICC. I know that obviously we have disagreed with their... Hold on. Let me address that. You support the work of the ICC until they do something about it. So we have had a lot... Let me just answer the question. Matt, let me answer the question because I was addressing that before you interrupted me. We obviously have had a jurisdictional dispute with them as it relates to cases against Israel. That is a longstanding jurisdictional dispute. But that said, we have also made clear that we support broadly their work and we have supported their work in other cases despite our jurisdictional dispute when it comes to Israel. But that said, when it comes to Assad, I suspect that before you ever get to the ICC, the people of Syria are probably going to want him to return home and stand judgment for his crimes in Syria. He's not going to return home. Only the Russians... I doubt that he's going to... I mean, if he's not going to return home from Russia, I doubt he's going to transfer himself My point being, should he ever decide he's willing to face accountability or should the Russians decide that they don't want to continue to harbor a war criminal, there may be a whole range of people in line to hold him accountable for his actions. Okay. I'm going to ask you about the Cesar Act, but do you think that the U.S. is undermining the trust of the international community in organizations like the ICC and ICJ by making an exception for Israel when trying to convince us that Assad and the like of Assad should be brought in front of the international community? So again, I think it takes too narrow a view of the ways in which he could be held accountable for his crimes by just focusing on the ICC. Because I do suspect that whatever comes out of the wake of the past 48 hours, you will see a demand by the Syrian people that he return to Syria and face justice for his crimes. And that would be the court of first jurisdiction before you even get to the ICC. So that's true. But when it comes to the overall question, I know we have a disagreement with other countries around the world, but this has been a longstanding good faith disagreement about where the ICC has jurisdiction and where it does not, based on the fact that there is no recognized Palestinian state. But that was the norm, because that's what happened with Rwanda. This is what happened with YPG. Final question, the Cesar Act sanctions is going to expire in December 28th, I believe. Do you think that it should be expired now that the regime is no longer there? I don't have any announcement on that Act today. We're going to continue to watch what happens and make our decisions. Syria? Yes. Go ahead. Can you talk about the U.S. alliance with Kurdish forces in Syria? How does the U.S. support for the SDF look like after the fall of the Assad regime? There has been no change in our posture with respect to support for the SDF. They continue to be a vital partner in the fight against ISIS, and they will continue to be so. How about the U.S. military troops deployed in Iraq? Is that the interest that there's no change? So there has been no change with respect to anything forward-looking. I'll defer to my colleagues at the Pentagon for that question. I'm not asking you to give a prediction or not, but has anyone checked in on the status of the embassy? Oh, yeah. So a couple of things with respect to that question. The checks are, or maybe were, still our protecting power, but the checks have left their embassy in Damascus. So there's... Protecting power. Supporting protecting power. Yeah, that is beyond my graph, unfortunately. That said, we have taken steps to secure our embassy, and we believe that our embassy, which, of course, we're not staffing at the time, but that our embassy is still secure. Well, what's that? I don't think I should... It's a security matter, so I don't think I should get into it from here, but obviously... Are there U.S.? No, there are no U.S. personnel. There are no U.S. forces there, but we are at times able to engage with local parties to maintain the security of our embassy, make sure that it is not breached, and we have taken those steps. On Syria, on Manbij, how do you view the fights between SDF and SMA, and are you coordinating between the SDF and Turkey to escort SDF militants from Manbij? So, our stance on this, with all the relevant parties, has been clear, that we don't want to see an escalation. We don't want to see anyone take advantage of this period of instability to try and further their own position inside Syria. We are making that clear to all of the concerned parties in the region. When you look at the important work that the SDF does to prosecute the fight against ISIS, to secure prisons where ISIS fighters are held, we don't want to see them distracted from that important duty in any way possible. So, we'll continue to make that clear to the relevant parties in the region. The SDF militants are besieged in Manbij. Are you working on this to escort them to take them out? I don't have anything to announce from here beyond what I just said. Another one, were the HDS able to control whole Syria in seven days without any international support? Who supported them? Well, the United States wasn't supporting them, and I think a lot of other countries were as well. And finally, on Iran, to what extent are you confirmed that Iran, after losing Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria, will move forward to cap the nuclear bomb? So, look, that is obviously an issue that we have been concerned about for some time and something that we have been watching for some time, something that we coordinate with our allies and partners. And without making an assessment, I will just repeat what we have always made clear, which is that President Biden will not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Period. Full stop. Thank you. A follow-up question? Yes. On Russia and on this topic, the government, you know, granting access to Assad, is it legal? Does he have a case here, do you think? If Russia refuses to hand him over, does it make Russia complicit? So, I think Russia is already complicit in Assad's crimes against the Syrian people. I don't think you need any more, any further actions by Russia to prove their complicity. And then with respect to the question of international law, I'm just not qualified to comment on that. And back to Tom's question, you mentioned that you guys are taking credit for your own past decisions on this. Ukraine, of course, has done a second dimension on Ukraine fighting back against Russia and that did actually contribute to this victory. Does that further signify support for Ukraine? In the long space, do you think? So, I can't speak for years ahead, obviously. I'm the spokesperson for an administration that will be in office for a little over one month. I can tell you that as long as President Biden is in office, we will continue to support Ukraine. And I would point to the broad support for Ukraine in the United States Congress and among the American public. But, of course, I can't speak to the decisions of the next administration. Thank you. Bye. I move on to Gaza. The rest of the room might get angry again, but it's fine with me. Is the bounty on his head still operative? If somebody were to turn him today, he would have to pay me? I would have to take that back. It's just a factual question. I don't know the answer to it. I'll move on to Gaza. Underwater, we issued a situation report, report number 150, that really shows a very abysmal situation that happened. It was updated between November 25th and the 30th of December. I was wondering, what is the aid situation? What has changed since the 12th of November when the United States said that Israel was allowing some aid in? Can you update us on figures and time and so on? What is happening with aid to Gaza? With respect to actual figures, I'll have to go back and take that back and get you. But I can speak to the broad pattern. After the Secretary and Secretary Austin sent that letter, we did see Israel take a number of steps now. The actual delivery of aid inside Gaza continues to be incredibly challenging because of the security situation there. The primary impediment continues to be the looting of convoys that try to deliver the aid that makes it to Gaza, actually to that last mile so it can be distributed to people. It seems to be something that we work on with our United Nations partners and with the government of Israel. So can you update us on what effort have you taken to ensure that whatever level you want to see going into Gaza, what measures have you taken in the last week, last two weeks, last three weeks? So I can tell you that Secretary Blinken met with the Foreign Minister of Israel in Malta on Thursday of last week and made very clear to him that though Israel has taken important steps to improve the humanitarian situation, they continue to need to do more. We want to see more provision of aid to the Palestinian people and we want to see that aid get distributed everywhere inside Gaza. Let me ask you a couple more questions. On UNRWA, is there any likelihood that this President, before he departs, could take any kind of emergency measure to say we need to use aid to UNRWA? So we don't have the ability under the law to do that. I think, as you know, the Congress barred the provision of humanitarian assistance to UNRWA and we are bound by that law. It extends until March 25th of next year, which is, of course, past the President's time in office. But I will say that despite that ban on funding to UNRWA, the United States is programming nearly $1.2 billion in humanitarian assistance to assist Palestinian refugees and others in Gaza, West Bank, and neighboring countries through other UN organizations. And a couple more questions. A U.S. Senator, Senator Tom Cotton, introduced a bill last week to ban the use of the term West Bank in regards to Judea and Samaria. Do you have any comment on that? I don't have any comment on the legislation, but we will continue to refer to the West Bank as the West Bank because that's what it is. Now, finally, I know that you spoke last week with the Danes about the amnesty and you refused to acknowledge that what Israel is doing is basically genocide in Gaza. You're saying that it does not rise to the level of genocide. I don't know what is the definition, what is the threshold for destruction and killing and so on that would qualify for genocide. But when you bring your attention to a historian, an Israeli historian, has documented, I mean voluminous, voluminous documents and so on, that basically says that Israel had the intent and carried out those genocides. So we've, yeah, we have seen that report. As you know, we have not concurred with past findings regarding genocide and we don't, again, with this report. We do remain deeply concerned by the reports of civilian harm in this topic and we continue to emphasize that all parties must comply with international law. Regarding the Israel strikes on Damascus, you mentioned the importance of destroying chemical weapons, but is the U.S. certain that Israel is actually targeting the chemical weapons? I don't have... Because, you know, there were some reports saying that Israel, you know, in the buildings Israel targeted in Damascus was Assad's intelligence office. Is the U.S. aware of this? I don't have any assessment of their strikes. And one more on this, regional countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Qatar condemned Israel's seizure of the Golden Heights. Actually, you know, we just had a fragile ceasefire agreement recently in Lebanon. And are you, you know, are you not concerned about Israel's actions like occupation of the Golden Heights and recent attacks on Damascus, which regional countries are also perceived as a terrorist group? So I already spoke to the situation on the board. I don't have any further comment on that. But of course, if you look at what we are trying to achieve here, we are trying to achieve de-escalation and stability. I know, but I'm just saying, ultimately we believe it is in the interest of all the countries in the region, including Israel, that you have stability in Syria, stability in Lebanon that will help reduce stability in the broader region. And that is what we are trying to accomplish and what we try to encourage all these parties to do when discussing their actions. On Manbij and also SDF. As you mentioned that the SDF is a vital partner in fighting against ISIS. These partners, the U.S. partners in the region, are distracted because of the Syrian National Army attacks in Manbij and Kobani, even as we are seeking the reports about attacks in Qamishlo. So have you tried to reach Turkey as they are backing these groups to stop these attacks on SDF in the region? We have discussed this with Turkey and with a number of other countries in the region and we have made clear what you heard me say in response to your previous question, which is that we want to see de-escalation. We don't want to see any party trying to take advantage of the situation. And there are a number of U.S. senators, including Senator Chris Van Holm and also Senator Lindsey Graham, they said that the U.S. should not guard down and also... Should not what? Guard down, they should not rest. Oh, yeah. They should support the Kurds in fighting against ISIS and also protect them from the attacks from other groups. So are you calling to stop these attacks from the Syrian National Army? As I just said, we want to see a de-escalation in Qamishlo. You've got to sit closer. I've never seen you so far back. I couldn't find you back there. Just to follow up on Humayra's question, because I want to... Usually I don't like to do that, but I want to argue with something when you are trying to take a little bit of credit regarding what happened in Syria. I mean, for four years, before the Secretary, before he becomes the Secretary of State, he said you will address this crisis when you are back in power. But the thing is, for four years, nothing changed. And also two weeks ago, you were a little bit open to engage again with Assad. We know that there was negotiations. Some regional partners reached out to you to maybe ease the sanctions. Nothing led to that. But when you say that your policies led to this moment, is it actually true? First of all, it a little bit puts words in my mouth to say that's what I claim. I said our policies, in combination with decisions by Assad himself not to engage in the political process that was outlined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, that's the primary driver of all this, the dissatisfaction of the Syrian public, which is driven by Assad's actions. But that said, absolutely, the international pressure that the United States put on Assad and, critically, the weakening of his biggest backers, which we were the primary, in many cases, force behind, also had an impact. So yes, of course, it did play a role. Okay. No, I want to follow up. I feel like I forgot part of the question, but maybe not. The second question is, yesterday in a briefing, a Syrian officer said that Assad asked Hezbollah for help, for support in Syria, and they didn't step up. In your assessment, they didn't step up because they were degraded or because the Iranians didn't want them? It's probably a combination of both. Primarily, they were degraded. If you look at what's happened to Hezbollah's military capability over the past three months, they have been significantly degraded from where they were before Israel launched full-scale military operations against them. And so they didn't have the capabilities to come to Assad's defense as they had in previous years. And regarding the negotiations or U.S.-involved visit to Beirut now, we know from your past engagements in Lebanon that Abbas Ibrahim was the one, the figure who led the negotiations with the Syrian regime, the former Syrian regime. So who are you talking to in Lebanon now? I am not going to read out specific conversations. As I said, we have the ability to communicate with any number of people in the region. That's what our officials who are there on the ground have been doing over the past few days. That's what we, for those of us here, have been doing by phone. And we'll continue to do it, but with rare exceptions. I'm just not going to read out specific conversations. And one final question. Is it safe to say today that we are going out of this room and we don't rule out that you are engaging with HDS in Syria currently? I'm not ruling anything in or out either way. Thank you, Matt. The implications on South Korea and the U.S., the impeachment vote against South Korea basically failed. As an ally, how does the United States view the state of confusion caused by the House-controlled impeachment and the abuse of certain political parties in South Korea? I'm certainly not going to comment on political parties inside South Korea. What we want to see and what we have been pleased to see over the past few days is the democratic resilience of the Republic of Korea during a period of testing and uncertainty. And what we expect going forward is that political disagreements continue to be resolved peacefully and in accordance with the rule of law. Will this chaotic situation in South Korea affect official meetings or events between the U.S. and South Korea? The alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea remains ironclad. We are committed to the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and we will continue to do so. The high-level consultation meeting between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan held in Tokyo for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Do you have anything, or also, on the U.S.-South Korea nuclear consultation to do? The meeting was canceled. Will it be held again before Biden's administration leaves? I don't have anything to say with regards to the rescheduling of that meeting. I can tell you that when it comes to the trilateral meetings between our three countries, something that we thought was important to establish, Assistant Secretary Christian Brink is in Tokyo now, or is in there now or will be there tomorrow, to hold meetings with his counterparts from the Republic of Korea and Japan. We believe the strengthening of that trilateral alliance has been an important engagement under this administration and we will continue to pursue it during our final days in office. Overall, what is the current U.S. view of HBS? Is Syria now a terrorist state? HBS continues to be a designated terrorist organization by the United States, but as the President said, we are going to judge them by their actions moving forward. But is Syria a terrorist? Syria is very much a state in a period of transition right now and I think it would behoove all of us not to be hasty in pronouncing judgments during an unstable time. And do we have any update on the U.S. state tables that were sent? I do not. And then, has the administration urged the Ukrainian government to expand its North-Right ground support? So we have had conversations with the government of Ukraine about the security situation it faces in the East. You heard the Secretary speak to this somewhat when we were in Brussels last week. Ultimately, the decisions about the composition of its military forces, those are decisions that the Ukrainians have to make for themselves. What we have made clear is that if they produce additional forces to join the fight, we and our allies would be ready to acquit those forces and train those forces to enter battle. Thank you. Next question. I'm clear in the back. The U.S. has continued to express support and solidarity with Korean people, not specifically the ROK government. Do you have any message for the Korean public who, despite impeachment votes being blocked by a boycott of the ruling party, are still calling for President Yun's immediate departure to uphold democracy and rule of law? And in addition to that, who do you regard the counterpart in the ROK as to President Biden? Because President Yun, who is remaining in power despite his illicit act of declaring martial law, is now under prosecution and travel ban. So, first of all, when it comes to our relationship with the Korean people, we stand shoulder to shoulder with the Korean people. And that is, of course, most true in times of testing and uncertainty, as we have seen over the past week. But what we believe is important, and what we have seen over the past week, is the democratic resilience of Korea. Democratic resilience that was hard won over a period of several decades. So, we will keep lines of communication open with all relevant parties in the Republic of Korea. The legal process and the political process should play out there, consistent with the rule of law. President Yun is the President of Korea. And the political process in Korea will play out as it should under Korea's laws and Korea's constitution. But we can assume that President Biden will probably not directly engage President Yun I don't have any engagements by the President to announce. I never do that from here anyway. It's a matter for the White House to do. Christians in Syria, other religious minorities there, with HTS now in control, how will their religious freedom be monitored by the U.S.? Well, this goes to exactly what I was speaking of when I said we're going to judge HTS by its actions, as we will judge every group inside Syria by their actions. And one of the foremost things that we want to see protected in Syria are the rights of religious and ethnic minorities. If I may ask another. The head of the Latin Church in Syria, the apostolic vicar there in Aleppo, is calling for the lifting of economic sanctions on Syria saying, quote, they have devastated ordinary people, end quote. Your reaction? So, I spoke to sanctions a number of times over the brief. I don't have anything to do with it. On a separate subject, on the solemnity of the Immaculate Conception, we have Pope Francis urging for a ceasefire on all war fronts across the globe by Christmas. Does the State Department support that urging? So, there are a number of conflicts where we are trying to get a ceasefire. The conflict in Gaza, the conflict in Sudan. But when you look at, say, for example, the war between Russia and Ukraine, that's ultimately a decision for Ukraine to make. Ukraine has the right to defend itself. I don't think you're going to see Russia heed the Pope's calls and unilaterally disarm. So, as long as Ukraine is under attack, they will continue to support their right to defend themselves. But, of course, speaking broadly, of course we want to see the end to conflict. We want to see conflict resolved. That doesn't mean, in every case, an immediate ceasefire. It would cause parties to give up their duly held rights. But we do want to see wars resolved and peace brought to the world. Thanks very much. Thank you.